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ABSTRACT
The thesis is a comparative study of economic and political developments in Central Asia 
since 1992. The post-Soviet period has been one of considerable economic and political 
change throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It was also one of 
extreme macroeconomic instability— all the countries in the region suffered severe col­
lapses in output and prolonged hyperinflation during the 1990s. Many economists argued 
that rapid, radical economic reform was integral to regaining macroeconomic stability in 
the transition countries, but comparative study of the Central Asian economies counters 
this theory: reform had no influence on either output or inflation performance in the 
region. Instead, output decline and subsequent recovery were dependent on factors rooted 
in the region’s history and geography: each republic’s degree of reliance on Soviet trade 
links, and consequently its export structure and overall economic structure; its transport 
links with the rest of the world; and, in Tajikistan, civil war. Similarly, inflation was not 
dependent on reform. Control of inflation depended in the first instance on each republic’s 
ability to restrain deficits, and in the second instance on its ability to finance government 
deficits without recourse to printing money. The thesis finds no link between rapid eco­
nomic reform and the reduction of deficits in the Central Asian context, rendering a direct 
connection between the speed of economic reform and control of inflation highly doubt­
ful. The thesis also finds that political practice in the region has barely changed in the 
post-Soviet period. The republics remain far from democratic, and this lack of political 
reform has influenced aspects of economic reform. Socioeconomic conditions have 
deteriorated in all the republics, irrespective of reform strategy, contradicting the justifica­
tions, made by some of the region’s leaders, for slow reform.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction: economic transition in C entral A sia
The 1990s were a period of immense political and economic flux in all the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This was a period of change, or transition, 
in which these countries shifted away from Soviet economic and political systems to 
new systems, frequently based on notions of democracy and capitalism. This thesis 
focuses on economic and political developments in the Central Asian republics of the 
former Soviet Union—Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan—since the early 1990s. It has two main objectives: to assess 
macroeconomic developments in the region in the post-Soviet period and relate them to 
theoretical understandings of transition, and to assess how economic and political 
change has affected people in the region. On the first objective, the thesis posits that 
there are many reasons why Central Asia is different from other transition economies in 
terms of economic history and structure, geographical location, and political 
developments, and that these characteristics are important in determining the Central 
Asian republics’ economic performance in the post-Soviet period. This contrasts with 
much of current economic theory, which assigns a prominent, even determining, role to 
the economic approach in explaining economic performance in the transition 
economies. The second, and possibly more important, objective is to ask the simple 
question: are Central Asians better off as a result of the transition? To answer this 
question, the thesis goes beyond purely macroeconomic developments and looks at the 
political situation as well as socio-economic change in the post-Soviet period.
1.1.1 The theory
The transition, as it came to be known, was a source of considerable debate among 
economists during the 1990s, and essentially became something of a battlefield for 
competing economic theories at this time. The debate was not so much about what 
economic steps were necessary; most economists could agree on the basic facets of a 
reform program—namely, macroeconomic stabilisation, liberalisation and institutional 
change. Where disagreement arose most was on the correct speed of reforms and the 
correct emphasis of the reform approach. There was in this respect a strong divide 
between economists who advocated rapid, ‘big-bang’ reforms and those who advocated 
a slower, more cautious approach. Similarly, rapid-reform advocates tended to place an 
emphasis on quickly privatising state-owned enterprises, whereas ‘gradualists’ stressed 
the importance of economic stability and institutional development.
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The transition period was characterised by extraordinary macroeconomic instability 
in most of the economies in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, particularly in 
terms of GDP declines and inflation. Again, economists advanced theories explaining 
the inflation and the GDP contractions in transition economies, typically to bolster their 
arguments regarding the correct reform approach. Furthermore, economists have used 
indicators of macroeconomic stability as a measure of success in transition. Thus, those 
countries that managed to bring down inflation rapidly and limit the output decline are 
seen as having a successful transition.
The Central Asian economies represent an interesting comparative study in this 
regard because they share similar geographic constraints and roughly similar starting 
points, but have adopted very different reform approaches. Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan 
have adopted the most radical reform approaches in the region, rapidly liberalising 
prices, trade, and exchange rates, and quickly privatising state enterprises. Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan represent the opposite approach, only gradually lifting price controls 
and trade restrictions. They have also been far slower to privatise state assets. Tajikistan 
represents the intermediate case— a fairly ambitious reform program was drawn up but 
its implementation was delayed until the conclusion of the civil war there in 1997.
In Central Asia, the results of reform have been far from those expected. Reform 
there is not associated with better output performance in transition, nor is it very well 
associated with good inflation outcomes. Instead, factors specific to each country 
determined economic performance in the post-Soviet period, and these factors are were 
largely based in constraints exogenous to the policy process.
The key to understanding these constraints lies in Central Asia’s economic history 
and its current geography. In the course of the last three centuries, the region has 
increasingly become an adjunct to Russian and later the Soviet economies. This has a 
bearing on the post-Soviet experience, because developments in these earlier periods 
propelled the Central Asian economies to a very peculiar structure by the time the 
republics gained their independence. In this respect, by independence, the Central Asian 
economies were cut off from influences outside the Soviet Union, strongly concentrated 
on raw materials production augmented by a Soviet subsidised manufacturing industry, 
heavily reliant on the Union for foodstuffs, capital, investment and social-sector spending. 
The republics, particularly Turkmenistan and Tajikistan remain severely constrained by 
geographic factors. Transport in particular has been, and remains, a major difficulty for 
them, and an important reason underlying their transition performance.
There has been even less change politically than economically. While all of the 
republics have adopted constitutions providing for democratic political systems, in 
practice the democratic process in Central Asia is mere formality. Political competition 
is everywhere circumscribed, elections are neither free nor fair, critical media are 
effectively silenced, and no judiciary in the region is independent. This has retarded 
progress in institutional reform, the facet of reform in which Central Asia as a whole 
lags the rest of the transition countries. At the same time, economic change and growth 
in the region may itself be influencing the course of political and institutional reform.
Looking at socio-economic developments we can see that reform approach has had 
little influence on results. While the slower reformers have sought to justify their
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approach as a way of avoiding unnecessary economic and social dislocation, their 
claims are not borne out by reality. Irrespective of reform approach, education and 
health care funding has decreased throughout the region. This, moreover, has been 
accompanied by increases in both poverty and inequality, which are in some cases most 
severe in the region’s slower reformers.
1.1.2 The human perspective
The other aim of the thesis is to ask the simple question: are the people of Central Asia 
better off than they were under the Soviet system? Has life in Central Asia improved in 
transition? These are essentially unanswerable questions because they depend obviously 
on individual personal situations and preferences. Some aggregated insight can, 
however, be gained by looking not only at the standard macroeconomic figures, but also 
socio-economic figures and political developments.
Politically, little has changed in the post-Soviet period. While there are substantial 
differences between the republics, none has become a democracy. As noted above, 
aspects of democratisation, such as elections, political contestation, rule of law and 
freedom of the media, have either not improved or have deteriorated precipitously in the 
Central Asian republics in the last decade. At the same time, economic activity decreased 
considerably and inflation reached massive levels. Together, these developments imply 
severe economic dislocation and change. In short, the Central Asian republics and their 
populations experienced economic chaos. The consequences of this chaos are most 
likely to felt in deteriorating conditions in the socio-economic sphere, where GDP 
contractions, inflation, and the withdrawal of Soviet subsidies have prompted decreased 
funding of social services, such as education and health care, and worsening poverty and 
inequality. These directly bear on people’s standard of living. Thus, we are entitled to 
ask what the true overall impacts of transition have been for the ordinary person.
1.2 A NOTE ON STATISTICAL SOURCES
Statistics are critical to a thesis of this kind. Unfortunately, the quality and availability 
of statistical information for the region are not high, and as a result I have been 
compelled to use heterogenous unconventional sources of information, subject, of 
course, to critical scrutiny. This is especially problematic with respect to official data on 
Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, which are increasingly not trusted and 
not available. Where appropriate, I have used CIS statistical sources to complement and 
extend those provided by international agencies.
1.3 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CENTRAL ASIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
This chapter seeks to provide a short overview of economic patterns over the course of 
Central Asia’s recent history. From the beginning of Russian penetration of the region in 
the late eighteenth century until the Central Asian republics became independent at the 
end of 1991, change largely proceeded in the same direction—traditional patterns 
collapsed and production became more specialised. The Central Asian economies, as a 
consequence, became increasingly dependent on Russia, less self-sufficient and less 
connected with the world outside the Russian, and later the Soviet, empires.
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The chapter argues that these developments occurred on the eve of Russian conquest, 
under Russian imperial rule, and under Soviet rule. It then discusses Soviet stagnation 
and collapse in the Central Asian context, and concludes by analysing the structure of 
the Central Asian economies at independence. It argues that there are grounds for 
treating them as different to most of the other transition economies, on the basis of such 
factors as geography, economic structure and resource endowments.
1.4 P re-Soviet economic patterns
1.4.1 Nomadic steppe versus irrigation-based economies
Central Asia cannot be viewed as a single cohesive economic space prior to the Soviet- 
period induced modernisation that began in the 1930s. Economic production before and 
even during the expansion of the Russian empire into Central Asia can be roughly divided 
into two major modes. Large tracts of land and population, in the deserts, steppe lands 
and mountain pastures, were devoted predominantly to nomadic pastoral production.1 
This contrasted with the oasis cities such as Samarkand and Bukhara, and regions such 
as the Ferghana valley, where activities centred to a much greater degree on sedentary 
cultivation and herding based on river irrigation (Christian 1998; Pierce 1960).
1.4.2 Nomadic pastoralism
The nomads in the steppe and desert areas concentrated on rearing livestock for their 
own consumption and for trade. Arable farming, while not unknown, was not 
particularly widespread prior to the Russian conquest. Goods that the nomads could not 
produce themselves were acquired by trading with, or raiding, the sedentary societies 
and traders’ caravans with which these groups came into contact (Olcott 1987).
Production on this basis was necessarily extensive rather than intensive, with 
nomadic groups migrating sometimes long distances between summer and winter 
pastures or, in the mountain regions, between high-altitude summer pastures and 
warmer low-lying winter pastures. This production system was well suited to Central 
Asian climatic conditions in that it maximised the chances of accessing water and 
avoiding drought during the extreme heat of summer, and evading the extreme cold of 
winter (both in the mountains and on the steppe).
Inevitably little or no investment was made, for example, in enhancing soil quality or 
introducing irrigation systems, which without a major change in the production system 
would have had little value to nomads. While nomadic groups in Central Asia were 
predominantly involved in livestock herding, Emeljanenko (1994) points out that even 
the most strongly nomadic groups undertook some agricultural activity (see also di 
Cosmo 1994). She highlights that nomadism covers a spectrum ranging from complete 
nomadism through semi-nomadism to near-complete sedentarisation.
Land was not owned by individuals, rather it was held in common among a particular 
group, and, according to Pierce (1960:141), land tenure was dependent on a group’s 
capacity ‘to seize land and hold it against other groups’. This, however, understates the 
power hierarchy within the nomadic societies, which controlled disputes within the 
nomadic groups, and mobilised the group to fend off external threats and also seize the
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resources of other groups. Thus, it is important not to understate the social organisation 
of the region’s population. Complex social systems ordered the way groups behaved and 
determined their social status. These influences are strong and have persisted to the 
extent that they arguably still play a role in modern Kazak politics (see, for example, 
Masanov 2002).2
1.4.3 Oasis areas
Oasis areas had rather different social and economic systems. Economic activities there 
were more commonly based on irrigated agriculture. The major cities and other areas of 
extensive sedentary activity were mostly sited along the river systems that emptied out 
of the mountains into the desert and steppe lands. Primary among these, of course, were 
the Syr-darya and Amu-darya rivers and their major tributaries, such as the Zerafshan. 
Production in these areas was typically less specialised than among the nomadic groups; 
and, prior to the Russian conquest, production covered a range of goods such as fruit, 
grains and cotton, finished textile goods, and also to some extent livestock. These areas 
also had a role as major posts in the long-distance trade routes that crossed the Eurasian 
landmass. Thus, they contained large service sectors aimed at providing for traders and 
travellers, including caravanserai, markets, money-lenders and so forth. It appears that 
trade may have had a very strong influence on the economies of these centres; serious 
declines in trade through these towns seem to have had profound effects on economic 
well-being and political stability (Knoblauch 2001; Gafurov 1989). These towns were 
therefore reliant in the first place on the maintenance of their irrigation systems, and in 
the second place on flourishing trade.
The irrigated areas represented an economic sector which specialised in production 
of goods other than livestock and livestock-related items. There was some secondary- 
level production of goods to satisfy both domestic and external demand, and this was 
supplemented by trade with nomadic groups and long-distance traders.
It would be wrong to think, however, that these rather different systems existed 
independently of one another. The sedentary areas were effectively enveloped by deserts 
and steppe and/or mountains, and consequently by nomadic activities. Hence, the 
nomadic and sedentary societies can be considered to have been largely complementary 
(Matley 1994b). In fact, the nomadic groups were usually reliant on trade with their 
sedentary counterparts to supplement their own production (see Khazanov 1984, 2001; 
Black et al. 1991; Barfield 2001). Audrey Burton’s very thorough analysis of Bukhara’s 
trade patterns in the 16th and 17th centuries describes how Bukharan traders (ie. merchants 
from a largely sedentary area of Central Asia) bought ‘livestock, articles of hide and 
wool, furs, wooden objects and slaves’ (1997:432), and also items derived from wool 
and fur, from Kazakh nomads. In return, the Kazakhs bought from the Bukharan traders 
‘...grain, flour, silks, metal, ceramic and glass goods’ (1997:434), as well as other 
manufactured goods and military hardware. Similar types of goods were traded with 
other nomadic groups. Burton notes of one such group, the Noghays, that they ‘...relied 
on the khanate [Bukhara] for their supplies of clothing, cottons and other materials’ 
(1997:427). The trade between the nomadic groups of Central Asia and the sedentary 
centres with which they coexisted was, it seems, quite extensive.
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1.4.4 The Silk Roads and other long-distance trade
Long-distance trade was difficult and costly. The long distances separating the major 
Central Asian centres from each other and from other regions, and the relatively 
cumbersome means of transport available at the time, such as camel trains, meant that 
such trade took considerable time and was a huge undertaking. The risks inherent in this 
transport were also serious. Trade caravans could easily be attacked by bandits, nomadic 
groups might seek to extort taxes from passing traders, and there was of course no 
guarantee of finding a ready market at the trader’s destination. Consequently, trade that 
did take place across these distances— including on the so-called Silk Roads—necessarily 
involved mostly non-perishable goods that had a high value-weight ratio. Such items 
would have included ‘spices, dyes, porcelain and precious stones’ (Burton 1997:435), 
tea, livestock, lapis lazuli, animal products, carpets, paper, metal goods and even fruit 
(Burton 1997).
Ostensibly, the Central Asian economies lost their position as part of major world 
trading networks from the seventeenth century onwards as sea routes were developed from 
Western Europe to South and East Asia. Rossabi (1990) argues, however, that large trans­
continental trade has been subject to repeated intermittent declines caused by instability 
in the major polities through which the Silk Routes passed, and that periods of stability 
along the Silk Routes are marked by increased trade.3 Rossabi’s argument is that stability 
along the Silk Routes lessened the risks of long-distance trade to such an extent that the 
trade became viable. Instability, on the other hand, could increase these risks to the point 
where this trade was no longer attractive to some merchants. Thus, Rossabi writes:
The common assumption that the seaborne commerce superseded the caravan trade needs 
qualification. The political disruptions that afflicted most of the Asian regions through which 
the caravans travelled were major causes for the decline of the Central Asian overland trade. 
Protection costs were too expensive, and plundering of cargo was a real concern. The 
economies to be gained from ship transport dampened still further the merchants’ plans for 
overland trade, but a major motive for not dispatching caravans stemmed from the military and 
political conditions to be faced along the Asian landmass (Rossabi 1990:367).
Rossabi goes on to point out that transcontinental trade did continue, but passed from 
European Russia through Russian Siberia and thence to China. This is an important 
development, because it meant that the Central Asian economies were effectively 
removed from world trade markets by both the loss of some trade volume to sea-borne 
transport, and also by the redirection of transcontinental routes away from Central Asia.
Christian (2000) also argues that the role of ‘trans-ecological exchange’ has been 
overlooked. He suggests that trade between different ecological areas, largely on routes 
transverse to the Silk Routes, preceded, and was at least as important as, the Silk Route 
trade. This is intuitively appealing, because different ecological areas will tend to have 
different resource endowments; and that is the basis for trade.4 This is echoed by Adshead 
(1993), who suggests that while the East-West trading networks may have declined in the 
1800s, this was offset by growth in the much more intense North-South trading networks.
Trade routes, both East-West and North-South, facilitated the movement not just of 
goods, but also of knowledge and technology (see, for example, Christian 2000; 
Diamond 1997; Adshead 1993). Traders brought with them news and information, as 
well as new goods, from utside the region, thus keeping the region’s economies
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connected albeit tenuously to world market developments and technological change.
Thus, loss of trade would necessarily have lowered the quantity of technological and 
strategic information brought into the region and thereby compounded the decline in 
Central Asia that resulted from the loss of the goods trade.
1.4.5 Regional self-sufficiency and regional backwardness
Inter-regional trade was, at any time, dangerous and unreliable, and the trade that was 
undertaken tended to involve high value luxury goods rather than staples. By contrast, 
the trans-ecological trade identified by Christian (2000) was more likely to involve the 
exchange of staple goods than the transcontinental trade of the Silk Roads.5 To add to 
this, the transcontinental trade seems to have suffered serious decline from the 1600s 
(Rossabi 1990). This would have affected conditions among the major export producers 
in the oasis-based regions, whose export earnings were concentrated on the trade in 
cotton and other textiles (see Burton 1997).
This has a number of consequences. First, the sedentary civilisations and nomadic 
groups of the region were reliant to some extent on the transcontinental trade as a source 
of tax revenue. The loss of this revenue would have caused deterioration in the fiscal basis 
of many of these states. And this would have weakened them politically and militarily.
Thus, in the century prior to the beginning of the Russian conquest, Central Asia was 
fairly effectively isolated from the world in economic terms. This inevitably influenced 
the way the economies of the region were structured. The opportunities for the region to 
develop economically were limited by their need to be largely self-supporting. Owing to 
the region’s isolation, requirements for most goods had to be met by domestic 
production, which meant that there could be little specialisation in production and trade 
on the basis of comparative advantage. That is, there was little scope for these 
economies to concentrate on producing particular goods and relying on imports to 
satisfy other requirements. It also meant that the spread of new production and social 
technologies into the region would have been fairly limited.
Figure 1.1 presents a simplified model of the economic structure of Central Asia 
prior to the Russian conquest.
1.5 The Russian conquest
Russian control over the region essentially began with the subordination and later 
suppression of the Kazak hordes on the northern fringes of the Kazak steppe from the 
early 1700s onwards.6 This was followed by an escalation of military campaigns against 
the southern Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Khoqand through the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The Russian conquest reached its furthest extent with the capture of 
Merv and later Kushka on the current Afghan border in the mid 1880s.7 As with other 
cases of European colonial expansion at the time, tsarist Russian expansion in Central 
Asia was motivated, in economic terms, by a desire to access the goods and resources of 
the colonised territories and to open up wider markets for the conqueror’s products.8 The 
Russians were also concerned strategically by Britain’s control over India, and by the 
halting British military and reconnaissance forays into Afghanistan and the areas 
adjacent to the Russian empire’s southern frontier.9
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Figure 1.1 Model of the Central Asian economy prior to Russian conquest
Livestock and related goods
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Note: Here the thickness of the arrows indicates the relative intensity of the linkages.
1.5.1 Economic structure
How was Central Asia’s economic structure changed by the Russian conquest and rule? 
A number of clear changes can be discerned in this period:
• decreased prevalence of nomadism
• increased concentration on cotton production
• increased regional production specialisation and decreased self-sufficiency
• decreased traditional manufacturing—cottage industry and handicrafts
• decreased intra-regional trade
• increased trade with Russia but decreased trade with other countries
1.5.2 Nomadic regions: the decline of pastoralism
The Russian conquest of Central Asia changed economic practices in both the nomadic 
and the sedentary areas. In the nomadic areas, the immigration of Russian settlers to 
take over the supposedly ‘unused’ steppe for settled cultivation caused severe 
disruptions to Kazak groups and their nomadic activities.10 Nomadic herders, at least in 
Kazakstan, were effectively compelled to become sedentary to some extent through loss 
of accessible grazing lands and closure of traditional stock routes. Black et al. (1991:245) 
state that
The primary immediate effect in the north was to curtail gradually the amount and quality of 
land available to the nomadic clans and tribes because of the settlement patterns of the rural 
Russian and other European newcomers. In turn, this phenomenon brought pressure to bear on 
the Kazakhs themselves to settle and turn to agricultural pursuits.
This process is detailed extensively by Olcott, who describes the Russian 
colonisation of the steppe region as leading to the ‘destruction of the nomadic economy 
practiced by the Kazakhs’ (1987:88).11 This, she argues, was brought about by the 
collapse of traditional herding routes owing to colonisation by peoples from the Russian
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empire, but also from the increased trading opportunities opened up by improved 
networks within the steppe and between the steppe and the rest of the Russian empire.
That said, the nomadic mode of production seems to have persisted (to borrow 
Dienes’ term) despite the loss of grazing lands (Olcott 1987; Popova 1994), and even 
past the forced collectivisation of the Soviet era (Dienes 1975; Popova 1994). This 
indicates that the nomadic lifestyle, though perhaps marginal, is still viable enough to be 
attractive to some groups. This persistence, in the face of often severe pressures, can be 
attributed to the perceived suitability of Central Asian climates and environmental 
conditions to nomadic livestock-herding (Dienes 1975; Popova 1994). Alternatively, it 
could be attributed to the unsuitability of these areas for other uses—the nomadic mode 
of production means that a given area will be grazed to its limit, at which time the 
nomadic group will usually leave the area, thus giving the vegetation and topsoil a 
chance to recover. Arable farming tends remove the natural vegetation and occupies the 
same area fairly constantly and over longer periods, accelerating the degradation of the 
soil while at the same time preventing its recovery, a situation exacerbated by farming 
practices in the Soviet period.12
Overall, the Russian conquest of the regions engaged mostly in nomadic livestock- 
herding activity was a major break from historical patterns. Although many nomadic 
groups did engage in some crop-growing, this did not form the basis of economic 
activity in the region. Colonisation by Russia disrupted the traditional economic 
structure by imposing alien societal norms onto the nomadic lands, turning hitherto 
common lands into effectively private property. This, in turn, directly impinged on the 
nomadic groups’ capacity to maintain traditional production systems, leading ultimately 
to increased impoverishment of most of these nomadic groups, social disruption, and 
also greater antagonism between the local populations and the colonising power. 
Pressures on land were accompanied by Russian policies that provided an incentive for 
nomadic herders to change production, under which nomadic groups would be granted 
land—which, it must be said, had earlier been expropriated from them—if they took up 
more sedentary practices (Brower 2003). Economic factors worked in the same 
direction: as their traditional grazing lands were occupied, nomadic groups had to turn 
to agriculture to raise feed grain if they were to continue raising livestock.13
Economically, the major effect was to shift these regions from concentration on 
livestock production (particularly sheep and horse rearing) on a nomadic basis, towards 
agriculture and cattle rearing on a largely sedentary basis.
1.5.3 Sedentary regions: the rise of cotton
In the more settled areas of Central Asia, the oasis towns, patterns of production were to 
be less radically altered—both colonisers and colonised pursued sedentary agricultural 
activities (d’Encausse 1994). The real change here was in the altered output mix. The 
sedentary regions shifted towards production of raw cotton, and away from production 
of grains, fruits, and manufactured goods.14
In fact, once Russia had asserted its dominance over the sedentary regions of Central 
Asia, cotton came to dominate their economies. There are several reasons for this.
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Russian dominance can be seen as the assertion of Central Asia’s incorporation into 
what was essentially a Russian trading bloc. Even prior to 1895, when the oasis cities 
were finally incorporated into the Russian customs area, trade with non-Russian regions 
was strongly discouraged (Becker 1968). Production in such circumstances would be 
determined by the interaction of Russian demand and Central Asian comparative 
advantage. Supply disruptions associated with the American Civil War (1861-65) 
prompted Russian policymakers to seek a domestic alternative to North America as a 
source of raw cotton (Matley 1994a), opening a profitable avenue for Central Asian 
agriculture. Central Asian farmers, who had long produced cotton for export and 
domestic consumption, were confronted by a situation in which the returns from cotton 
production outstripped the returns from producing most other goods, and hence had a 
very strong incentive to divert resources towards raising cotton output. Restating this 
from an economic perspective, Central Asia had a comparative advantage in producing 
cotton when it was engaged in extensive trading with the Russian empire. Even in the 
absence of other changes, the Russian conquest of Central Asia would be expected to 
have moved towards increased specialisation and trade based on regional comparative 
advantage.
This was facilitated by another development from the 1860s onwards—the railways. 
Although the impact of the railways would not be fully felt until the late 1890s and first 
decade of the twentieth century (Taafe 1962), their extension into Central Asia is crucial 
in several respects. First, it allowed trade between Central Asia and the Russian empire 
to assume a more formal and continuous basis than had been possible with the earlier 
sporadic caravan trade. Second, it enabled goods, particularly foodstuffs such as grains, 
to be imported cheaply and reliably into Central Asia. This eliminated the need for 
Central Asia to maintain a particular level of self-sufficiency, and also undercut the 
returns to Central Asian producers of foodstuffs or manufactured goods. The railways 
opened up the opportunity for increased specialisation in Central Asia by reducing the 
need to allocate land to uses other than cotton production; they removed the need, and 
indeed the economic impulse, for regional economic self-sufficiency (see Pierce I960).15
One impact of this increased trade, and reduced need for self-sufficiency, was erosion 
of the domestic small industry and handcraft sectors. In this regard Becker notes that
[t]he only group in Bukhara and Khiva that was adversely affected by the growth of trade with 
Russia was the native craftsmen, who could not compete with the cheap Russian textiles and 
metal goods, although the extent of the Russian impact is difficult to judge (1968:180).16
Similarly, Black et al. state that
[t]he expansion of trade with Russia toward the end of the nineteenth century, with the 
appearance of cheaper factory goods from the West, had the effect of driving down prices of 
local crafts, reducing demand, and eventually undermining the crafts themselves (1991:104).
The railways were complemented by more active, directed Russian trade and tariff 
policies that sought to subsidise grain imports from Russia into Central Asia and Central 
Asian cotton exports to European Russia. These served to skew further the returns to 
agricultural production, discouraging grain and foodstuffs production and promoting the 
production of cotton in the region (Taafe 1962).
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Thus, it may be more sensible to talk of two levels of economic change in Central 
Asia during this period—a ‘natural’ economic process of specialisation, and an ‘un­
natural’ process of overspecialisation in cotton production.17 The natural process of 
specialisation resulted from the effective incorporation of Central Asia into the Russian 
trading bloc, and the extension of trade-facilitating infrastructure. The un-natural 
process, the overspecialisation, was a consequence of targeted distortionary policy 
initiated by the imperial power to serve the interests of the imperial centre.
1.5.4 Trade and technology in Central Asia in the Tsarist era
The Russian colonisation of the region brought with it improved (although potentially 
negative) access to world technological advances, and also reopened the possibility of 
trade into world markets, although this likely meant specialisation of Central Asian 
producers in primary production to trade for imports of Russian and Western finished 
goods (Matley 1994b). This represented a limited reversal of the stagnation imposed by 
the loss of transcontinental trade routes in the period preceding the Russian conquest. 
Such industrialisation as there was seemed to follow the logic of complementing local 
primary production, with the main industrial activities developing around the refining of 
cotton (Aminov and Babakhodzhaev 1966).18
Trade in this period shifted away from the sporadic caravan-based process of earlier 
years. At the same time, the construction of railway connections with Russia and the 
growing dominance of Russia both economically and as a colonising power meant that 
Central Asia’s trade interactions with other regions and nations were curtailed. Another 
important change was the decreasing basis for trade within Central Asia. As the nomadic 
areas turned to sedentary activities, their scope for trade with the irrigated areas was 
eroded because production in both areas was converging. So, as trade with Russia grew, 
trade within the region and with other regions declined.
1.5.5 Consequences
Clearly, the imposition of Russian rule over Central Asia changed the economic 
structure of the region. These changes had long-lasting impacts on the region, through
• increased reliance on Russian imports for grain and manufactured goods
• increased sensitivity to Russian demand
• impoverishment and sedentarisation of nomadic groups
• impoverishment of croppers in irrigated areas
• loss of world trade
• loss of exposure to world technological advances and information flows
The most obvious consequence of all these changes was the general impoverishment 
of the Central Asian population. The nomadic groups in particular suffered severely, 
often losing their traditional lifestyle, territory and practices, and were forced to eke out 
an existence on those lands the Russian colonisers did not want. Similarly, farmers in 
the irrigated areas frequently did not benefit greatly from the changes wrought by the 
Russian conquest. Land rights in the region were expropriated completely to the Russian 
emperor, although tenure was left basically unchanged. Peasants became impoverished 
through tough credit conditions, the fact that they essentially faced a monopsony buyer, 
and the retrenchment of small-scale food production (Whitman 1956).
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As a region, Central Asia came to rely on Russia to supply its basic grain 
requirements, and also as a source of processed/manufactured goods. Lacking an outlet 
to the sea, and bordered by regions that shared similar ecological conditions, Central 
Asia became more vulnerable than most areas of the world to disruptions in grain 
supply. At the same time, Central Asian output came to be reliant on Russian demand. 
The growth of cotton production was to serve Russian, and later Soviet, needs, rather 
than be sold on world markets.
Together, these factors meant that Central Asia was bound economically, perhaps 
even more strongly than politically, into the Russian empire, and later the Soviet Union. 
Any disruption to imports from Russia had the potential to cause widespread famine and 
suffering, and any loss of Russian demand for Central Asian products would likely 
cause a collapse in the Central Asian economies. This actually happened during the 
years of the Russian revolution and subsequent civil war, when Russian demand for 
cotton plummeted, suddenly reducing cash incomes in the region, and the supply of 
grain from Europe to Central Asia was cut. The Central Asian response was predictable: 
cotton cultivation dropped and grain production shot up, but not by enough to cover the 
loss imports. The result was starvation (Whitman 1956).
Figure 1.2 shows how the Russian conquest altered the region’s economic structure.
1 There was less basis for trade within the region between the traditionally nomadic 
and the traditionally sedentary irrigated areas
2 Russia came to dominate Central Asian trade both as a source of imports (particularly 
grain and finished goods) and as a market for Central Asian products. The long­
distance Eurasian trade routes through Central Asia collapsed almost completely.
Figure 1.2 Economic structure after the Russian conquest
Goods Goods
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3 The Central Asian economy became more specialised, particularly in cotton 
production, and Central Asia became less self-sufficient as a region.
4 There was a renewed flow of capital, infrastructure and some technologies into the 
region, but this served specifically Russian interests.
1.6 T he Soviet era
1.6.1 Changes in economic structure
The economic structure of Central Asia changed fundamentally in the Soviet era. This 
section will outline developments in this period. It does not aim to provide a detailed 
economic history of the region; rather, it aims to highlight the major changes in 
economic structure introduced over the course of Soviet rule.
1.6.2 Centralisation of production decisions
The economic system of the Soviet Union has been extensively described elsewhere and 
will not be rehearsed here.19 The critical aspects for Central Asia’s economic structure 
were the removal of economic incentives in economic decision-making and, more 
importantly, the accretion of economic decision-making to the all-Union level. During 
the tsarist period, policies (such as tariff and trade policies) had been used to influence 
the economic structure of Central Asia, but more strenuous attempts to alter the 
economic structures of the region were not seriously pursued. This changed during the 
Soviet period. For reasons of both ideology and strategy, the Soviets sought first to 
control and then to direct the types of economic activities undertaken in the region, and 
hence spurred considerable change in the region.
The Union centre made repeated and increasingly successful attempts to assert direct 
control over economic decision-making in the region as part of its effort to reconsolidate 
the former Russian empire as the Soviet Union. In the 1920s this was tempered by 
pragmatic demands in terms of avoiding further catastrophes in grain output and 
placating nationalist sentiments, and it was only in 1929 that the centre felt in a strong 
enough position to move decisively against widespread private ownership in the 
pastoral and agricultural sectors. It did so by attempting to force farmers and herders 
into collective organisations—the kolkhozy and sovkhozy10—to which it could dictate 
output, yields, inputs and resource allocations.
1.6.3 Collectivisation of both nomadic and sedentary producers
The imposition of collective-based communism was instrumental in the near collapse of 
traditional social structures, which were considered primitive forms of economic 
organisation. In the steppe regions, the remaining nomadic groups were pressured to 
adopt sedentary farming practices and, beginning in the late 1920s, were forcibly 
formed into various forms of communal production organisation (see Olcott 1981). The 
upheaval had unnecessarily massive and brutal consequences in terms of social 
dislocation and economic collapse. Local reactions varied: some groups resisted 
violently, some emigrated, some slaughtered their stock rather than turn it over to Soviet 
control. There is no doubt that this created famine in the region, but the famine seems to 
have been exacerbated by incompetence among officials in establishing the collectives.
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Olcott (1981:122) reports that ‘over 1.5 million Kazakhs lost their lives in the decade of 
the thirties and...nearly 80 percent of the herd was destroyed in the period 1928-30’ 
owing to a combination of local resistance to the changes and bureaucratic incompetence. 
Figure 1.3 shows the population dynamic in Kazakstan—probably the Central Asian 
country hit hardest by the collectivisation—over the period 1897-1959 and suggests 
that the Kazak population nearly halved during the early Soviet period while the Slavic 
population grew. Fluctuations in the sheep and goat population in Kazakstan are shown 
in Figure 1.4. The livestock data are drawn from official sources, and probably 
understate the scale of the collapse, but nonetheless they illustrate a collapse in 
Kazakstan’s sheep and goat population between the revolution and the second world 
war, by which time the population would have recovered slightly.
After the Second World War agricultural production in Steppe regions was 
increasingly directed towards cropping rather than herding. The ‘Virgin Lands’ scheme, 
initiated by Khrushchev in 1954, formed a major part of this move. Under this scheme, 
millions of hectares of supposedly unused land, primarily in Kazakstan and Western 
Siberia, were to be ploughed for grain production (Mills 1970; Durgin 1962). Soviet 
data assert that 18 million hectares of previously unworked land were turned over 
between 1953-60 for grain production in Kazakstan alone (Figure 1.5).
The early results of this were inconsistent, but the scheme was not without success 
(Durgin 1962). The extension of total land area under given over to grain cultivation had 
the desired effect of increasing overall grain production, but yields remained stubbornly
Figure 1.3 Populations of Kazakstan, 1897-1959 (millions)
1897 1911 1926 1939 1959
Source: Alexandrov, M., 1998. Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, 1992-97, PhD Thesis, Centre 
for Arab and Islamic Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra.
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Figure 1.4 Sheep and goat population, Kazakstan and other Central Asian SSRs, 
1916-78 (millions)
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Figure 1.5 Sown area, Kazakstan, 1913-60
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Source: Central Statistical Office, 1962. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu: statisticheskiy 
ezhegodnik, Gosstatizdat, Moscow.
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low.21 The problems of the scheme were not long in appearing—production was 
characterised by inefficiency and outright waste,22 and the environmental consequences 
were dire. Within a decade, a large portion of the land had been returned to fallow, but 
only once the soil had been degraded to the point where it could not sustain any further 
activity (McCauley 1976). The time taken to reach this point was minimised, however, 
by a politically-motivated aversion to rotating fields through fallow periods. The 
conditions, and soil types in particular, were not really suited to this type of agriculture. 
Much of the region’s topsoil was as a result lost in extensive windstorms through the 
1960s, a foreseeable event precipitated largely by the removal of the native vegetation.23
The social consequences were similarly massive. The scheme continued the restriction 
of lands available for livestock production and, as such, continued the repression of the 
indigenous Kazak populace and their traditional practices. Some two million Soviet 
citizens were brought in, largely from the Slavic regions of the Soviet Union, to staff the 
new farms set up under the scheme (Laird and Chappell 1961), but there seems to have 
been little role for native Kazaks in the new system. The Kazak population of Kazakstan 
was, of course, further diluted by this renewed influx of Slavic groups.
1.6.4 Extension of cotton production
The upheaval in the steppe zones was paralleled by that in the oasis areas. Agricultural 
production had earlier been carried out by large numbers of small-holders who 
contracted wage labour and sharecroppers. Irrigation was crucial to this agricultural 
production, and there was a strongly developed, entrenched and complex system of 
water allocation (Matley 1970). The Soviets broke up both the landholding and the 
water allocation systems and re-organised them on a collective basis (with minimal 
private activity). Their aim was to eliminate private landholders as a class and centralise 
production decisions under their own control.
The Soviets came to be more aggressive than their Tsarist predecessors in turning 
agriculture away from food production (except during the war years) towards 
production of cotton. They also devoted far more effort to increasing the area available 
for cotton production (Matley 1970). Attempts were made to increase cotton production 
by extending the area devoted to it, at the expense of grain production, and by extending 
the area under irrigation through large-scale canal and irrigation channel construction 
(Matley 1970). Increases in yield were sought through application of ‘more scientific’ 
crop management practices such as more extensive use of fertiliser and ‘more rational’ 
application of water. Data on the irrigated area in Central Asia are shown in Figure 1.6, 
and they suggest that the irrigated area rose approximately 250 per cent between 1913 
and 1990. This data should be interpreted with caution, but is reasonably consistent with 
data presented by other authors (eg. Rafikov 1983; UNECE 1957).
Whereas the bulk of irrigated land (greater than 60 per cent) was devoted to grain 
production in 1913, by the mid 1950s grain production accounted for only 10 per cent of 
irrigated land in Central Asia (UNECE 1957). The area devoted to grain production 
throughout Central Asia fell or remained steady throughout the early-mid twentieth 
century, except in Kazakstan (Table 1.1), even though the total amount of arable land 
was increasing throughout the period. In assessing the data in Table 1.1, it should be
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Figure 1.6 Irrigated area, Central Asia, 1913-90
1913 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990
Source: Ivanov et al., 1996. ‘Review of the scientific and environmental issues of the Aral Sea Basin’, in 
RR Micklin and W.D. Williams (eds), The Aral Sea Basin, Springer, Berlin.
Table 1.1 Area devoted to grain and cotton production, Central Asian SSRs,
1913-71
1913 1940 1953 1960 1971
Grain production (million hectares) 
Kazakstan 3.89 5.82 7.03 22.11 22.4
Kyrgyzstan 0.56 0.78 0.66 0.66 0.56
Tajikistan 0.44 0.57 0.45 0.38 0.22
Turkmenistan 0.20 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.08
Uzbekistan 1.54 1.48 0.97 0.96 1.1
Cotton production (thousand hectares)
Kazakstan 20 102 113 106 118
Kyrgyzstan 22 64 81 71 77
Tajikistan 27 106 146 176 261
Turkmenistan 69 150 172 222 401
Uzbekistan 425 924 1152 1387 1707
Sources: Central Statistical Office, 1962. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu: statisticheskiy 
ezhegodnik, Gosstatizdat, Moscow; Central Statistical Office, 1972. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR 1922- 
72, Statistika, Moscow.
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noted that the 1940 figure, coming immediately prior to the Soviet Union’s entry into 
the Second World War, probably gives an inflated figure for the amount of land devoted 
to grain production.
Fertiliser and pesticide use turns out to have been inappropriate or excessive in many 
cases, causing damage to the health of both the soil and the people that work it 
(Peterson 1993; Lubin 1989). And the ‘rational’ application of water appears to be 
something of a misnomer given the combination of poor water transport and storage 
practices, which led to massive losses through evaporation and seepage, and excessive 
irrigation, which led to a rising water table and salinisation (Peterson 1993).
Micklin (1992) points to 1988 data which indicate that water users were essentially 
extracting all available water from the river systems, as well as some groundwater, in that 
year, between 80 and 90 per cent of this for agricultural uses. Just over 25 per cent of 
the water extracted from the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers was lost in transport, but 
the figure for the ‘other’ river systems—including the notorious Karakum Canal—was 
42 per cent (see also Peterson 1993).24 That these practices had, by the later half of the 
twentieth century, reached a socially and economically unhealthy, and environmentally 
unsustainable, level has been extensively documented by Rumer (1989) among others.25
The Soviet approach to agriculture in Central Asia fairly consistently reprises the 
base problem in the Soviet economy. A politically-motivated perception that the Soviet 
Union had to keep up with Western countries called for constant increases in output of 
just about everything; but where economic growth was achieved in Western economies 
through a combination of increased inputs, increased productivity, and technical change, 
the Soviet economy relied far more on pure increases in inputs. As we shall see later, the 
insusceptibility of productivity to repeated efforts at raising it, and the consequent 
recourse to extensive growth in place of intensive growth, is considered by some to be a 
factor in the economic stagnation of the late Soviet period. The Virgin Lands scheme, 
the glorious engineering of ever more wasteful irrigation projects, the mindless overuse 
of fertiliser, are all just iterations of this basic problem: instead of introducing ways of 
increasing productivity per worker or per hectare of land, instead of properly 
disseminating new technologies, it was simply quicker and easier to expand inputs.26
1.6.5 Diversifying production: industrial growth
Although the Central Asian economies were further diverted towards production of 
primary products for all-Union production processes, there was some move to diversify 
the types of production in Central Asia. Black et al. (1991:238) make probably the most 
positive assessment, arguing that ‘...the rapid growth of industrial development during 
the decade before the war was impressive’, but they concede that efforts were 
concentrated on developing mineral extraction industries. Some secondary industries 
were developed in areas such as textile manufacture, machine building and food 
processing (Black et al. 1991), but this was fairly limited and largely devoted to 
satisfying some of the local demand for particular goods and materials. Dienes (1987), 
for example, notes that in 1975 only 6.5 per cent of Soviet cotton textiles was 
manufactured in Central Asia, even though the region accounted for well over 90 per 
cent of the Soviet Union’s raw cotton output at the time (Tables 1.2 and 1.3).27
1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 19
Table 1.2 Grain and raw cotton production, Central Asian SSRs, 1913-78 
(‘000 tonnes)
1913 1940 1953 1960 1978
Grain production
Kazakstan 2162 2516 5439 18844 29826
Kyrgyzstan 436 588 516 754 1360
Tajikistan 202 324 247 274 305
Turkm enistan 159 124 62 41 258
Uzbekistan 1025 601 689 807 2001
Raw cotton production
Kazakstan 15 94 163 174 261
Kyrgyzstan 28 95 134 126 205
Tajikistan 32 172 390 399 909
Turkm enistan 69 211 308 363 1027
Uzbekistan 517 1386 2432 2824 5500
Cotton production as per cent of USSR total
Uzbekistan 69.5 61.0 63.1 65.8 64.7
Other C entral Asian SSRs 19.4 25.2 25.8 24.8 28.3
Sources: Central Statistical Office, 1962. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu: statisticheskii 
ezhegodnik, Gosstatizdat, Moscow; Central Statistical Office, 1978. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR: 
statisticheskii ezhegodnik, Statistika, Moscow.
Table 1.3 Production of cotton fabric, USSR, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian 
SSRs, 1913-60 (million metres)
1913 1940 1960 1970 1974/75
USSR 2671.5 3953.8 6386.7 7482 7810a
Uzbekistan .. 107.4 234.7 210 218b
Other Central Asian SSRs .. 10.04 96.9 n.a. n.a.
Percent of USSR total
Uzbekistan ,, 2.7 3.7 2.8 2.8
O ther Central Asian SSRs .. 0.3 1.5
N ote:a 1975 figure.b 1974 figure.c Including Kazakstan
Sources: Central Statistical Office, 1962. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu: statisticheskiy 
ezhegodnik, Gosstatizdat, Moscow; Central Statistical Office, 1978. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 
godu: statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Gosstatizdat, Moscow; Central Statistical Office (Uzbek SSR), 1974. 
Narodnoe Khoziaistvo Uzbekskoy SSR v 1974 godu: statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, “Uzbekistan”, Tashkent.
The Second World War gave a further boost to industrialisation of the region, 
particularly Kazakstan, when industries were evacuated from the European republics 
into the interior of the Soviet Union.28 After the war, this scale of industrialisation was 
only briefly recovered during the 1960s, with the move in that era towards increased 
regional economic self-sufficiency (Rumer 1989).
That said, it is not always clear that the types of manufacturing developed in Central 
Asia would have been economically feasible in a market economy (Rumer 1989; see 
also Dyker 1970 for a case study of some Tajik industries). This industrialisation
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moreover arguably did not significantly alter economic structures, in that it employed 
mostly Russian immigrants rather than drawing Central Asians away from agricultural 
and pastoral activities (Black et al. 1991, see also Wheeler 1955) and largely relied on 
the centre for infusions of funds and capital. By way of explanation, however, Rumer 
(1989:60) makes the cogent point that
[i]f Central Asia is unique as a producer of cotton and silk, Moscow finds it expedient to shift 
the processing of nonferrous metals and chemical production to other regions, where the water 
shortage is less acute.
1.6.6 Minerals and energy
One area that definitely developed during the Soviet period was the extractive 
industries. Oil and gas extraction, concentrated mostly in Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, 
grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s (Table 1.4; Rumer 1989). These developments 
were undertaken to increase the overall supply of these products within the Soviet 
Union. At the same time, coal mining was developed in parts of Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and hydroelectric energy was tapped in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Rumer 
(1989) argues that the extractive industries were developed in Central Asia primarily to
Table 1.4 Production of oil, natural gas and coal: USSR and the Central Asian 
SSRs, 1913-60
O il (thousand tonnes)
1913 1940 1950 1960 1992
USSR 10281 31121 37878 147859 ..
Kazakstan 118 697 1059 1610 26000
Kyrgyzstan . . 24 47 464 no
Tajikistan 10 30 20 17 60
Turkmenistan 129 587 2021 5278 5200
Uzbekistan 13 119 1342 1603 3300
Natural gas (million m 3)
USSR 304.0 3219.1 5761 45303.2 ..
Kazakstan 1.3 3.9 7 39.4 8800
Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . 41.2 60
Tajikistan 0.3 2.2 n.a. .. 85
Turkmenistan .. 9.2 65 234.4 60000
Uzbekistan •• 0.7 52 446.6 4700
Coal (thousand tonnes)
USSR 29153 165923 216100 513186 ..
Kazakstan 90 6972 17400 32375 130000s
Kyrgyzstan 103 1475 1900 3502 3500a
Tajikistan 28 204 400 854 300a
Turkmenistan 27 2.3 .. .. • •
Uzbekistan •• 3.4 1500 3410 5900a
Note: al991 figures.
Sources: Central Statistical Office, 1962. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu: statisticheskiy 
ezhegodnik, Gosstatizdat, Moscow; Central Statistical Office, 1978. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR: 
statisticheskii ezhegodnik, Statistika, Moscow; Statkomitet SNG, 2001. SNG v 2000 godu, Statkomitet, 
Moscow; Levine, R.M., 1994. ‘Mineral industry in Kazakstan/Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan/Turkmenistan/ 
Uzbekistan’ in USGS (ed.), Minerals Yearbook 1994, Volume 3: Area Reports—International, USGS, 
Reston, Virginia.
1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 21
fulfil needs in the other republics. This appears unsupported by the aggregate 
interrepublican trade data, which suggests that the region was a net oil and gas importer 
(see Figure 1.9), but assessment is clouded by the fact that most of the region’s oil was 
exported unrefined but considerable amounts were also imported from outside the 
region for refining (Pomfret 1995).
As well as developing the region’s energy resources, the Soviet authorities expanded 
the extraction of other minerals; gold was the most prominent of these, but there were 
others; copper in Kazakstan, uranium in Tajikistan (Dienes 1987). Again, the focus of 
this activity was on merely extracting the raw materials rather than developing extensive 
value-adding industries.29
1.6.7 Socio-economic improvements
Whereas the Tsarist rulers limited infrastructural investment and development to 
projects that served imperial economic and strategic needs, the Soviet era saw a 
conscious effort to raise levels of income and social well-being through investments in 
education, improved production methods and industrialisation, capital developments, 
infrastructural developments, education and health services.30 One impact of Soviet rule 
in Central Asia was to raise income levels and social standards, in terms of health and 
education, far above the levels that would have been achieved otherwise. As a UNECE 
report from 1957 notes: ‘In these fields [health and education] the standards in central 
Asia have improved so strikingly in the period of Soviet rule that the relevant 
comparison is no longer with neighbouring Asian countries, but with the countries of 
Western Europe’ (UNECE 1957:71). This is substantiated by Jukes (1973), who 
compared the Central Asian republics with their regional neighbours using 1967 figures. 
He found that on average Central Asia had one hospital bed per 100 people, compared 
with one per 960 in Iran, 560 in Turkey, and 5,810 in Afghanistan. Similarly, Central 
Asia had one doctor per 430 people, compared to one per 3820 in Iran, 2760 in Turkey 
and 21,360 in Afghanistan, and provision of medical services appears to have been 
instrumental in rapidly bringing down mortality rates in the Soviet regions (UNECE 
1957; Field 2002).31 Equivalent statistics for later periods are presented in Figure 1.7, 
which imply a continuous increase in provision of health services in the region 
throughout the Soviet period.
The extension of educational facilities and staff in the region raised literacy from 
negligible levels at the outset of Soviet rule to almost complete literacy.32 This was 
complemented by simultaneous development of higher education (UNECE 1957:72). 
Again Jukes (1973) substantiated this, finding tertiary education enrolments in Central 
Asia higher, if not far higher, than in obvious comparator countries. Thus, on average, 1 
person in every 127 was a full-time tertiary student in Central Asia, compared to 1 in 
383 Iranians, 1 in 224 Turks and 1 in 3,200 Afghans.33
Such factors set the region apart from its neighbours during the Soviet period, and 
continue to set the Central Asian republics apart from countries with similar income 
levels now despite the CARs’ considerable difficulties in funding social services in the 
post-Soviet period (see Chapter 7).
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Figure 1.7 Number of people per doctor, Central Asia, 1975 and 1988
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Source: Goskomstat, 1990. Sotsial’noe razvitie: statisticheskii sbornik, Goskomstat, Moscow.
1.6.8 Why was this approach adopted?
The Soviet approach was pragmatic and ideological. In the first sense, Soviet policy in 
Central Asia shared the aims of its Tsarist predecessors—to secure the region as a part 
of the ‘empire’, and more specifically to extend and intensify its role as a source of raw 
materials for largely metropolitan production.34 In addition, the Soviets, even more than 
the Tsarists, sought to eliminate the USSR’s reliance on imports from external sources, 
which meant that domestic sources had to be expanded and developed. This need drove 
both the cotton specialisation in the Southern regions of Central Asia and also the Virgin 
Lands scheme in Kazakstan. Shahrani (1993), however, further argues that the 
metropolitan centre sought to bind the region into the Union by exacerbating its 
economic dependency on the Union. He argues that Central Asia was so overspecialised 
in raw materials, particularly cotton, production it could not survive without substantial 
resource transfers from other areas of the Soviet Union. There is probably an element of 
truth in this, but it also needs to be considered in the context of the Soviet Union’s 
economic requirements. If we accept as given the ideological urge towards autarky in 
Soviet economic policy, the concentration of Central Asia on cotton production makes 
some sense: cotton was an important crop, and Central Asia was in practice the only 
Soviet region with climatic conditions favourable for its cultivation.
The diversification of production seems also to have met ideological aims. Such 
undertakings were made on the understanding that inter-regional equality was as 
important as inter-personal equality (Rumer 1989). As Central Asian industrialisation 
never reached anything more than a minor complement to industrial production 
elsewhere, however, it is hard to see it as anything other than a token effort.35
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Beyond tokenism were the developments in socio-economic conditions, and the 
massive subsidies allocated to this end, particularly to improving health and education 
standards. There were of course ideological and pragmatic aspects to the 
industrialisation efforts and the improvement in socio-economic conditions. The policy 
was ideological in that it sought to lift the region out of its perceived backwardness— 
modernisation was seen as the key to socialist/communist development; traditional 
conditions and practices could only retard this development. The other aspects were 
pragmatic: traditional practices, particularly religious practices, could act as an alternate 
focus of control and power in the region. Education and science, it was thought, would 
expose the backwardness of such practices and hence draw people away from the old 
centres of power towards the new. The policy was also pragmatic in the external sense 
in that the improved conditions enjoyed by Central Asians (as both Muslims and 
‘Asians’) could act as a demonstration to other Muslims and Asians outside the Soviet 
Union of the wisdom and necessity of following Soviet ways (Jukes 1973; Umarov and 
Mahmadshoev 2001).
1.6.9 Consequences of the Soviet dominance
The Central Asian economies had become highly dependent on Russia as a source of 
secondary and tertiary products, and as a market for primary products, in the Tsarist era. 
In the Soviet era, this deepened and Central Asia became almost completely dependent 
on the Russian centre as a market for exports from the region, a source of industrial 
goods, and particularly as a source of investment in productive capacities, infrastructure 
and social services. Figure 1.8 presents a simplified model of the Central Asian 
economies in the Soviet period.
Figure 1.8 Economic structure in the Soviet era
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The industries established in Central Asia after the war were often propped up by 
massive subsidies from the all-Union budget. Similarly, relatively high levels of social 
services, such as health care and education, were achieved by way of financial support 
and transfers from the centre—it is unlikely that such levels could have been maintained 
on the resources available to each republican government alone. Reliance on the centre 
was also found in things like capital growth and infrastructure creation, and 
technological advances (Jukes 1973). Moreover, the fact that Central Asia was 
essentially precluded from engaging in trade or independent foreign relations meant that 
the region came to rely on the centre for expertise in these areas and became, if possible, 
even more isolated from the rest of the world than most other Soviet republics.36
As noted above, Soviet policy in the region had severe environmental impacts. Aside 
from the well-known Aral Sea problem, Soviet agricultural practices led to 
desertification, waterlogging, salinisation, accelerated soil erosion by wind and water, 
contamination of the soil, water resources and food chain by pesticides and fertilisers. 
The environmental consequences have persisted long after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and in many cases will probably persist long after those responsible for creating 
them have died (see also Lubin 1989, 2000).
Central Asia’s relationship with the Union, however, was not completely negative. It 
is clear that being part of the Soviet Union delivered certain benefits to the region, not 
only in terms of the economic developments outlined above, but also in terms of lifting 
standards of living, providing modem educational systems, and establishing a 
framework for social support among other things. This goes some way to explaining the 
region’s ambivalence towards the collapse of the Soviet Union.
1.7 C entral A sian  perspectives o n  the  collapse of Soviet U n io n
A few aspects of the collapse of the USSR need to be mentioned; these relate to 
Gorbachev’s referendum of March 1991, the failed coup of August 1991, and the 
formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991. In an 
attempt to avert the collapse of the Soviet Union, and implicitly to counter the rise of 
Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev held a referendum on 17 March 1991, which asked: ‘Do you 
consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign 
republics, in which human rights and the freedom of all nationalities will be fully 
guaranteed?’.37 Where a number of the republics refused even to hold the poll, the 
Central Asian republics held it and the voters supported Gorbachev’s proposal 
emphatically. Results ranged from a low of 83.6 per cent of voters in favour of the 
proposal in Kazakstan to a high of 95.7 per cent in Turkmenistan. By contrast, only 69.7 
per cent of Azerbaijanis, 58.1 per cent of Ukrainians, and 52.8 per cent of Russians 
supported the proposal (The Economist, 23 March 1991). While there were repeated 
bouts of political unrest in the lead-up to 1991 in many of the Central Asian republics, 
these results imply that there was no obvious groundswell of support for dissolution of 
the Soviet Union among the people.
Similarly, responses differed among the Central Asian leaderships to the August 1991 
putsch by communist hardliners. The coup leaders seem to have had a number of aims, 
but primarily hoped to prevent an agreement between the Soviet Union and its
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constituent republics that would devolve considerable power to the republican-level 
governments (Sakwa 2002; The Economist, 24 August 1991). Among the Central Asian 
leaders, only Akaev actively opposed the coup, evading arrest in a standoff between his 
own security staff and KGB agents sent to detain him (Hiro 1994). Nazarbaev opposed 
the coup but was somewhat tardy in denouncing it, Niyazov remained ‘neutral’, or 
probably more precisely ‘silent’, and Karimov initially supported the coup, but quickly 
reversed this support when it became clear who had won (.Independent, 24 August 1991; 
Independent, 24 August 1991). Tajikistan’s president at the time, Kakhar Makhkamov, 
also supported the coup. It is clear from this that the leaders of the Central Asian 
republics were not ready at this stage to commit to the unravelling of the USSR. In all 
cases they either prevaricated38 or actively aligned themselves with the old regime, even 
though the agreement sought by Gorbachev and Yeltsin would substantially raise their 
own personal power.
Similarly, the Central Asian republics were passive (non-)observers to the creation by 
Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 8 
December 1991.39 Even after the leaders of these republics signed the agreement to 
disband the Soviet Union and establish the CIS, Nazarbaev persisted in backing 
Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.40 Karimov was similarly conservative. Nonetheless, 
all the Central Asian republics took part in the meeting to found the CIS in Almaty on 
20 December 1991 (Sakwa 2002; Reuters, 20 December 1991, 21 December 1991).
What this points to is the passive/reactive role of the Central Asian leaderships in 
relation to developments within the Soviet Union. Unlike many other Soviet republics 
and the countries of Eastern Europe, there was no broadly-based nationalistic 
enthusiasm to escape from or dissolve the Soviet Union among the region’s populations 
as a whole or among its elites. Rather, the Central Asian republics persistently fought to 
maintain the status quo, only accepting change when it became clearly inevitable.
1.8 P eculiarities of the  C entral A slan econom ies at independence
The preceding section illustrated the changes imposed by the all-Union centre on the 
economies of Central Asia during the Soviet period. Prime among these were the strong 
specialisation in raw materials production, the limited and often uneconomic 
development of industry, isolation from world trade, and high reliance on inputs and 
subsidies from the all-Union budget. The following section expands on these points and 
introduces a number of additional reasons why the Central Asian economies are distinct 
from most other transition economies.
1.8.1 Structural factors
The economies of Central Asia are fundamentally different from most others currently 
undergoing transition. They are even quite different from those found elsewhere in the 
former Soviet Union. Why? First, the economies of Central Asia have historically been 
dominated by primary production; namely, agriculture and extraction of mineral 
resources. Secondary and tertiary production have played a rather limited role in the 
their economies (Tables 1.5 and 1.6). The figures for the industrial share in the 
economic structure presented in Table 1.5 do not give a clear indication of this because
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Table 1.5 Structure of the Central Asian Economies: Net Material Product by 
origin at current prices, 1980-90 (per cent of total NMP)
Kazakstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Russia Ukraine
1980
Agriculture 
Industry and
25.9 30.4 34.5 34.3 34.1 9.9 18.3
construction 47.4 48.1 45.8 42.9 44.5 66.4 58.8
Services 26.6 21.5 19.7 22.9 21.4 23.7 22.8
1990
Agriculture 
Industry and
41.9 43.2 36.8 47.9 44.3 20.0 30.4
construction 37.0 43.8 41.4 33.5 38.6 55.0 51.0
Services 21.2 13 21.8 18.6 17.0 25.0 18.6
Source: World Bank, 1993. Statistical Handbook 1993: states of the former USSR, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
they include mineral and energy extraction as part of the industrial share. They do, 
however, show that agriculture was a far larger proportion of the CAR’s economies than 
of Russia’s or Ukraine’s, representing 26-35 per cent of the economic activity in the 
Central Asian republics, compared to 10 per cent in Russia.
A further breakdown of the late-Soviet industrial structure is presented in Table 1.6. 
Using machinery and metalworking production as an indicator of secondary level 
production, we can see that it played a minor role in industrial production in the Central 
Asian economies compared to Russia and Ukraine, and therefore an even lesser role in 
the overall economic structure of these republics (Table 1.6). Transformative industry— 
or, alternatively, value-adding industry—played little role in the Central Asian 
economies overall.
The unusual structure of the Central Asian economies is underlined by the sector 
shares of employment (Table 1.7). The Central Asian economies employed a far higher 
share of workers in agriculture than the European republics. Only Kazakstan approached 
the kind of employment share seen in the European republics, with 25.5 per cent of 
workers employed in agriculture, whereas elsewhere in Central Asia 30 per cent or more 
of the population was thus engaged. Russia and the Ukraine, by contrast, employed 
around 13 and 20 per cent respectively of their workers in this sector.
The demographic structure of the Central Asian republics also contrasts with that of 
the European republics. The CARs have extremely young populations: 30-40 per cent 
of all their citizens were less than 15 years old in 1987, compared with around 20 per 
cent in Russia and the Ukraine. At the same time, the European republics have higher 
dependency ratios at the opposite end of the age profile, with far higher proportions of 
the population aged 60 or over (Tables 1.8 and 1.9).
Taken together, these factors suggest that the Central Asian economies are far closer 
to being pure developing economies than the European transition economies. The issues 
are those of developing economies: finding ways of dealing with the extremely young 
population (training, education, etc.), raising agricultural productivity, reducing
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Table 1.8 Population base: Central Asia, Russia and Ukraine, 1990
Kazakstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Russia Ukraine
Population
(millions) 14991 4355 5232 3657 20227 148164 51839
Rural share 
(per cent) 51.8 50.9 50.3 50.6 50.6 26.2 32.7
Source: World Bank, 1993. Statistical Handbook 1993: states of the former USSR, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
Table 1.9 Population under 15/above 60, 1959 and 1987 (per cent)
Population underage 15 Population over age 60
1959 1987 1959 1987
Kazakstan 35.6 31.4 7.8 9.4
Kyrgyzstan 37.2 37.5 9.7 7.8
Tajikistan 38.8 42.4 7.9 6.4
Turkmenistan 38.3 40.5 7.9 6.1
Uzbekistan 37.9 40.7 9.4 6.5
Russia 29.2 22.6 9.0 14.7
Ukraine 26.0 22.0 10.5 16.8
Source: Goskomstat, 1988. Naselenie SSSR 1987: statisticheskii sbornik, Goskomstat, Moscow
underemployment in the agricultural sector and freeing up resources currently in the 
agricultural sector to move into other sectors.
Second, the Central Asian economies were substantially geared towards production 
of inputs into all-Union production processes. Figure 1.9 shows Central Asia’s 
interrepublican trade balance for major commodities in 1987. This indicates that Central 
Asia was an overall net importer from the other republics of the Soviet Union. Second, 
Central Asia’s major export goods were light industrial products, agricultural products 
and non-ferrous metallurgy. It was a relatively large importer of food and beverages and 
machinery and metalwork goods (Figure 1.9). Secondary and processing industries were 
relatively rare and underdeveloped. The industrialisation that took place was prompted 
by direct transfers from outside the region. As Shahrani (1993:128) notes ‘...all 
equipment and machinery was brought to the area from Russia’; the factory managers 
tended also to be European. Narzikulov describes it as a dual economy,
the larger part of which (the agricultural sector ) employs mainly the local population, while in 
the smaller (industrial) part the bulk of [the] labour force is Russian-speaking. Internal links 
between the two parts, whereby agriculture might have provided a source of labor for 
developing industry, in fact were practically non-existent (1993:434).
In a similar vein, transport and energy linkages were designed with the object of 
supplying the USSR and links with regional neighbours were few and incomplete (see 
section 1.6.2).
Third, the Central Asian states relied on an annual infusions of funds from the central 
Soviet budget—equivalent to 15-30 per cent of republican GDP—to subsidise 
republican government activity (Figure 1.10). This allowed the Central Asian republics
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Figure 1.9 Central Asia regional trade balance in major goods, 1988 
(million roubles)
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Source: World Bank, 1993. Statistical Handbook 1993: states of the former USSR, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
to achieve levels of social development—particularly in terms of health standards and 
overall educational levels—in the later stages of the Soviet Union far higher than would 
probably otherwise have been possible.41 Orlowski, who provided the foundation study 
(1995) of this topic, argues that the transfers served political ends: to preserve inefficient 
enterprises in economically depressed areas, to compensate for losses arising from 
anomalous fixed prices, which hit state farms in Central Asia particularly severely; and 
to provide the infrastructure needed in region with high population growth rates.42 What 
is clear is that they enabled the Central Asian republics to achieve levels of government 
spending—and therefore to provide infrastructure and services—that they could not 
have otherwise.
1.8.2 Geographical factors
Recent research by economists such as Gallup and Sachs (1999), Demurger et al.
(2001), Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Redding and Venables (2004), has renewed interest 
in the role that geographical location plays in transition and economic development. 
This literature highlights the fact that geographical factors do play a role in explaining
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Figure 1.10 Net transfers from all-Union budget to republican budgets as proportion 
of total republican government revenue (per cent)
30
Kazakstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Source: Orlowski, L.T., 1995. ‘Direct transfers between the former Soviet Union central budget and the 
republics: past evidence and current implications’, Economics of Planning, 28(l):59-73.
economic performance, seem to play a role in explaining political developments, and 
have an impact on institutional development. Gallup and Sachs (1999) and Demurger et 
al. (2001) look at the importance of geography in terms of whether or not countries and 
regions are landlocked. Redding and Venables (2004) discuss the importance of access 
to markets and suppliers in determining economic performance. Sachs (1997a) discusses 
geographic influences on economic performance with specific reference to the transition 
economies, arguing that geography can influence not only trade and investment but also 
policy choices.
The basic idea is that being landlocked, in the modem world economy, makes it more 
difficult and more expensive for a country or region to engage in trade. One of the basic 
tenets of economic theory is that trade forms the basis of division of labour and hence of 
economic growth. Thus, the more open a country is to trade, the more likely it is to 
experience increased division of labour and increased economic growth (all other things 
being equal!) (Sachs 1997a). Gallup and Sachs (1999:7) find that very few landlocked 
countries outside Central and Western Europe are not poor, and those landlocked countries 
that are not poor tend to have navigable bodies of water connected to the main trading 
routes and/or are highly integrated into low-cost transport networks. Demurger et al. 
similarly find that access to navigable waterways is an important explanation for the 
varied performance of China’s regions. Sachs in this context notes that the landlocked 
countries of Eastern Europe are well connected with Western Europe by good roads and 
rail networks, whereas the landlocked countries of the Central Asia are ‘very far away 
from advanced-country markets’, and lack good road and rail connections (1997a: 10-11), 
which may explain some aspects of divergent economic performance.
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All the countries of Central Asia are landlocked and Central Asia is an extremely 
long way not just from Western Europe but any of the world’s major trading centres.
The Caspian Sea-Volga-Don system is the only long navigable waterway in the region, 
but this route encounters similar problems to the land-based transport systems— 
transhipments between the Caspian and the Volga and transport through Russia and 
Ukraine, with all the official and unofficial impositions that implies. This suggests that 
the Central Asian republics are at something of a geographic disadvantage compared 
with the European transition economies. Transport costs from Central Asia are high, so 
the goods exported from the region have to minimise transport and be high value: for 
example, oil, natural gas, gold. There is no scope for the kind of import-processing-re­
export form of industrialisation that characterised East Asia’s boom and which Sachs 
(1997a) sees emerging in Eastern Europe.
The most likely way of overcoming this isolation is the development of rail links, but 
progress has been slow. The USSR constructed railheads to the Chinese and Afghan 
borders, the China line reaching the border at Druzhba in present-day Kazakstan and the 
Afghan line reaching the border at Kushka in Turkmenistan and Termez in southern 
Uzbekistan. In Afghanistan, they were able to build linking roads through to the major 
urban centres. The Chinese link from Urumqi to Druzhba was only completed in 
September 1990, having been delayed by the Sino-Soviet dispute until the Gorbachev 
era. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, rail linkages have not expanded a great deal. 
One major success was the opening of a rail link between Iran and Turkmenistan 
running from Mashhad to Sarakhs in 1997. Iran’s rail network itself is underdeveloped, 
but this link does provide access to an ocean port at Bandar Abbas, currently via Tehran 
but soon by a more direct route.
Even where rail linkages have been created, the gauge sizes generally differ between 
FSU and other countries. This means that the services are delayed by the need to trans­
ship goods or change bogies. This is the case between, for example, Kazakstan and 
China and between Turkmenistan and Iran. Where suitable facilities have been installed, 
such as on the Chinese side at Druzhba or on the Polish-Belorussian border, the bogies 
of a whole train can be changed in a few hours; but, where these facilities are not 
available, goods must be transshiped, which is both time-consuming and costly.
The fact is that the Central Asian economies are severely isolated from world 
markets, which hinders their ability to export competitively or import cheaply and 
easily. The ability to overcome the constraints of landlockedness is a crucial factor in 
the economic performance of the region’s economies (Gleason 2000), and no doubt 
underlies the almost universal interest in the Great Silk Road project among the region’s 
leaders (Akaev 2001; Niyazov 2001).43
Unfortunately, policymakers in the region have done little actual work to address this 
critical constraint. Repressive policies hindering the movement of goods and people, 
combined with reportedly pervasive corruption among border officials, have made 
exporting through the region extremely difficult (see Green 2001). Molnar and Ojala 
(2003:9), for example, claim ‘[u]noffial payments made by truck drivers between 
Kyrgyzstan and Siberia amount to US$1,500 on average’. This is obviously in addition 
to the official fees, duties, and so forth, as well as unnecessary bureaucratic time-wasting.44
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Economic cooperation agreements and proposals for free trade areas have foundered as 
politicians pursue domestic interests. If the region has any hope of reducing its isolation 
from world markets, it must work to reduce the barriers to land transport. This means 
reducing official customs requirements and inspections and the capacity of customs 
officials to delay shipments; it also means eliminating the unofficial costs of transport, 
increasing the security of shipments, and ensuring the infrastructure is in place to make 
competitive exporting feasible. Again, however, the Central Asian republics are forced 
to rely first on one another to act positively, but also on their bigger, more powerful, 
neighbours to act similarly.
Transport of oil and natural gas presents similar difficulties. Transport pipelines in 
the Soviet era ran from the region to Russia and the other European republics. Oil and 
natural gas production in the region was intended to fill all-Union needs, and exports to 
neighbours in the region were not a high priority. As a consequence, Russia has enjoyed 
a near monopoly on transporting oil and natural gas out of Central Asia. There are two 
problems with this for Central Asia: Russia can dictate terms to Central Asian exporters, 
and the most immediate export destinations are countries that have at times proved 
reluctant or unable to pay for their imports (for example, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine). 
The urgency of developing alternative transport routes out of the region is obvious. A 
number of possible routes have been mooted, but economic sense seems to be inversely 
related to strategic palatability to the potential financiers. The most economically 
feasible routes would appear to run to a deep-water port in Iran, and possibly through 
China to supply East Asia, but neither option is palatable to US policymakers. 
Nonetheless, Iran has established a limited trade in natural gas with Turkmenistan, and 
China signed an agreement with Kazakstan to build a pipeline linking the Caspian area 
to China, the competition from which has provided a fillip to Kazakstan’s oil exports 
{Washington Times, 19 May 2004).
US focus has been on developing the massive Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which would 
provide access to the Mediterranean but still leaves the problem of delivering the oil 
from Central Asia to Baku. Suggestions of developing a pipeline route through 
Afghanistan have also revived since the fall of the Taliban. This line is projected to run 
from Turkmenistan’s Davlatabad gas fields through Afghanistan to the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar (BBC News, 30 May 2002; Smirnov 2003), but it is not clear whether 
Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan are secure enough to make this viable. 
Nor is it clear that the Pakistani and Indian markets, which would be a major component 
of the projected revenue stream, really warrant the investment (Smirnov 2003).
Central Asia is further constrained by economic geography. Compared to their 
neighbours in East and South Asia, the Central Asian economies have relatively very 
high labour costs. This means that the development path followed initially in East Asia, 
and now in Eastern Europe, whereby a country can position itself as a cheaper 
alternative to production in nearby industrialised economies, is not available. Contrast 
this with the situation in Vietnam or the Eastern European countries. In both cases, the 
labour costs are sufficiently low in comparison with nearby industrialised competitors 
that it becomes attractive for firms to relocate production to low labour-cost centres and 
then export their goods back to high-income countries.
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On a related note, there is the issue of trade complementarities. Of the Central Asian 
economies’ major exports—oil, gas, and cotton—all are produced to a serious extent by 
neighbouring economies. Both gas and oil find natural competitor economies quite close 
at hand. Russia is the world’s largest producer and exporter of natural gas, and Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are among the top ten producers. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and 
China all figure among the world’s largest producers of crude oil. There are more 
grounds for optimism in respect of oil exports, given that the world’s largest importers 
of crude oil include Japan, Korea, China and India, but it remains to be seen whether 
Central Asian producers can overcome the cost advantages held by producers in other 
regions (International Energy Agency 2002).
Cotton, one of the more successful exports from Central Asia since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, also faces some problems. Russia, Turkey and a number of East Asian 
countries are among the world’s largest importers of cotton, but Central Asian cotton 
exporters face a certain amount of competition from the substantial cotton exporting 
nations of Australia, Greece, Pakistan, Egypt, China and even Syria. Whether Central 
Asian cotton production can remain competitive in the face of exports from these 
nations is also not clear (Australian Cottongrower 2000).
The Central Asian energy producers are clearly going to find it difficult to find 
natural trading partners within the region, and production for export to more distant 
customers is made still more tenuous by the fact that the products actually have to be 
transported through competitor countries (see above).
1.8.3 Resource abundance and rentier states
Three of the Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, have 
substantial holdings of energy reserves—natural gas and oil (and to a lesser extent, 
coal). Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are also extremely dependent on gold exports. This 
natural endowment is widely seen as a positive aspect of their post-Soviet economic 
situation, particularly by the post-Soviet leaders.45 It is not clear, however, that such 
substantial reserves do indeed have a positive influence on economic and political 
outcomes. The economic debate on the problems experienced by resource-rich states, 
and their causes, is now so extensive that a truly comprehensive summary is probably 
beyond the scope of a full PhD thesis. Ross (1999) provides a mercifully compendious 
introduction to the issue;46 Auty (1997, 1998, 2001, 2003), Jones Luong and Weinthal 
(2001), and Tsalik (2003) provide useful discussions with particular reference to Central 
Asia; and Esanov et al. (2001) discusses the issue with respect to transition economies 
more generally. A highly simplified one-line summary of the debate would posit that 
natural resources represent an easily expropriated form of wealth, and this can lead to 
imbalance in a country’s economic structure and/or distort policymaking.
The Central Asian economies are highly dependent on mineral wealth, and this 
distinguishes them in an economic sense from most other CIS countries. It also means 
that these countries face economic and political pressures beyond those in Eastern 
Europe—a major challenge for the Central Asian republics will be ensuring that income 
flows from natural resource exploitation do not distort their economies or political 
systems.
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1.8.4 Geopolitical dimensions
A further geographical factor seems to be at work. Gallup and Sachs, for example, note 
that geographical location may have an influence on the types of policies chosen. They 
argue that ‘good policy and good geography may have a tendency to go together’ 
(1999:22). Or, consider Lindauer and Pritchett’s observation that ‘[l]iving near thriving 
neighbours with sound institutions creates an opportunity to borrow or even lock in 
good policies that is not available to others’ (2002:27). This is unfortunate because it is 
hard to identify a single properly democratic country near Central Asia.
The Central Asian economies are distinguished from both the Eastern European and 
East Asian counterparts by the amount and nature of foreign investment. Foreign direct 
investment is considered to be one way of overcoming the shortfall in domestic sources 
of finance that has characterised transition and developing economies. Unlike the East 
Asian and Eastern European economies, the Central Asian economies are a long way 
from any obvious sources of investment finance. Moreover, the funds they do receive 
are targeted at different kinds of investment than is the case in either East Asia or 
Eastern Europe. Investment in these regions has typically been directed towards opening 
up new markets or taking advantage of low labour costs in the host country, but 
investment in Central Asia is typically directed towards natural resources extraction 
(Campos and Kinoshita 2003).47 The impacts of this difference should be obvious: FDI 
based on markets or lower labour costs in the host country is more likely to lead to 
modernisation and a diversification of economic activity; FDI in natural resource 
extraction is more likely to reinforce the existing reliance on a few select products. 
Shiells (2003) notes that FDI flows into Kazakstan and Turkmenistan were 
overwhelmingly associated with energy sector developments, and those into Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan were almost completely associated with a single gold mining project in 
each country. FDI inflows to Uzbekistan were minimal given the republic’s economic 
potential—between 1989 and 2001, Uzbekistan received US$30 per capita cumulative. 
Only Tajikistan received less at US$24. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan received US$85, 
Turkmenistan US$191, and Kazakstan US$765 per capita (Table 1.10; also EBRD 2003).
Table 1.10 Net foreign direct investment, Central Asian republics, 1992-2002 
(US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kazakhstan 100 1271 660 964 1137 1320 1143 1584 1278 2796 2138
Kyrgyzstan 0.0 10 38 96 47 83 87 38 -7 -1 16
Tajikistan 9 9 12 10 18 18 25 21 24 9 36
Turkmenistan n.a 79 103 233 108 108 62 125 126 170 100
Uzbekistan 9 48 73 -24 90 167 140 121 75 83 65
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003: education for global participation, Asian 
Development, Manila. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003. EBRD Transition 
Report 2003, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London.
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1.9 Conclusion
Central Asia has been in a fairly continuous process of economic change since the 
Russian invasion began in the late 1700s. Through both the Tsarist and Soviet eras, the 
region became increasingly specialised in the production of raw materials for export to 
the Russian metropolis. This was accompanied, in most of the region, by a 
corresponding decrease in food self-sufficiency and manufacturing industry. The Soviet 
era saw some significant attempts to reverse this overall trend—grain production in 
Kazakstan increased under the Virgin Lands scheme, and Soviet industrial plants were 
opened in the region during and after the Second World War—but these did little to alter 
the dependence of the region on the centre as a market for production and as a source of 
resources and capital.
Thus, on gaining their independence, the Central Asian economies did not face the 
same set of circumstances as faced by the CEE or Baltic transition economies.
Alongside their dependence on the centre for capital, goods, subsidies and markets, the 
Central Asian republics differed significantly from those countries in terms of resource 
endowments, structure, demographic factors, and geographic location. In their 
population and economic structures, for example, the Central Asian economies resemble 
more closely the transition economies of East Asia than those of Central and Eastern 
Europe, but even this comparison is faulty in that regions of the East Asian transitional 
economies were able to take advantage of the dynamism and growth occurring 
throughout East and Southeast Asia and also the benefits of trade. Recent advances in 
economic research also point to the influence of geographic location on economic and 
political systems and their performance. This would not appear propitious for Central 
Asia because the region is geographically isolated from world markets and surrounded 
by polities not noted for democracy or even strong institutional development.
Such factors are important because they explain, to a considerable extent, economic 
developments in the region since 1991. The withdrawal of the Soviet centre from 
economic coordination and activity was an exogenous economic shock to the Central 
Asian republics. The way in which the republics responded to this shock, and were able 
to make use of the peculiar conditions outlined above, determined their economic 
performance in the post-Soviet period.
N otes
1 Christian (1998), for example, outlines why the steppe environment was conducive to this kind of activity.
2 See also Collins (2002) for a discussion of ‘clan’ politics in Central Asia more generally.
3 While this proposition is acceptable, the coincidence of political instability in many of the societies along the Silk Routes 
may, however, be grounds for suspicion. Certainly in the oasis towns of inner Asia, the trans-continental trade would have 
represented an important aspect of their economies. Thus, any disruption to that trade would pose a powerful exogenous 
shock to economic/social well-being in each town, and this would likely create political instability.
4 This, together with Rossabi’s political stability argument should be considered carefully by contemporary silk-road 
revivalists. It is not enough to simply establish the infrastructure of a new Silk Road; political and economic security and 
stability has also to be established along the route. It is not clear that this will be achieved soon. The second point is that there 
is ample scope for trade within Central Asia and with regional neighbours to the north and south—again, factors have worked 
against this being realised.
5 See also Adshead (1993).
6 For a füll description of the process, see Soucek (2000). It is quite difficult to establish a precise starting point for the Russian 
conquest of the region. Roy (2000), for example, takes it as the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1552 and 1556 respectively.
7 Laying aside, of course, the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan in 1979-89, on which, see Maley (2003).
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8 Aminov and Babakhodzhaev (1966:33), for example, point to disruptions to world cotton markets owing to the American Civil 
war as prompting more vigorous Russian colonisation of Central Asia in the 1860s. Pierce (1960) also suggests that Russia 
was already searching for new sources of cotton after suffering interruptions to its cotton imports during the Crimean War.
9 The Great Game—as the geopolitical contest between the Russian and British empires in South and Central Asia in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are known—has generated wide interest and a considerable popular literature. See, 
for example, Hopkirk (1991, 1995) and Meyer and Brysac (1999). More academic sources include Gillard (1977) and 
Edwardes (1975).
10 This, inevitably, was a source of conflict in the steppe areas of Central Asia: as d’Encausse (1994:161) notes, ‘conflict 
between Russian settlers and local nomads became a daily occurrence on the plain...’. See also Olcott (1987).
11 See also Matley (1994a) and Demko (1969).
12 This is considered in more detail below in the discussion of the Virgin Lands scheme.
13 See Olcott (1987) for the authoritative discussion of this process.
14 It would be wrong, in this light, to see increasing monoculture in Central Asia as specifically a Soviet inspired problem.
15 The development of the railways in this way did not, however, reflect a deliberate economic policy choice. They were 
designed to serve strategic military rather than economic ends. Matley (1994b), for example, notes that Central Asia’s major 
cotton producing areas did not directly access the rail network until the Trans-Caspian line was extended through Tashkent to 
the Ferghana Valley (in 1898-99). The first economically effective rail connection came with the opening of the Orenburg- 
Tashkent line in 1906 (Matley 1994b).
16 Becker (1968) argues that Russian dominance was involved in some industrial growth, but that this was mostly associated 
with cotton processing and closely attached to the railways.
17 Note, however, that Becker (1968:182) states that ‘Bukhara and Khiva never developed the kind of overspecialised, one-crop 
economy that Fergana had’, and that ‘Bukhara and Khiva, unlike Fergana, remained self-sufficient in food, and for the most 
part cotton was raised by small peasants as a supplementary source of income, rather than by specialized producers’ (1968:183).
18 Aminov and Babakhodzhaev (1966:49) argue that the industrialisation that took place in Central Asia during the Tsarist era 
was a consequence of the introduction of capitalism to the region but that this did not reflect a conscious effort at 
modernisation by the Tsarist rulers (but that is a different question). They also attribute to the introduction of capitalism the 
opportunity to develop more progressive forms of ownership and societal relations, a higher level of economic development, a 
more rapid collapse of patriarchal-feudal relations, and increased levels of non-subsistence farming (including the 
specialisation in cotton). This seems somewhat optimistic: it is not clear that patriarchal dominance has been sufficiently 
tempered to this day, it is probable that feudal relations were (and are) maintained in altered form throughout the Tsarist,
Soviet and even post-Soviet eras; and the growth of cotton specialisation and the break-up of nomadic herding practices are 
now seen as environmentally disastrous. The general approach of Soviet-era writers was to highlight the importance of Tsarist 
colonisation in taking the region to a higher, but of course not the ultimate, stage of economic organisation by eliminating 
feudal-patriarchal relations, by connecting Central Asia to world markets, and also by curtailing the squabbles and warfare 
between neighbouring khanates (see Khalfin 1965).
19 For example, Nove (1989) provides the classic account of the development of the Soviet system from 1917 through to the mid 
1980s; Nove (1977) provides a detailed critical overview of the operation of the Soviet economic system; Desai (1987) 
considers the problems of the late Soviet economy; and IMF et al. (1991) provide a comprehensive overview of the Soviet 
economy immediately prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
20 In the kolkhozy, land was worked collectively, each member’s income was a share of the final produce. The sovkhozy were 
run more like state factories in that their employees were paid a set wage (Davies 1998). In theory, the kolkhozy were more 
autonomous from the state, electing their own management and financing their activities out of revenue earned, whereas the 
sovkhozy were directed by the state organs and relied on the state to pay wages, fund investments and appoint managers. In 
practice, however, kolkhoz managers were no more autonomous than their sovkhoz counterparts. See Nove (1977) for a more 
complete, and wryly critical, discussion of the Soviet agricultural production system.
21 In 1992, the wheat yield in the Asian areas of the former Soviet Union was 13955 hectograms (100 grams) per hectare, 
compared with 21697 in the European areas. More specifically, the Ukraine in that year yielded 30926 hectograms of wheat 
per hectare, compared with 13324 in Kazakstan, 27335 in Kyrgyzstan, 9286 in Tajikistan, 19137 in Turkmenistan and 15375 
in Uzbekistan. That said, these figures compare fairly favourably with Australia’s wheat production at the time (FAOSTAT, 
2004 data).
22 McCauley (1976) and Durgin (1962), for example, describe massive quantities of grain being left to rot in the fields owing to 
the lack of appropriate collection and storage facilities.
23 This seems to have been driven partly by an almost wilful lack of attention among policymakers to the prevention of erosion 
(see McCauley 1976). Peterson (1993:99) claims that ‘an average of 30-50 percent of the humus was lost’ from the soil 
across the regions in the Virgin Lands program.
24 An early and still fairly positive assessment of the Karakum Canal is provided by Kornilov and Timoshkina (1975). For, a 
more recent discussion of the operation of the canal, and its problems, see Hannan and O’Hara (1998).
25 For example, Peterson (1993); Massey Stewart (1992). Until September 2001, the Aral Sea problem garnered by far the 
widest media and public attention towards Central Asia in the West. In my experience, it was probably the only association 
most Westerners could make with the region at that time. This dominance has led to the black observation that if every 
international consultant sent to study the Aral Sea just took along a bucket of water, there would be no problem. Back issues 
of Soviet Geography (later Post-Soviet Geography and Economics and Eurasian Geography and Economics) chart the 
development of the issue from an idle scientific/engineering problem into a full-scale disaster (some examples include 
Chernenko 1968; Kuznetsov 1976; Borovskiy 1980; Rafikov 1983; monograph studies of the region’s problems include 
Micklin and Williams 1996; Kobori and Glantz 1998).
Chernenko (1968:491) provides a salutary example of the blithe arrogance of the scientists and policymakers who chose to 
manufacture this crisis. Predicting that the sea level would stabilise at 12 metres below the then level, he noted that this 
wobld ‘reduce sea area from its present 64,100km2 to 38,800km2...’ adding that ‘[s]uch a body of water may, of course, no 
longer deserve the generic name of “sea”, but at least it will continue to exist, to delight people as before, to serve as a 
waterway and as a source of fish, and to prevent the great danger of regional salinization’.
26 Pomfret (2002a: 176), for example, notes that decisions regarding the best way to increase production and yields were decided 
on political grounds, whereas ‘[i]n a market economy there would have been technical competition and, in most cases, a 
convergence on the technology revealed to be superior’.
27 See Pomfret (2002a) for a useful summary of Soviet cotton production statistics.
1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 37
28 Black et al. (1991:239) argue that much of this was only temporarily evacuated.
29 One is tempted to ponder what would have occurred under different economic and political structures. The Central Asian 
economies were characterised by high population growth and consequently by abundant labour and relatively low wage rates 
compared to the rest of the Union. They would appear to have had a comparative advantage compared over the rest of the 
Union in agriculture, some extractive industries, and in labour-intensive, low-skill industry. This, however, would have been 
offset by the high transport costs, making the overall impact on the economic structure difficult to discern.
30 Contemporary Western economists have, perhaps understandably, tended to denigrate the achievements of the Soviet era, 
preferring to concentrate on the (admittedly often terrible) failures. They have also tended to belittle the attitudes of those 
who express regret for the passing of the Soviet era as the mutterings of reactionaries, unreconstructed communists or 
contrarians. To do this, however, is to ignore the fact that for the majority of people in Central Asia the Soviet era was better 
than both the era that preceded it and, sadly, that which has followed it.
31 As Field (2002) notes, however, emphasis in the Soviet health care system was on quantitative, rather than qualitative, 
indices. Thus, while the number of hospital beds and health personnel increased throughout the period, less attention was 
paid to improving facilities or techniques. The existence of separate health care facilities specifically for various elite groups 
also subverted the principle of equality of access.
32 The increase in literacy was especially pronounced among women because provision of education to women had not been 
given a particularly high priority prior to the revolution.
33 Jukes’ finding that female enrolments in tertiary-level education far outstripped those of Iran. Afghanistan, Turkey and India 
(and indeed was similar to that in Australia at the time)—despite near universal female illiteracy at the beginning of Soviet 
rule—is indicative of the progress made in the region (Jukes 1973 :43).
34 As Matley (1994a:284) notes, in the early years Soviet policy was ‘simply a projection of pre-1917 Russian policy with its 
emphasis on cotton growing and upon withdrawal from raising grain and other foodstuffs’.
35 For example, Central Asian production of cotton fabric represented around 5 per cent of the Soviet Union total in 1960.
36 The lack of trade with Central Asia’s immediate neighbours was briefly discussed in the 1957 UNECE report (1957).
37 This was somewhat altered in Kazakstan, but not in the other Central Asian republics {The Economist, 16 February 1991).
38 This is apparently true even of Akaev {Independent, 24 August 1991).
39 Nazarbaev was scheduled to take part in the discussions, but the agreement among the three republics was concluded before 
he arrived {Renters, 8 December 1991).
40 Nazarbaev’s position here was probably influenced by Gorbachev’s promise to appoint him Prime Minister within a renewed 
Soviet Union {Reuters, 8 December 1991, 9 December 1991; 10 December 1991).
41 Esanov et al. (2001:13) raise this as a pressing factor in the transition, stating that ‘[r]uling elites in the CIS countries were 
faced with a serious challenge: how to replace implicit and explicit transfers to maintain their support base’.
42 One of the curious factors that Orlowski (1995) points out is that the ‘richer’ republics—Kazakstan and Uzbekistan— 
paradoxically received proportionally more than the poorer republics.
43 Tajikistan probably represents the worst case in that it has very limited land transport connections with the rest of the world. 
Its current shipping routes pass through Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The Afghan route was obviously not viable 
during the Afghan wars, but the Kyrgyz and Uzbek routes were also frequently closed when officials in those countries 
became unsettled by radical groups operating from Tajik border regions and by the civil war more generally. Thus, Tajik trade 
was, and remains, highly contingent on officials in neighbouring countries allowing shipments across their borders (see 
Gleason 2000).
44 Molnar and Ojala (2003), for example, note that whereas trains typically spend 30-40 minutes at borders between EU 
countries, they can be detained for days at CIS borders.
45 For example, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister is reported to have said, ‘A radical restructuring of the economy will take decades, 
so the country should now rely on its extractive industries . . Because the accelerated expansion of extractive industries would 
improve conditions for other sectors, using them as a locomotive would be strategically correct’ {Interfax, 17 October 2003).
46 See also Ross (2001) for a statistically-informed argument in favour of the thesis that resource wealth impedes democratisation.
47 In the more technical description, investment in Eastern Europe is ‘efficiency-seeking’ and/or ‘market-seeking’; investment 
in Central Asia is ‘resource-seeking’. See Shiells (2003) and Campos and Kinoshita (2003). Another important factor in this 
regard is that ‘resource-seeking’ investment seems to occur in spite of the usual barriers to investment—corruption, 
bureaucratic heavy-handedness, etc.—whereas market-seeking and efficiency-seeking investment seems to rely on these 
barriers being removed. It would be interesting to speculate on the influence this difference could have on host governments.
2 THEORIES OF TRANSITION
This chapter will discuss theories of transition, starting from the problematic aspects of 
defining exactly what the term transition describes. The chapter leads on from Chapter 1 
by discussing reasons underpinning the impetus for reform in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It then discusses the standard theoretical 
reform packages advanced at the beginning of the transition period, highlighting the 
debates and differences in approach that characterised that period. It will conclude by 
discussing two of the most divisive aspects of the transition era—the speed of transition 
and the role of privatisation in transition.
2 .1  D e f in in g  t r a n s it io n
2.1.1 Economic reform
Although most people recognise the existence of a group of economies known as the 
transition economies, it is actually rather difficult to define what exactly transition is. Is 
it defined by sweeping economic reform? This is a dubious proposition. Countries such 
as India, the individual nations of South America, even Western economies such as the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia, have undertaken widespread economic 
reforms that have radically altered the economic processes within them, but these 
countries would never be regarded as ‘in transition’. On the other hand, Turkmenistan 
and Belarus are considered to be undergoing transition, even though they have introduced 
very little in the way of economic reform and strong elements of government control are 
still in place.
2.1.2 Political reform
Can it be said that transition involves a move to increased democracy? After all, these 
countries were once part of the Soviet Union, notorious in the West for its totalitarianism 
and lack of democracy. Again, however, the idea that transition necessarily involves 
democratisation is sadly untenable. While it is arguable that the transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe has generally been associated with a shift towards more democratic 
regimes, the argument founders the further east one travels. Most of the current regimes 
in the Central Asian republics mouth the words of democracy, but are less interested in 
actually implementing it (see Chapter 5). If democracy had a role in transition, it is 
unlikely that any of the Central Asian republics, particularly Turkmenistan, could be 
considered as being in transition.
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2.1.3 The problem of definitions
But if we must conclude that neither extensive economic reform nor extensive political 
reform are integral to transition, we are rightly forced to ask: what is transition?
There is no concrete meaning to the term; it is ambiguous and means different things 
to different people. Economists, particularly those associated with the multinational 
institutions, tend to emphasise the importance of economic restructuring. Fischer and 
Gelb (1991:91) outlined what could be seen as the Western economic understanding of 
transition, arguing for a ‘move from a more or less planned socialist system to a private 
market economy, one in which ownership predominates’. The World Bank (1996) 
report, From Plan to Market, optimistically identifies transition as
...not simply the adoption or modification of a few policies or programs but a passage from one
mode of economic organization to a thoroughly different one (World Bank 1996:6).
The approach seems to have derived from economic reform experiences in South 
America and the currently unfashionable Washington Consensus.1 At the same time, 
there seems to have been a broad assumption among economists that the transition 
countries would democratise.
The other side of transition theory derives from theorists of political change and 
democratisation. This line of thought has typically sought to place democratisation in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in the context of democratisation 
movements throughout the world (Linz and Stepan 1996a; Schmitter and Karl 1994). As 
with the economic aspects of transition, however, not everyone accepted that South 
America provided a sensible model, or even comparator, for post-socialist democratic 
transition (for example, Meiklejohn Terry 1993; Bunce 1995). Political theorists have 
differed from the economists in being far more reticent to extrapolate experiences 
elsewhere to provide a model for transition countries and instead seeing the transition as 
a way of refining their theories.2 The advocacy role has been left to multinational 
organisations—such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters without 
Borders—and think-tanks such as Freedom House.
Many observers implicitly pictured some sort of end-point or goal, with a Western 
market economy or a Western-style democracy or both the assumed result of the reform 
process.3 This turned out to be a reasonable assumption in Eastern Europe and the 
Baltics, but less tenable in the other transition nations.4 The assumption is typified by 
UNICEF’s review publication A Decade of Transition, which elaborates on
the twin goals that have shaped the region since 1989: to create democratic societies in which 
human rights flourish...and to move economic organization from a planned to a market system 
(UNICEF 2001 :ix).
The problematic aspect is that, outside Eastern Europe and the Baltics, 
democratisation and market economics are in play only where they (a) bolster the 
sustainability of essentially undemocratic regimes or (b) exist beyond the repressive 
reach of the state. The problem is identified by Carothers (2002:6), who notes: ‘Most 
countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling “transitional” are not 
in transition to democracy, and of the democratic transitions that are under way, more 
than a few are not following the model’.
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So, in defining what a transition country is, we are reduced to noting merely that they 
are the residual countries of the former Soviet bloc and nothing more (Allsop and 
Kierzkowski 1997). There is no other process, condition or goal that defines them.
Perhaps we could follow and extend Ellman’s (1994) approach and argue that transition 
involved a period of political and economic instability in nominally socialist countries, 
which opened up the possibility of substantial political and economic change but did not 
always result in that change. Alternatively, we could argue that transition in fact does 
involve both political and economic change; and thus force ourselves to conclude that 
most of Central Asia is not and has not been in transition. In this thesis, I have adopted 
the first of these approaches, using ‘transition’ to refer broadly to countries of the 
former Soviet bloc and to the period of economic and political stability starting from 
1989 in Eastern Europe and 1991 in the former Soviet Union.
2.2 W hy transition?
2.2.1 Economic stagnation
The push for economic reform did not simply appear. It reflected ongoing stagnation 
and economic distress in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and also the Soviet 
Union, and also dissatisfaction with the political situation in many of these countries.
During the 1980s, growth of Russian gross national product was moribund, productivity 
growth in terms of both capital and labour was minimal, the opportunities for extensive 
rather than intensive growth had been largely exhausted,5 the diversion of resources 
away from consumer goods to bolster heavy-industry and armaments manufacturing 
meant that rationing had to be imposed on consumers, and government finances were in 
a perilous state (Nove 1989; Ofer 1987; Easterly and Fischer 1994, 1995; Desai 1987). 
Why did the growth model that had served the Soviet Union reasonably well since the 
1930s, most notably in mobilising resources in the second world war but also with some 
successes in the 1960s, go awry?
This taps into the long debate on what exactly caused growth to slow down in the 
Soviet Union, particularly during the 1980s. Writing in the 1980s, authors such as Desai 
(1987) and Ofer (1987, 1990) argued that the slowdown was caused by diminishing 
returns to capital accumulation and a slowdown in technical change arising from the 
inefficiencies of the Soviet economic system. Ofer argues that, with the extremely slow 
growth in the labour force, economic growth under the extensive growth model, in 
which growth is achieved by merely adding more of the factors of production into the 
production process, could only be derived from additions of capital. But additions of 
capital while labour is held constant would yield rapidly diminishing returns (Ofer 
1987; see also Nove 1989). This was compounded by the limited indigenous technical 
change in the Soviet Union: at the enterprise or farm level, managers had no incentive to 
introduce new technologies and production processes because the consequences of 
getting things wrong, or even a temporary slowdown as new technologies were 
introduced, were too high (Desai 1987). Ofer proffered the following explanation:
First, extensive growth is by nature exhaustible, as manifested in the unavoidable decline in the
growth rates of inputs. Second, technological change and improved efficiency failed to replace
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input growth; in fact the contribution of technology declined over the years, reflecting the 
increased difficulty of borrowing Western technologies cheaply. Finally, the decline in growth 
was accelerated by the strategy of haste (Ofer 1987:1814).
Writing prior to the East Asian financial collapse, Easterly and Fischer (1994, 1995) 
countered this by arguing that the extensive growth model was not the important 
factor—after all, many countries, such as Japan and the ‘Asian Tigers’, were 
successfully following exactly the same model of growth and had not run into the same 
problems. They argued that the growth slowdown was caused by a ‘low elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor’ causing ‘especially acute diminishing returns to 
capital compared with the case in market economies’ (Easterly and Fischer 1995:341). 
They were less clear about the reasons for the low substitutability of capital and labour 
in the Soviet Union.
Nove (1989) also provided the simple explanation that the complexity of organising 
the planned economy overwhelmed the planners. Information was not complete enough 
to make coherent and consistent judgments; plans became imbalanced, often making it 
difficult for producers to get the inputs they needed for production. Desai (1987) raised 
the issue of these bottlenecks and shortages as a factor in the decline, but in reality they 
are both a cause and consequence of economic decline. They reflect the inability of the 
economy to produce enough of the right kinds of goods, and this reflects the deeper lack 
of information, signalling and feedback within the system, combined with the inflexible 
attitudes of producers towards changes in production, prices or production processes.
2.2.2 The shift from economic stagnation to political unrest
These approaches may explain why the growth slowdown occurred, but they do not 
explain why or how this was transformed into a major regime shift in the Soviet Union. 
The link between economic hardship and political regime shift is not always obvious. 
Most countries, obviously, do not suffer a revolution whenever their economies are flat.
In considering the Soviet economy, many economists highlighted the worsening 
shortages and the need for queuing and rationing.6 And, indeed, the economic stagnation 
manifested itself most destructively in the increased rationing of even basic consumption 
goods. This, however, really does not suffice as an explanation: certainly, if economic 
stagnation is to break out into widespread popular unrest, then shortages of basic 
consumer goods—bread, meat, milk and so forth—are the most likely channel, but 
rationing and queuing had long been a feature of the Soviet economy. The post-war 
housing shortage, for example, was a limitation to a basic human need, but did not result 
in revolution or regime change. What then was special about the late 1980s?
In an authoritarian regime a special set of conditions is necessary for economic 
disorder to break out into political change. The elite in an authoritarian regime has at all 
times to provide the majority of the people incentives not to push for political change. 
This has two sides to it: there is the negative incentive of repression (such as the threat 
of punishment, torture or death, economic harm and social marginalisation) and the 
positive incentive of current or future economic, political and social well-being (such as 
the achievement or promise of rapid economic growth, improved living standards and 
political stability, among other things).
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The negative incentive is obvious; the government, through political violence or 
oppression, can make the consequences of dissent so grave as to render dissent 
unattractive to most people. As long as the regime is powerful and committed to 
maintaining authoritarian rule, it will be in a position to ensure that the costs of dissent 
(such as, being imprisoned, tortured, ostracised) are too high for most people.7
On the other hand, the government can provide positive incentives to limit the urge 
to dissent. If most people feel that they are better off maintaining the incumbent regime 
for the benefits it provides now, or is expected to provide in the future, they will not 
push for a major regime shift. As O’Donnell et al. (1986:21) suggested, ‘...where the 
objective performance and subjective confidence of the regime is high, a transition is 
not likely to occur’. In a sense, under such circumstances the majority are unwilling to 
join the efforts of those agitating for reform because they feel that the expected political, 
economic and social benefits of retaining the incumbent situation are higher than the 
expected gains from moving to an uncertain new system.
So, even if economic conditions are terrible, revolution or regime change is not 
necessarily just around the comer. This is just part of the necessary conditions for 
economic stagnation to be transferred into economic unrest. What needs to happen is:
(a) the repressive power of the state must break down,8 and (b) the promise of future and 
current political, social and economic well-being needs to be absent or at least 
discredited. Once these two conditions are in play, there is scope for widespread and 
open public action.
Now to our question: what was special about the late 1980s? The answer lies in the 
special factors mentioned above. In the immediate post-war era, the negative and 
positive incentives worked together to inhibit the urge to dissent. Political repression 
was still very strong, and economic conditions for most people were clearly improving 
after the severe privations of the war era. The Soviet Union at this time was moving 
towards its ‘golden era’, with increasing GDP, improved health and social conditions 
reflected in wider access to better housing, improved life expectancy, and so forth 
(Nove 1989). The leadership could point to the very real progress that had been made in 
terms of improving economic and social conditions and could credibly claim that this 
would continue. While economic conditions were dire, the future looked better and the 
incumbent regime would have seemed the group most likely to be able to guarantee 
social and political stability.
In the late 1980s, the positive and negative incentives were once again working 
together but in the other direction. Economic conditions were worsening—and had been 
for some time—and the long-run inability to control this decline brought into question 
the Soviet regime’s credibility. There was no obvious acceptable solution to the 
problem, which meant that not only current economic conditions were dim, but so also 
were perceptions of how economic conditions would be in the future. At the same time, 
the regime’s willingness to repress dissent had weakened. As Noren and Kurtzweg 
(1993:26) put it:
To explain the popular discontent that flourished in the 1980s...one also has to take into 
account the much greater freedom of expression in printed and spoken dialogue and even in 
demonstrations and strikes.
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The late 1980s were different in that the negative and positive incentives meant to 
limit dissent were suddenly lost. In Russia at least, perestroika served to worsen the 
economic situation, while glasnost’ worked to open up the political space for critical 
voices. Yeltsin’s emergence as a legitimate and popular alternate centre of power from 
within the Communist Party was made possible by social collapse, but also by the 
widening space for criticism.9
As discussed in Chapter 1, Central Asia was passive amidst the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. There is a reason for this. The Central Asian republics arguably achieved far 
higher levels of income and social well-being than would have been likely had they not 
been part of the Soviet Union. The region saw riots and protests in the perestroika era, 
but none of these manifested themselves as overtly revolutionary in the sense of aiming 
for the destruction of the Soviet Union. Even though there was considerable privation 
and extensive shortages in the region, with housing an especially provocative issue, the 
positive economic incentive remained far stronger in Central Asia than elsewhere in the 
Union. The costs of collapse were apparent and too large, and the benefits (social, 
psychological and economic) of breaking away from the Soviet Union too nebulous for 
large-scale change to attract widespread support. At the same time, the period of 
political instability (or democratic opening) was far shorter in Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and virtually non-existent in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, limiting the 
opportunity for people to push for change.
2.3 C omponents of transition
Perceptions of what economic transition involves vary. The basic formula presented by 
the World Bank (1996) posits ‘Liberalisation, stabilisation, and growth’ as the necessary 
general ingredients for transition. I take this to mean converting economic processes to 
systems more extensively based on market forces, achieving price stability, and 
regaining economic growth.
Liberalisation, it is stated, ‘involves freeing up prices, trade, and entry from state 
controls...’ and ‘...decentralizes production and trading decisions to enterprises and 
households and directly addresses the two fundamental weaknesses of central planning: 
poor incentives and poor information’ (World Bank 1996:22).
This is fairly abstract and gives no sense of what exactly is required. Fischer and 
Gelb’s very early article ‘The process of socialist economic transformation’ set what can 
be considered the blueprint, if there is one, for most of the reform programs (Fischer and 
Gelb 1991; see also Gelb and Gray 1991). They define the critical elements of reform 
as:
1 Macroeconomic stabilisation. This particularly refers to price stabilisation, 
through elimination of monetary overhang and restraining of budget deficits, and 
attainment of external balance in terms of exchange rate stability, restraint of 
current account deficits, and also dealing with external debt problems (Gelb and 
Gray 1991).
2 Price and market reform. This includes the elimination of state controls over the 
prices, quantities, and types of goods sold. Further elements of this include
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opening up markets to foreign goods and the reduction of price subsidies on 
politically strategic goods. Market liberalisation is not confined to goods markets; 
labour and capital markets are also to be opened up.
3 Enterprise reform. Fischer and Gelb (1991) see two phases to enterprise reform— 
restructuring and privatisation. This includes imposition of hard budget 
constraints, reform of management, and finally change of management and/or 
ownership.
4 Institutional change. Institutions are formal and informal rules and constraints on 
the way people interact and transact within an economy (see discussion in section 
2.3.5). With the role of state in economic activity suddenly and drastically 
curtailed, replacement institutions to facilitate economic activity have to be 
induced or introduced.
This basic structure was widely accepted, and similar assessments are presented by, 
for example, the International Monetary Fund (2000a), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1995), Pomfret (2002b), Parker et al. (1994), 
Balcerowicz (1994a) and Roland (2000), among countless others. This is basically a 
summary of what an idealised market economy looks like and a set of fairly loose 
directions for finding it. It is reasonably safe to say that most non-Marxist economists 
shared this view of what needed to be done at the beginning of transition. Few argued, 
for example, that macroeconomic stabilisation was unnecessary. Very few even argued 
that most prices and markets should not be liberalised.10 Where economists divided was 
on the relative importance of these various aspects and the speed with which they 
should be implemented (this will be discussed in section 2.4).
2.3.1 Macroeconomic stabilisation
The transition economies entered the period with severe macroeconomic imbalances, 
which were manifested most overtly in severe inflation and output collapse. Because 
these two factors came to dominate perceptions of success and failure in the transition 
economies, they are dealt with separately in detail in Chapter 3. At the same time, 
however, macroeconomic stabilisation was intimately tied to the structural reforms— 
macroeconomic stabilisation was a necessary condition for the structural reforms to be 
effective, but the structural reforms would also contribute to the macroeconomic 
stabilisation.
Inflation. Achieving price stability quickly came to dominate the attentions of both 
Western and local economists and policymakers. This was driven by the widely-accepted 
notion that high inflation, or price instability, was a major factor in preventing the 
resumption of growth in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (World Bank 
1996),11 but also by the very dire nature of the inflation crises that seemed to have taken 
hold in the transition economies during the early 1990s. There was strikingly little debate 
about the importance of dealing with inflation—most economists and policymakers 
accepted that inflation was a problem, and most policymakers in the region made efforts 
to deal with it. What did generate considerable discussion, however, was the causes of 
the inflation. Chapter 3 will discuss these arguments in detail, and Chapter 6 will argue 
that the inflation in Central Asia, and its eventual control, were driven predominantly
2 THEORIES OF TRANSITION 45
but not exclusively by monetisation of budget deficits. Interestingly, the inflation crises, 
regardless of the strategies taken to address them, seemed to run their course rapidly, 
with hyperinflation disappearing in all countries within 3-̂ 4- years.
Output. The output collapse in the transition countries was more striking than the 
inflationary surge, largely because it was not as widely anticipated. In the most fortunate 
countries, output dropped to about 80 per cent of its pre-transition level before recovering; 
the worst cases saw output collapse to 30-40 per cent of its pre-transition level. Chapter 
3 discusses the various theories advanced to try to explain why this happened.
While restoring balanced growth of output was a major concern during the transition, 
the way of achieving this was, and is, a source of considerable conflict. Western 
economists and the multinational financial institutions have tended to argue that fast, 
radical reform was the key to output recovery. Considerable econometric work has been 
devoted to finding correlations between ‘reforms’ and economic growth, usually using 
large-scale cross-regional data from all the transition countries (see section 3.2.5). 
Chapter 6 will argue that reform is important, but among the Central Asian republics 
country-specific factors have far more obviously than economic reform driven output 
trends.
2.3.2 Price and market reform
What was wrong with prices? Prices in the Soviet economy were set to reflect plan 
priorities rather than relative scarcities. Market forces of supply and demand had no 
short-run influence on the official price of any particular good, a situation that pervaded 
all levels of the economy, from primary producers through industry to the consumer.
The prices of some goods, such as energy products, were held artificially low, whereas 
the prices of other goods were unrealistically high.
Several authors have provided outlines of how industrial input prices were set (see 
Nove 1977; Komai 1992; Bomstein 1989). In the industrial sector, prices were used 
more to enable the measurement and comparison of different, qualitatively non­
comparable, physical goods than as a means of economic coordination (Komai 1992; 
Nove 1977).12 The prices set under the planning system reflected a complex set of 
factors, most of which had economic basis. As Bomstein summarises,
[t]he resulting prices do not reflect relative scarcities or balance supply and demand for 
different products. Instead the goods are administratively allocated to users by the central 
supply agencies...Finally, because they do not correspond to relative scarcities, these prices are 
misleading measures of the relative importance of different goods in enterprise calculations of 
sales revenue, costs and profit, and in national plans and macroeconomic balances (1989:314).
Using Nove’s (1977) terminology, prices in the industrial sector had an evaluative 
rather than allocative purpose. They allowed planners to measure and assess enterprise 
economy—the efficiency with which they used the inputs they received—but they did not 
determine the inputs enterprises received or reflect the value of their transformation. For 
example, if both input prices and output prices are arbitrarily set, there is no way to judge 
whether a particular form of production is economically worthwhile or even adds value.
Consumer prices were similarly set to reflect planning priorities. At base, consumer 
prices were set according to producer costs plus an arbitrary profit margin, handling
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costs and so forth. Prices were supposed to be market clearing, but in practice they were 
not. Arbitrary judgments were made in determining prices, with some goods massively 
subsidised and other goods overpriced, which meant that over- and undersupply of 
particular goods was typical. Nove (1977) noted that goods such as oranges and meat 
were all but impossible to obtain in state stores, but other goods were impossible to sell. 
There was no way of effectively signalling which products were valued by consumers, 
and no power among enterprises to alter their product mix. Only the central planners 
could solve these problems, but they were working at a massive macroeconomic scale 
and probably could not be consistently aware of shortages and gluts at the extreme 
micro-level (see Nove 1989).
Markets and trade. A second problem was the absence of official competitive markets. 
In the industrial sector, this meant that businesses were largely obliged to obtain inputs 
from a specified source and sell their output to a particular buyer. The public also faced 
limited choices in purchasing consumer goods. Private enterprise was largely forbidden 
until the 1980s (other than small-scale retail and petty trade in some cases), so no new 
firms could enter the market to fill the gaps in plan output.13 Imports and the influx of 
foreign competition were strictly controlled by the state, so these gaps could not be 
filled by external sources either.
Soviet production was further distorted by monopoly-based production. Competition 
in both consumer and input goods markets was specifically avoided, which was 
particularly damaging because producers could not seek alternative, more competitive, 
sources of inputs—they were locked into their supply relationships.
Furthermore, the industrial structure was skewed away from production in which the 
Soviet Union had a natural advantage towards heavy-industry and the military-industrial 
complex, further reducing the efficiency of input usage. Planners, moreover, prioritised 
particular sectors at the expense of other sectors. Most notoriously, strong emphasis was 
placed on the development of heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer 
goods production generally.14 Thus, at the beginning of the reform process in the Soviet 
Union
• prices were set arbitrarily and did not reflect scarcity or the costs of production
• competition was repressed and even outlawed
• the industrial sector was severely distorted.
Price and market reforms were intended to reduce and minimise these distortions. 
Freeing prices would eradicate distortions in consumer markets (especially the 
pervasive queuing that had emerged as a form of rationing) and facilitate more efficient 
production by establishing more appropriate factor prices.
Market reforms would extend this by allowing greater competition from imports, 
foreign firms establishing a presence in Soviet markets, and from nascent domestic 
private sector firms. Producers would be allowed to source inputs from a range of 
suppliers, both domestic and foreign, thus enabling them to adopt more efficient 
production practices. In addition, suppliers would be permitted to sell their products to 
the highest bidders, rather than the customers stipulated by the planners.
The process of liberalising prices and markets was expected to revive the Soviet 
economies by improving the quantity, range and quality of goods and services available
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to consumers, by increasing the incentives and developing the economic signalling 
necessary for efficient production, and by diversifying the range of producers and the 
types of production.
Different approaches to price and market reform. Once again, few economists 
would argue against the importance of market-based prices in ensuring efficient use of 
resources and equilibration of supply and demand. The argument, however, lay in 
whether prices should be liberalised en masse or whether some sort of gradual or ‘dual 
track’ liberalisation of prices, such as that which had emerged in China, should be 
adopted.
Those arguing for the gradual, ‘dual-track’ approach maintained that it was necessary 
to avoid the shock that would be introduced by a single comprehensive reform. Ideally, 
under this system, there would be two price systems operating in any particular market, 
a set of prices at which the state bought and sold certain quantities of particular goods 
and services, and a market price determined by actual supply and demand for those 
goods and services in the economy. Over time, the gap between these two prices would 
be closed, as (a) the two different prices were brought into alignment and (b) goods 
were removed from the state track. The benefits of this system, it was argued, were that 
enterprises needed to be given time to adopt more efficient production practices, that a 
price shock would cause dislocation in markets and would lead to distress among 
consumers. Supporters of the dual-track system could seemingly point to the positive 
results of the dual-track system in China as evidence in favour of using this approach.
Those arguing for a comprehensive once-off liberalisation of prices suggested that 
dual-track pricing systems prevented the goods and services, particularly the factors of 
production, from being allocated efficiently. They also pointed out the potential for this 
system to generate corruption. People (usually those with strong political connections) 
could access goods at the lower state-set price and resell them at the higher market 
price, thus essentially receiving an undeserved direct transfer from the state. Another 
argument against the continuation of the dual-track pricing system was that it could give 
inefficient state-owned enterprises an advantage over start-up, or de novo, enterprises in 
accessing production inputs, thus hampering the emergence of new and more efficient 
industries.
In practice, no country eliminated all price controls overnight. Poland for example 
had a series of liberalisations which intensified around 1989-90, and Czechoslovakia 
initially maintained price controls over at least some goods (Berg and Blanchard 1992; 
Dyba and Svejnar 1992). In Russia, halting efforts at price adjustments and 
liberalisation through the late 1980s and into the 1990s were followed by the eventual 
repeal of most price controls in 1992 (Äslund 1995). As with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, however, price controls were maintained over some of the most 
sensitive goods. Chapter 4 discusses the process of price reform in each of the Central 
Asian republics in detail.
Other factors involved legalising non-state trade and the emergence of private 
enterprise in most if not all sectors of the economy. Reform efforts within the Soviet 
Union through the late 1980s were intended to open up space for new private enterprise 
but leave the economic system and ownership largely unchanged (IMF et al. 1991). The
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results were not particularly good because regulations on private sector activity 
remained too restrictive and the conditions for such activity were too difficult. After 
1991, the emphasis among reform-minded economists turned to creating a private 
sector by privatising Soviet era enterprises, but this had its own problems, as we shall 
see in section 2.3.3.
Wages and labour. Until the late 1980s, wages and labour markets were tightly 
managed in accordance with the plan. Wages were set centrally and employment was 
not determined by actual need or demand for labour. Unlike in market economies, 
where wage rates loosely reflect a wide range of factors associated with the job, 
including supply and demand for that skill, perceived skill levels or education required 
and so forth, wage rates in the USSR were determined centrally according to ‘a rather 
ideological hierarchy of sectors and skills, but with little weight attached to the 
incentive function of wages’ (IMF et al. 199 lb: 179).
While there was scope for workers to choose their place of work, this was 
circumscribed by the regulations governing where people could live (IMF et al. 1991b), 
which severely limited the mobility of labour in practice. Restrictions on private 
employment were eased through the late 1980s, firstly to allow self-employment in private 
activities and later to allow groups to engage in private activities and also employ people 
(IMF et al. 1991b). Liberalisation and indeed stabilisation required that labour markets 
and wages be freed and decentralised, and also required removal of restrictions on 
residence.
Foreign trade. Until 1986, foreign trade in the USSR was monopolised by the Ministry' 
of Foreign Trade, operating through a number of Foreign Trade Organisations (FTOs). 
Reforms in 1986 sought to remove this monopoly by extending trading rights to a wider 
range of organisations. The liberalisation was further extended in 1989 by reforms that 
gave individual firms and enterprises the right to import (except finished goods for 
resale) or export, provided they were registered with the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations (IMF et al. 1991a).
Prior to 1987, exporters faced a confiscatory foreign exchange regime. This was 
relaxed with the introduction of complex schemes for foreign exchange retention that 
allowed exporters to retain a given proportion of their export earnings, whereas previously 
they had to exchange all export earnings at the official, and highly implausible, exchange 
rate (IMF et al. 1991a).
While these liberalising reforms were being adopted, a licensing system was introduced 
for particular exports and imports which set export limits on the amount of particular 
goods. The aim of this scheme was to ensure domestic supply (IMF et al. 1991a).
Thus, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign trade was still highly 
constrained by licensing requirements, export and import controls, export taxes, 
confiscatory official exchange rates and exchange rate regulations, and backwardness at 
the enterprise level in international trade. The reforms of the post-Soviet period would aim 
to free up foreign trade completely by abolishing import and export restrictions on all 
but a handful of key goods, encourage enterprises to engage in foreign trade and react to 
foreign competition, and liberalise foreign exchange transactions (Gelb and Gray 1991).
2 THEORIES OF TRANSITION 49
2.3.3 Enterprise reform
Enterprise reform had three components: making firms face market-determined prices 
for inputs and outputs, introducing sustainable budgets and a profit motive, and 
privatisation. As noted earlier, enterprises in the Soviet system faced administratively- 
set prices for their inputs and their products. Thus, input prices did not necessarily 
reflect the true value of their use, and final product prices bore no relation to the demand 
or supply of these products. There was, therefore, no signal from consumers to 
producers regarding the desire for particular products in the market. Similarly, there was 
no signalling from raw materials producers to manufacturers regarding the relative costs 
of using particular inputs, so the manufacturing enterprise had no way of identifying the 
most cost-effective way of producing.
Finally, there was no profit motive. The goal of enterprise managers was to ensure 
that their particular part of the plan was fulfilled. The central plan set quantitative output 
requirements rather than targeting enterprise profits (which would have come closer to 
ensuring appropriate outputs and efficient use of inputs), and enterprise losses were 
largely covered by transfers from the state. Profits in this system were irrelevant 
because firms were under no obligation to make a profit to survive—what Janos Kornai 
famously described as the soft budget constraint (Kornai 1992). So, on one hand, 
enterprise managers had no incentive to improve or diversify production because doing 
so could jeopardise fulfilment of output targets, and, on the other hand, they had no 
incentive to achieve output targets efficiently because they did not have to pay for their 
inputs and did not have the discipline of having to make a profit.
Enterprise reform meant that the firm should operate with
1 market-determined prices for inputs and outputs
2 enterprise autonomy in decisionmaking
3 a profit motive and a hard-budget constraint
This effectively meant that those running the enterprise would make production 
decisions that would at least approximate market-based decisions. They would choose 
production inputs based on a range of factors including cost, quality, availability, and so 
forth; they would try to implement the most efficient production process possible; and 
they would choose their output mix according to consumer demand— all guided by the 
profit motive.
This would be underlain by the twin factors in enterprise autonomy— decision­
making autonomy and financial autonomy. Enterprise managers would have the power 
to make decisions about all these facets of production, but would also have a responsibility 
to ensure that the enterprise remained financially viable without recourse to the state 
budget.
The basic aim of this aspect of the transition was making enterprises more responsive 
to market needs and conditions, particularly the relative scarcities of inputs. Reform was 
meant to raise the efficiency and reduce the wastefulness of Soviet production. It was 
hoped that, with the correct incentives in place, enterprises would increase and improve 
production, eliminating the shortages that characterised the Soviet economy and 
providing better, more appealing goods and services.
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Reform was also meant to reduce the burden of this sector on state finances. If firms’ 
reliance on the state budget were eliminated it would go some way towards reducing the 
overall fiscal instability that beset all the transition economies during the initial reform 
period.
Thus, enterprise reform sought to restructure state-owned firms in order to eliminate 
soft-budget constraints and government interference in production decisions, free the 
enterprise from the constraints of the plan, provide workers and managers with proper 
incentives to work, and institute higher-quality management and production processes.
2.3.4 Privatisation
The crux of the transition debate came to be privatisation. The most ardent agitators for 
privatisation saw it as crucial to the creation of a private sector, and argued that 
privatisation was the only way state enterprises could be made to face consistent profit 
motives and hard-budget constraints. They also asserted that private property rights and 
private ownership were crucial to the operation of non-state enterprises.
There was considerable strength to this argument: at the outset, it was not clear that 
politicians, facing massive social upheaval, would be able to resist enterprise managers’ 
calls for subsidies. If these calls proved irresistible, the enterprise restructuring would be 
useless from the microeconomic perspective of making enterprises operate like 
Western-style private firms and from the macroeconomic perspective that these 
subsidies would continue to inflate government budget deficits.15
Types of privatisation scheme? A number of different approaches to privatisation were 
adopted throughout the transition region. The World Bank (2002b) identified three 
broad strands of privatisation approach: direct auctions/sales (that is, sales to the highest 
bidder), voucher schemes, and ‘buyouts’ by enterprise managers and/or employees.16
• Direct sales/auctions were simply sales, by tender or otherwise, for cash. The 
benefit of this was simplicity, speed, and the infusion of cash it provided to the 
government budget. The negative side was that, in the post-Soviet situation, where 
hyperinflation had eroded most people’s savings to nothing and most people had 
no assets, cash privatisations tended to favour those who had access to either 
credit or cash—predominantly the nomenklatura, the incumbent elite.
• Voucher schemes involved distributing privatisation vouchers, according to some 
formula, to almost all citizens in the country, who could then redeem them for 
shares in privatising assets. In some cases, investment companies were set up so 
that citizens could gain shares in the investment company, which would then bid 
in privatisations. The voucher schemes were an attempt to involve as many people 
as possible in the privatisation process, thus developing a broad popular base in 
favour of the reform process generally. The voucher schemes’ drawback was 
generally their complexity.
• Manager/employee buyouts—either through cash sales, some sort of voucher deal, 
or through direct handover of ownership—were expected to place ownership in 
the hands of those people who had the greatest incentive to make the privatised 
enterprise work properly: its staff. The negative aspect was that former state-
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enterprise managers and workers were not necessarily equipped with either the 
experience or the will to run a private enterprise properly in a market 
environment.
In reality, each transition country has pursued different combinations and 
permutations of these three types of scheme. The privatisation programs adopted in the 
Central Asian republics are discussed at length in Chapter 4.
2.3.5 Institutional change
What are institutions? The term ‘institutions’ is quite difficult to define 
comprehensively. Broadly speaking, it refers to all those things that underpin economic 
interactions in a particular society. Thus, it can mean, on the one hand, public and 
private organisations that facilitate economic activity, such as banks, the judiciary, 
regulatory agencies,17 but in general use it can also refer to the rules of economic 
interaction. The more tangible of these are, of course, legal systems and legislation, but 
unwritten codes and expectations are just as important even though they are less 
quantifiable.18 As North (1991:3) notes, they are ‘the rules of the game in society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction...they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic’.
The problem of institutions in transition should be obvious: the post-Soviet states 
were attempting to create market economies, but lacked the formal and informal 
institutions to support such a system in a positive way. It proved possible to alter formal 
institutions rapidly in the short term, by drafting and enacting new laws and creating 
new organisations to oversee them. In practice, however, it has proved far more difficult 
to enforce these new institutions and make them credible. It has also proved difficult to 
change rapidly the informal institutions that govern the way most people act every day.19 
In the interim, old institutions can persist or even grow stronger, potentially locking the 
economy into a poor institutional equilibrium. In this respect, Moers (2002) argues that 
a number of features of transitional economies, such as tax avoidance and inter-enterprise 
arrears, can be seen as products of old conventions persisting in the new economy.
The relative importance and difficulty of institutional change was only belatedly 
recognised widely (see Murrell 2003; Comia and Popov 2001). There may be an 
element of misunderstanding involved—early radical proponents of reform did mention 
institutions, but referred specifically to formal institutions and organisations like banks, 
legal systems and courts. Institutional and evolutionary economists seem to be taking 
the term more broadly to mean both formal and informal institutions—that is, the broad 
swathe of rules and conventions that determine economic interactions. Roland 
(2001:36-37) sums up the situation, stating
it would be completely wrong to state that the Washington consensus has ignored institutional 
reform while the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective has not. While the latter insists more 
on institutions than the former, the main differences are elsewhere. The Washington consensus 
emphasises mainly the introduction of laws: adequate laws to secure private property, rights of 
shareholders, creditors and so forth. The evolutionary-institutionalist perspective takes a more 
comprehensive view toward institutional conditions. These include not only legal and financial 
change but also comprehensive conditions of law enforcement, including reform of the 
organization of government and the development of self-enforcing social norms that foster 
entrepreneurship, trust, respect of legality and commitment.
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Worldwide, the market economy is not homogenous; each separate economy is 
unique. Market-based systems can operate in a number of different ways, at a number of 
different potential equilibrium points. Institutions are therefore important in influencing 
the way in which the economy works, essentially determining the stable point to which 
the economy will gravitate.20
Measurement of institutional change. Recognising the potential value of institutions 
in explaining economic performance, a number of economists and political scientists 
have sought to develop measurable indices of institutional quality. Examples include 
Djankov et al. (2002, 2003), who concentrate on individual indicators of institutional 
quality: the regulation of business entry and the efficacy of courts; Campos (1999), who 
looks at five aspects of institutions of political economy in transition economies;
Brunetti et al. (1997), who look at institutional reliability;21 and Kaufmann et al. (2003), 
who develop a number of indicators to measure governance developments in 199 
countries.
This thesis uses the data collated by Kaufmann et al. (2003) as a guide to institutional 
and governance developments in the region because their country coverage is the most 
extensive and up-to-date, they draw their data from the widest range of sources (thus 
limiting bias to an extent), and they provide data on the widest range of institutional 
factors. This is not to say that the Kaufmann et al. approach is without problems, as they 
themselves admit. Great caution should be deployed in interpreting their results, and 
their measures should be taken as purely indicative.
The factors Kaufmann et al. (2003) try to measure are: control of corruption, rule of 
law, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, political stability, and voice and 
accountability.22 One of the benefits of their approach is that, rather than present purely 
formal indicators of institutional change (eg. a law stipulating a particular court or 
process), they concentrate on measures of the effectiveness of institutions.
2.4 T ransition Issues
2.4.1 Is there an optimal speed of transition?
The optimal speed of transition (OST) debate was probably one of the most acrimonious 
and least fruitful academic exercises of the past decade. That it persists, ten years after it 
had any practical relevance anywhere except for perhaps North Korea and Cuba, is 
testament to its fiery nature. Essentially, a false dichotomy was established between the 
so-called ‘gradualists’ and those who favoured a ‘big-bang’ approach to reform.23 
Gradual reforms. The gradual reform approach can be roughly divided into three 
streams of thought—structural conservatism, the institutional approach, and the political 
economy approach—which are not exclusive of one another.
By structural conservatism, I am referring to an approach that seeks to minimise the 
break with the old system, and hence the minimise the dislocation unleashed by change. 
It seeks to maintain the old while building the new. Taking as their guide the reasonably 
successful reforms in China, followers of this approach argued that a cautious, slow 
approach to reform was the most advisable. A dual-track pricing and production system
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should be adopted under which planned levels of both agricultural and industrial 
production were sold at government-set prices, and above-plan production of both 
agricultural and industrial goods that could be sold at market prices. Producers would be 
given increased autonomy in decisionmaking regarding the input and output mix, and firms 
would be allowed to retain higher levels of profits and would have autonomy over how 
these would be used. The reforms would try to induce in existing state-owned firms an 
approximation of the behaviour of a private firm operating in a market economy, and this 
reform would be accompanied by legislation allowing new non-state firms to begin 
production and directly compete with state-owned enterprises (see, for example, Gelb et 
al. 1993). As Kenneth Arrow retrospectively argued for the European transition economies
[p]rivate enterprise should have started in commerce and light industry through free entry by 
entrepreneurs financed directly or indirectly by current savings. In the long run, profit 
generated in this sector would have been used to finance entry of new enterprises into heavy 
industry. In the meantime, heavy industry should be restructured into viable operating 
firms...Each firm has to pay its own way, and the government has to be prepared to shut down 
long-term losers (Arrow 2000:17; see also Murrell 1992a:44^45).
In agriculture, land would be leased (or sold) to private operators who would have 
responsibility over production decisions and marketing preferences, would keep a 
proportion of the profits, and would be able to determine any production in excess of 
plan requirements.
Under this approach, it was envisaged that the plan would slowly wither away as the 
market came to dominate economic activity (see McMillan and Naughton 1992). Output 
targets would be slowly retrenched and the gap between plan prices and the price available 
for the same goods traded in the market would gradually converge, thereby eliminating 
the distortions caused by price fixing.
While the Chinese experience provided a guide for this approach, most of the 
gradualists recognised that the Chinese experience would not be replicable in most of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,24 and do not flinch from the realisation 
that these reforms had generated problems of their own (Singh 1991; McMillan and 
Naughton 1992).
Nonetheless, the Chinese idea of avoiding dislocation, serious shocks and 
catastrophic collapse was at the heart of the gradual approach. Gradual reform would 
give the private sector an opportunity to develop, but would not demolish the old 
economy in the meantime (Aghion and Blanchard 1994). Thus, firms would have the 
opportunity to restructure and become more efficient producers; access to essential 
services and minimal dietary requirements could be ensured for the majority of the 
population (Singh 1991; Arrow 2000); and trading relationships driven by the command 
economy system could be prevented from collapsing, restructured, and made more 
sensible— an especially important factor given that the collapse of trading relationships 
drove much of the collapse of industry in the Soviet Union’s transition (Arrow 2000; 
Roland 2001). The crux of the gradualist approach was to introduce reforms that 
enabled rather than enacted a market economy.
A related strand of thought was developed by the institutional economists, who were 
concerned about the development of correct institutions for a market economy. They
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argued that economic behaviour is determined by the way in which people interact with 
one another, and the way in which economic agents interact with other structures such 
as the legal system, or the government.23 As discussed in section 2.3.5, poor institutional 
frameworks can retard economic activity by making trade and economic activity too 
risky.
The institutional economists argued that institutions do not and cannot change 
rapidly, thus the rapid destruction of the old system envisaged by radical reformers 
eradicates the old institutions but sets up nothing in their place. Nolan, for example, 
notes that ‘[destroying existing institutions has a high cost in that it takes time for 
individuals to reconstruct their knowledge about the workings of the economy’ (Nolan 
1995:57).26 Others pointed out that institutions must be credible to work properly. It is 
not enough simply to invent property rights or regulatory regimes, they need to be 
effective, otherwise people will at best ignore them (Koslowski 1992).
Institutional economists argued that gradual reform was necessary to allow proper, 
functioning institutions to develop, avoiding any catastrophic institutional interregnum 
and minimising the risk of developing a negative institutional framework that would be 
inherent in any radical uncontrolled reform program. In this respect, Chen et al. (1992) 
argue that this may cause problems because institutions are the underlying structure 
determining economic activities and outcomes, and flawed institutions and policies can 
themselves impede reform.27 They argue that there will be a period of relative chaos 
while replacement institutions are being developed, and that the institutions developed 
as an endogenous response to blanket liberalisation may not lead to the right outcomes. 
Thus, they argue that it is better to retain the institutions of the flawed old system until a 
new set has been specifically and actively developed.28
There is also a political economy basis for gradual reform. Roland (1997) and 
Dewatripont and Roland (1992, 1995), for example, argued that a gradual transition 
could be self-affirming, with early successes generating popular support for further 
reforms. Furthermore, Roland (2000) posits that, if there is widespread uncertainty 
about the outcome of reforms (particularly in terms of distributional outcomes, but also 
economy-wide outcomes) and the costs of reversing the reforms are expected to be high, 
the reforms may be politically unviable even though they would benefit the majority of 
the populace. Thus, they argue that there may be a role for partial reforms in minimising 
the reversal costs and, if effective, building ‘constituencies for further reform’ (Roland 
2001:5). Wei (1997) develops this line of thought, arguing that multiple phases in a 
reform program may be a way of overcoming initial political resistance. Wei’s argument 
is that a one-step big-bang reform package may generate too much political resistance 
by encroaching on the interests of too many groups simultaneously. If the same package 
is introduced in discrete phases, it becomes more difficult for groups to maintain 
coherent resistance.
Alternatively, McMillan and Naughton (1992) argued that it is impossible to know 
ahead of time what the necessary sequencing and timing of reform measures in the ‘big- 
bang’ approach should be, how the reforms should be undertaken, what the end-point 
should be, among other things (see also Murrell 1992a). Thus, a step-by-step process 
would allow reformers to experiment. Reformers would be able to develop a specific
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policy, implement it, and assess its impact. They could then reformulate it to make it 
more workable, or reverse it in the case of catastrophic outcomes (see also Dewatripont 
and Roland 1995, 1992; Nolan 1995).
Michael Bruno (not strictly a gradualist), in a different approach, pointed to the fact 
that not all aspects of a transition package necessarily have to be performed at the same 
speed. He argued that, while macroeconomic stabilisation should be undertaken as rapidly 
as possible, there is no obvious reason why liberalisation (such as trade liberalisation or 
privatisation) could, or even should, be undertaken at the same speed (Bruno 1994). This 
ties into the argument made by Kenneth Arrow, who notes that ‘[i]t is usually argued that 
privatisation is an inseparable concomitant of the market system. But this further step is 
logically distinct from the acceptance of the price system or even markets’ (Arrow 2000). 
As we shall see, advocates of the big-bang approach contested this claim.
‘Big-bang’ reforms. The most eloquent enunciation of the radical approach was that of 
Lipton and Sachs (1990). Their argument is based on a number of economic and 
political projections. They argued that stabilisation policies would probably have some 
negative consequences, hence the reform program should be introduced as quickly and 
simultaneously as possible so that the reforms would be entrenched and irreversible by 
the time any populist backlash developed. Balcerowicz (1994a) and Äslund et al. (1996) 
developed this point, arguing that there would be a brief interim period during which 
reforms could be enacted; a gradual approach would be cut off mid-program as the 
popular mood turned away from reform.
Other arguments concentrated on holdovers from the old system. Lipton and Sachs 
(1990) argued that the people charged with managing the economy would be the 
bureaucratic corps that had survived from the old system. Their experience and 
mentality would be that of the old system, thus they could not be ‘relied upon for 
efficiency in regulating monopoly prices, promoting infant industries, or implementing 
industrial policy’ (Lipton and Sachs 1990:88). On a similar note, Äslund (1994) 
somewhat optimistically argued that rapid privatisation would prevent the old 
nomenklatura, the Soviet era elite, from appropriating state assets.
Far less tendentiously, those in favour of radical reform argued that partial 
liberalisations would open up opportunities for corruption (Lipton and Sachs 1990; Woo 
1994; Murphy et al. 1992; Äslund et al. 1996). Thus, in an economy with both 
administrative prices and market prices, those with access to goods at administrative 
prices have an incentive to re-sell those goods at market prices. Indeed, this argument 
has repeatedly been vindicated in the Central Asian context, where the initial Russian 
price liberalisation compelled the Central Asian republics to liberalise prices to halt the 
flow of goods out of the region, and remaining price controls in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan continue to generate rents for select groups. The sustainability of the 
Chinese dual price system—the model for gradual transition—is based on draconian 
enforcement, which many of the European transition nations either could not or would 
not emulate. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have maintained price 
restrictions, but these countries are also strongly, but not perfectly, repressive states.
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They also persuasively argued that piecemeal reforms could not work. The reforms 
needed to be introduced en masse as they all reinforced and relied on each other. As 
Lipton and Sachs put it:
Structural reforms cannot work without a working price system; a working price system cannot 
be put in place without ending excess demand and creating a convertible currency; and a credit 
squeeze and tight macroeconomic policy cannot be sustained unless prices are realistic, so that 
there is a rational basis for deciding which firms should be allowed to close. At the same time, 
for real structural adjustment to take place under the pressures of tight demand, the 
macroeconomic shock must be accompanied by other measures, including selling off state 
assets, freeing up the private sector, establishing procedures for bankruptcy, preparing a social 
safety net and undertaking tax reform (Lipton and Sachs 1990:99).
Äslund (1994) argued for the simplicity of the radical reform package. This is linked 
to the argument that, if a gradual approach were adopted, it was not obvious what the 
correct sequence of reforms would be. Given that Fischer and Gelb (1991)—prominent 
proponents of rapid reform—had already developed a logical sequence of reform 
measures under a rapid reform program, it is not clear how valid this argument was.
The benefits of history. In hindsight, most of the division between big-bang and 
gradual reforms appears to lie in differences in emphasis. Where the big-bang reformers 
put the majority of emphasis on the price and market liberalisation, particularly through 
rapid retreat of the government from overt involvement in economic activities (ie. 
privatisation), the gradualists placed more emphasis on enterprise restructuring and 
institutional development.
Unfortunately, as so often happens in the real world, both points of view were partly 
correct. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see the conflict between these two 
points of view as somewhat of an unnecessary distraction (Ellman 1997). As Pomfret 
(2002b) notes, given the range of things that needed to be done, there could be no total 
Big Bang: some aspects of the transition would by necessity follow others (as was 
recognised early on by some big bang proponents, such as Fischer and Gelb (1991) and 
Balcerowicz (1994a)).29 A sensible approach would have been pragmatic, doing quickly 
that which could be done quickly, and slowly that which could only be done slowly.
The big-bang reformers were correct to argue that continued economic distortions 
would be extremely destructive and would open up opportunities for corruption and that 
it would be best to get the transition economies functioning on a market basis as quickly 
as possible. At the same time, the gradualists were correct in arguing that radical shifts 
would cause economic disruption, and institutional economists were correct to argue 
that market economies require a functioning institutional framework to deliver the 
correct outcomes.
Because even the most ardent big-bangers recognised that some things (like 
institutions) would take longer to change than others, and the gradualists were overtaken 
by events with the early and swift price liberalisation in the Soviet Union/CIS, the 
debate came to focus on privatisation.
2.4.2 Privatisation and transition
It seems odd in hindsight that privatisation came to be the focal point of debate about 
transition. In almost all countries small and medium enterprises were placed under 
private control quite rapidly and without much complaint.30 The crux of the issue seems
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to have been the privatisation of large-scale enterprises. The big-bang approach of 
rapidly exposing these enterprises to market discipline and eliminating the burden they 
place on state budgets had appeal. Unfortunately, the privatisation process could not 
guarantee either of these things.31
Time has exposed the naivete of the big-bang approach.32 The quality of privatisation 
matters at both the micro level and the macro level. It is clear that reforms undertaken 
rapidly are not an effective substitute for considered, well thought out, reforms (see, for 
example, Ellman 1997). At the micro level, privatisation has not helped if the new 
owners have neither the skills nor the incentives to run the businesses as profit-making 
concerns. At the macro level, poor privatisation has concentrated wealth in the hands of 
a few, and in the worst cases has led to alliances between political and economic 
interests in, for example, Russia and Kazakstan (Pomfret 2002b; Stiglitz 1999). The 
presence of large, poorly governed enterprises has hampered the emergence of dynamic 
new enterprises, because large-scale entrepreneurs acting in a negative way can impose 
entry barriers on new firms—such as violence, political intimidation, risk of 
expropriation, and so forth—that prevent these firms from emerging. Russia represented 
a kind of worst-case scenario for this—a few select entrepreneurs in alliance with the 
state executive are able to avoid taxes and other legal obligations and are able to deploy 
violence against competitors with near impunity. This is coupled with a bureaucracy 
riven by corruption and a state chronically unable to protect property rights. In short, 
property rights are useless if you can’t protect them.
2.5 Conclusion
Economic stagnation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was bound up with moves 
to alter significantly the economic and political structures of the region, but economic 
stagnation alone is not enough to effect such a change in totalitarian societies. The 
potential for economic and political reform emerged in the Soviet Union because 
economic stagnation removed the positive incentive of present or future well-being at a 
time when the state’s repressive and coercive power was waning. This opened a 
‘window of opportunity’, to use Balcerowicz’s (1994a) phrase, in which far reaching 
economic and political reform—the transition—could be enacted.
The meaning of transition is harder to define. The assumption of the time was that 
transition involved a shift away from totalitarianism and the command economy 
towards democracy and a market-based economy. While this basically defines the 
process in Eastern Europe, the Central Asian economies do not appear to be following 
the path—some have introduced considerable economic reforms, others have not; but 
none of the Central Asian republics are democratising (see Chapters 4 and 5).
In the economic sphere the problem is less acute. Most economists were able to agree 
on the basic outline of what economic transition involved—macroeconomic 
stabilisation, liberalisation, and institutional change—but disagreed, often vehemently, 
on the appropriate speed and focus of reform efforts. Some reformers persuasively 
argued for rapid and radical reforms that would divest state of most of its involvement 
in the economy by rapidly liberalising all prices, trade, wages, and so forth. The
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gradualists and institutional economists urged caution, contending that radical reform 
should be avoided for many reasons, not least of which were its inherent uncertainty and 
the structural and institutional void that it would create. Both sides can claim some 
vindication in results in the region, but, as we shall see, this is clouded in Central Asia 
by factors particular to the region and the individual republics.
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25 See, for example, McMillan and Naughton (1992); Murrell (1992a, 1992b); North (1997); and Nolan (1995).
26 See also, Yavlinsky and Braguinsky (1994); Arrow (2000); and Ericson (2002).
27 See also Moers (2002).
28 See also Koslowski (1992).
29 Because the big bang presented a concrete program with a diverse set of requirements, and the gradual reform emphasised 
experimenting with small, discrete reform advances, big-bang proponents had more scope for disingenuousness in explaining 
failures. Portes made in 1991 the rather prophetic point that ‘...it is impossible to test the desirability of the pure Big Bang, 
simply because of administrative and institutional constraints. It will therefore always be possible to claim that a given 
package, though brilliantly planned, was totally undermined by the omission of some key measure’ (Portes 1991:7). For 
exactly this kind of defence, see Aslund (1999a, 1999b).
30 For a description of the process in individual Central Asian republics, see Chapter 4.
31 A realistic assessment of Western economies should have told economists that governments in otherwise highly capitalistic 
societies (such as the United States) frequently waste tax revenues propping up uncompetitive private firms and industries for 
political and/or social reasons. There is nothing about transition economies to suggest they would be different.
32 Aslund (1994) supplies a breathtaking example of this ‘naivete’, arguing that ‘ [i]t is true that the short-term effects of 
comprehensive liberalization are also hard to assess, but we do know that market economies work better than command 
economies’. What he really meant is that working market economies work better than command economies. No such bland 
generalisation can be made about market economies that do not work well or at all.
3 MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES
3.1 O verview of macroeconomic instability
Macroeconomic instability was the most prominent characteristic of the transition 
period. Massive and unexpected measured falls in output were accompanied by 
outbreaks of rampant inflation. As a consequence, macroeconomic instability came to 
dominate perceptions of transition economy performance so much that success in 
curbing instability has come to be a proxy for success in transition (among many others, 
see Äslund et al. 1996, de Melo et al. 1996, World Bank 1996). This chapter discusses 
the main theories of macroeconomic instability , looking first at theories seeking to 
explain the output decline (section 3.2) and then theories to explain the inflation surge 
(section 3.3).
3.2 O utput decline
3.2.1 What caused the decline?
Various theories have been proposed to explain the output collapse in the transition 
economies during the 1990s. Following and expanding on Williamson’s (1993) approach, 
these are set out below according to their influence as demand or supply shocks. In 
addition, some observers have also pointed to the role of statistical mismeasurement in 
explaining the perceived decline; and institutional and evolutionary economists have 
argued that institutional difficulties, rather than conventional supply and demand factors, 
are critical. The alternative arguments are outlined in section 3.2.4. It is important to 
remember, however, that these often different interpretations are not necessarily 
exclusive—it is likely that both demand and supply factors influenced outcomes, and it 
is likely that institutional factors have also played a role. A particularly good example of 
this is the collapse of trading relations, which would have had both demand and supply- 
side impacts on output. Furthermore, the relative importance of particular explanations 
will tend to vary according to the individual circumstances of each transition country.
3.2.2 Demand side
Keynesian demand deficiency. Keynesian demand deficiency is the name given to the 
decrease in demand that arises from tight macroeconomic policies (Williamson 1993). 
This decrease in demand is communicated to the industrial sector, which responds by 
reducing output in order to maintain profitability. The most obvious cause of this kind 
of demand influence would be the restrictive monetary policies adopted to restrain
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inflation in many of the transition economies. In the Central Asian case, the 
disappearance of direct inter-republican subsidies from the Soviet centre during 
transition would be another very prominent source (see De Broeck and Kostial 1998).
This is a tempting theory. Many transition economies did introduce tight 
macroeconomic policies, raising real interest rates to positive levels, and this would be 
expected to reduce aggregate demand within the economy. The withdrawal of 
government procurement, and government spending generally, will also effect 
economy-wide levels of demand (Borensztein 1993). In the transition economies, this 
may have been compounded by decreases in consumer demand owing to delayed salary 
payments in the state sector as well as the erosion in real wages.
There is, however, some reason to doubt this as a prime explanator in the transition 
economies. Countries that imposed severe macroeconomic stabilisation measures (for 
example, through high real interest rates and decreased subsidies) do not seem to have 
suffered any deeper or more prolonged recession than countries that did not. In fact, the 
opposite often seems to be the case. Poland is the most prominent example: it rapidly 
adopted strong stabilisation policies, but has subsequently been one of the standout 
performers among the transition economies (Lipton and Sachs 1990; Äslund et al. 1996; 
Balcerowicz 1994b)
Demand shift. Another type of demand shock is known as a demand shift. In this 
situation, there is a comprehensive shift of demand from one type of good to another. As 
demand shifts away from certain products, resources have to be reallocated away from 
the previous production processes towards new ones, causing a temporary decline in 
output. Williamson notes that ‘[t]here is typically a delay between their release and their 
reabsorption in a different activity, and in the meantime they produce nothing and in 
consequence output declines’ (Williamson 1993:32). This is particularly compelling in 
the transition context (Williamson 1993, World Bank 1996). As noted in Chapter 2, the 
Soviet economy was heavily distorted by government preference for the development of 
heavy-industry, and particularly the military-industrial complex, at the expense of 
consumer goods production. As a result, services and consumer goods were largely 
undersupplied (Winiecki 2000; Wing Thye Woo 1994). With allocation increasingly 
based on market supply and demand, and the government withdrawing subsidies, a 
demand shift would take place from the industrial sectors towards the service sector and 
consumer goods manufacturers (de Melo et al. 1996:402; Kaser 1998; Komai 1994; 
Äslund 1994).
Kornai goes further by discussing the shifting relationship between consumers and 
producers. He notes that the economy in transition shifts from ‘a supply-constrained 
economy to a demand-constrained economy’ (1994:41). What this means is that, prior 
to the reforms, consumers could only purchase what was supplied by the state firms. If 
they could not buy what they wanted, they were forced either to substitute some less- 
desirable option or to save involuntarily. This had the effect of both artificially boosting 
demand for the products of the socialist economies and of artificially increasing savings 
levels. Thus, once the reforms had opened up consumer markets to new domestic 
suppliers and foreign suppliers, consumers had far more choice in what they purchased. 
They were no longer compelled by poor supply to substitute to less desirable products
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(subject, of course, to individual budget constraints). Consequently, the old enterprises 
faced a situation in which the constraints that had held demand for their products 
artificially high were removed. Their response would be either to change production or 
go bankrupt, thus causing output declines in either the short or long run. This was likely 
exacerbated by the erosion of real wages during the inflationary surge—as real wages 
declined consumers came to spend proportionally more of their income on food and 
other essentials and delayed purchases of less essential goods, which tend to be more 
elaborately transformed manufactured goods.
Hoarding. Winiecki (1991, 2000) argues that much of the transitional recession was 
due to enterprises and consumers changing their behaviour. He argues that supply 
uncertainties, under which future goods or input supplies could never be guaranteed, 
distorted demand because consumers and, more importantly, enterprises would hoard 
goods and inputs to insure themselves against future supply interruptions. This was 
particularly important for enterprise managers, who were judged on their ability to fulfil 
plan requirements—any shortfall in supplies could impede production and hence 
jeopardise their career. Thus, according to Winiecki, when reforms established proper 
market conditions of competitive supply, enterprises no longer needed to hoard goods 
and consequently began running down their reserves. Aggregated across a large number 
of firms, this running-down created a serious interruption to demand, which in turn 
induced a one-off fall in output (see also Williamson 1993). This seems highly unlikely. 
A one-off fall can only explain a minimal amount of the fall in output that has been 
observed in transition economies over the last decade. Second, in a high inflation or 
hyperinflationary economy, it is unlikely that either consumers or producers will 
suddenly decide to start holding cash instead of products. If anything, hoarding is likely 
to have been exacerbated in the transition period as consumers sought to convert 
currency holdings into assets of almost any kind.
Trade collapse. The Soviet bloc had extensive internal trade linkages. Members of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the trade arrangement among 
countries of the Soviet bloc, were something of a captive market for Soviet products. 
Members were ideologically committed to purchasing products within the CMEA, 
regardless of their value or utility, and irrespective of whether similar or better products 
could be sourced more cheaply outside the CMEA. Winiecki (2000:270) states that 
‘[ajpart from the trade in raw materials that largely survived the collapse of 
communism...most of the trade consisted of intermediate inputs and investment goods, 
usually of sub-standard quality and saleable on the CMEA markets thanks to the 
generalised excess demand...’. With the liberalisation of trade in central and eastern 
Europe, these traditional products were exposed to competition from suppliers from 
outside the CMEA, and producers turned to non-CMEA suppliers that produced cheaper 
or higher quality goods. Sourcing such goods outside the CMEA would inevitably 
decrease demand in the former CMEA and would consequently impact on output.
That the collapse in trade links was instrumental in the GDP contraction is widely 
agreed among economists. Kornai (1994), for example, points to the collapse of CMEA 
trading relations as one of the most serious factors in the output decline.1 He argues that 
the CMEA allowed the skewed industrial structure of these economies to be maintained
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and that, once the CMEA had collapsed, ‘[t]he structure of these economies must be 
altered once and for all before they can prosper without it’ (Kornai 1994:56). This can 
be seen as a demand shift operating on the regional trade level. Kornai’s theory is 
echoed by Borensztein et al. (1993:3) who argue that ‘the CMEA shock simply reflected 
a collapse of activities that were no longer competitive once the system of central 
planning was abandoned and enterprises began to face world market prices for their 
inputs and outputs’.
More properly the collapse of trading relations should be seen as both a demand and 
supply-side shock (Wing Thye Woo 1994). Even more intense than trading relations 
within the CMEA, however, were the economic linkages within the Soviet Union. As 
noted in Chapter 1, the republics of the Soviet Union were part of a unified economic 
space, in which production lines extended across republican borders in highly complex 
networks. When the Soviet Union collapsed, these links were either severed or made 
more difficult or costly to maintain, a situation exacerbated by the introduction of 
complex international trade requirements, not to mention trade obstructions, and the 
collapse of international payments systems (De Broeck and Kostial 1998; Schoors 2003; 
Pomfret 2001b). In this respect, the Eastern European economies were in a more 
favourable position than the FSU economies when transition began because their 
economies were far more self-contained than those of the Soviet republics.
3.2.3 Supply side
Price liberalisation and enterprise restructuring. On the supply side, freeing up 
prices to reflect relative scarcity alters the viability of enterprises (Williamson 1993, de 
Melo et al. 1996). At the same time, enterprises lose the flow of subsidies from the state 
and face newly-hardened budget constraints. In the new circumstances, those enterprises 
that do not add sufficient value to inputs will not survive. If the costs of production are 
too large given the revenue that can be generated from sale of the final product, the 
enterprise will not survive in a competitive market environment. As the market is 
opened up, such firms are forced to retrench production, and this causes overall 
economic collapse if aggregated across a large enough number of firms or sectors. As 
De Broeck and Kostial note, ‘[l]arge changes in relative prices induced by the combined 
price liberalization and opening to world markets significantly affected sectoral 
prospects, and created incentives to withdraw or reallocate factor inputs across sectors’ 
(1998:26).
The very process of restructuring the apparently highly distorted centrally planned 
economy towards serving market demands necessarily requires old activities to be 
retrenched, and new activities to be allowed to develop. This can cause transient output 
falls as resources are dropped from the old sectors but are not taken up immediately by 
new growth sectors (de Melo et al. 1996). Growth of the newer sectors will, however, 
come to outweigh the decline of the older sectors over time (Berg et al. 1999). Kornai, 
for example, argues that the ‘transformation recession’ may be a product of better 
signalling after prices are freed and changes in industrial structure due to privatisation 
and the emergence of new enterprises. Increased enterprise efficiency and/or more 
bankruptcies would also have an impact (Kornai 1994).
3 MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 64
Dislocation of input supplies. Collapse of the previous systems of production can also 
drive output collapse. As markets and trade are liberalised, producers of valued goods 
have an opportunity to increase profits. Where previously they were locked into Soviet 
supply chains, in the new situation they can redirect their sales to the most profitable 
markets. This is positive for the individual firm because it can increase income and 
profits, but it also has negative consequences on the wider the scale because 
manufacturers who are unable to access their usual inputs will be forced either to 
arrange alternative suppliers or retrench production (Williamson 1993).
This can go beyond a problem of mere opportunistic redirection of inputs to non- 
traditional buyers; other observers see problems arising in the coordination of 
production.2 This is particularly important given the complex, and often highly 
specified, supply relationships in Soviet production processes. In the transition, the 
organisational mechanisms of central planning have already collapsed, but the 
organisational mechanisms of a normal market economy are not yet available. Thus de 
Melo et al. (1996:402) note that ‘output declines from disruptions in the coordinating 
mechanism... sudden abolition of planning in a highly complex, highly interdependent 
economy can impair economic coordination’. This is echoed by Komai (1994:47), who 
argues that ‘there is a curious no-man’s land where bureaucratic coordination no longer 
applies and market coordination does not yet apply, and economic activity is impeded 
by disintegration, lack of coordination and anarchy’. In a way, these authors seem to 
prefigure one of the key insights into the transition recession—Blanchard and Kremer’s 
(1997) disorganisation theory.
Input and disorganisation. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) refer to the disorganisation 
that occurs when the traditional Soviet-era supply chains collapse and a decentralised 
system emerges, and the wider effects this can have on production. Their argument is 
really an extension of Komai’s (1994) theory, but seeks to explain why the output 
collapse was so much larger than anyone anticipated. They argue that supply 
relationships under central planning were ‘highly specific’. By this they mean that most 
firms had only one option for the supply of any particular output, and only sold their 
finished product to one particular buyer.3 The potential for inefficient monopolistic 
selling or monopsonistic buying practices is enormous, but is constrained in the central 
planning system by ‘the coercive power of the central planner’ (Blanchard and Kremer 
1997:1093). In the transition, the central planner is eradicated, but the monopsonistic/ 
monopolistic markets remain, leading to economic instability. Because firms in the 
Soviet economy had ‘highly specific’ supply relationships, problems at one end of the 
supply chain were communicated along the supply chain. In these circumstances, if a 
components supplier at the bottom of the supply chain collapses, any firm that relies on 
this particular supplier will also falter. Similarly, if a finished goods manufacturer fails, 
its highly-specialised input suppliers will also be put in trouble. Liquidity problems at 
one part of the chain would spread along the chain (thus, partly explaining the explosion 
of barter trade in post-Soviet supply networks).
Two important issues need to be noted here. Given that Soviet production processes 
were characterised by this specificity, most manufacturers were endangered by problems
3 MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 63
in the Soviet economy. However, producers of goods that could readily be redirected to 
other markets could insulate themselves from this effect simply by establishing alternate 
trade links. In practice, this turned out to be raw materials producers—those at the very 
bottom of the supply chain.
Second, the break-up of the Soviet Union exacerbated this situation. Where 
production had previously crossed republican borders, it often became impossible or 
impractical to continue. Firms could not produce because their major supplier or 
customer was now in another country; and goods had to be imported and/or exported 
subject to customs duties, predatory customs inspectors, collapsing transport networks 
and impossible conditions for international payments.4
Credit crunch. Calvo and Coricelli (1993) tentatively argued the importance of tight 
credit as an explanation of output performance. They argued that reforms introduced 
positive real exchange rates and removed the ‘lender of last resort’ role played by the 
central banks in the socialist economy, but left the banking system weakly developed 
(Calvo and Coricelli 1992). Enterprises could no longer access credit to underpin their 
transactions with other enterprises and became unwilling to engage in trade on the basis 
of credit. They were able to offset this to some extent by using up inventories, 
accumulating inter-enterprise arrears and/or decreasing wages, but they could not 
completely offset the collapse in willingness to trade among enterprises—a situation 
that led ultimately to a ‘trade implosion’ (Calvo and Coricelli 1993). Similarly both 
Kornai (1994) and Winiecki (2000) indicate that the fall in investment during transition 
was a major factor in the fall of output. Kornai (1994) attributes this to a breach between 
the removal of government subsidies to enterprises and the development of private 
investment in productive activities (mostly due to the lack of facilitating institutions). 
Winiecki (2000), on the other hand, argues that the fall in investment is a positive 
development because it eliminates the over-investment of the Soviet period. At some 
level, however, the fall investment surely must become excessive—rates of investment 
in fixed capital in Kazakstan for example were for much of the 1990s less than one-fifth 
their 1991 value, in other Central Asian republics and the CIS on average they were 
around one-third their 1991 value (Goskomstat Rossii 2000).
3.2.4 Other explanations
Institutional factors. Economists have become more aware of the importance of 
institutions to underpin economic activity. Institutional economists argue that a complex 
set of institutions had developed in the Soviet economies which facilitated, however 
inefficiently, economic outcomes. The collapse of Soviet political and economic 
structures destroyed the old institutional structure, but the emergence of a new structure 
would necessarily take time because individuals and organisations are not able to adapt 
immediately to the new ‘rules of the game’. Uncertainty makes it difficult and costly for 
economic agents to operate in the new circumstances. Transactions in particular become 
fraught or near impossible because of the uncertain underlying legal environment, and 
output collapses as a consequence. Schmieding (1993) argues, however, that this will be 
temporary—people will adapt to the new situation, and economic activity will recover 
as they adjust. Similarly, North comments that the
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demise of Communism [in Eastern Europe] in 1989 reflected a collapse of the perceived 
legitimacy of the existing belief system and consequent weakening of the supporting 
organizations. The result was the destruction of most of the formal institutional framework, but 
the survival of many of the informal constraints...The relative success of policy measures...in 
the Czech Republic compared to Russia resulted from the heritage of informal norms from the 
pre-communist era that made for the relatively harmonious establishment of the new rules in 
the former country (North 1997).
The collapse can be more prolonged if governments manage to remove the old 
institutional structure but prove unable to impose a new one, or impose one that has poor 
incentives. Absent or poorly functioning market institutions raise the expected costs of 
transaction, and at some point the costs can become so great that transactions are 
inhibited.5 In this regard, Komai (1994) has pointed out that the transition economies 
have lacked the institutions necessary for the smooth functioning of a market economy, 
particularly in the financial sector (Komai 1994). Kolodko (1999) similarly highlights a 
wide range of institutional lacks, particularly in the financial/commercial sphere, that have 
contributed to poor outcomes in the transition economies. A lack of formal institutional 
strength, in terms of protecting property rights inter alia, can moreover become self- 
perpetuating by generating a situation that stifles general growth of the private sector 
but benefits a group of politically-connected individuals and organisations, who then 
fight further institutional change (Moers 2002; Umarov and Mahmadshoev 2001).
Statistical illusion. Statistical mismeasurement may account for part of the apparent 
output collapse. Some economists argued that, under the central planning system, 
enterprises had an incentive to overstate production in order to gain favour among 
political superiors. After the transformation process had begun, however, these same 
firms would have an incentive to understate production in order to minimise the amount 
of tax they would have to pay (Äslund 1994, Kuboniwa and Gavrilenkov 1997, World 
Bank 1996, Williamson 1993). As Jan Winiecki (1991) writes, ‘[o]nce enterprises begin 
to depend on what they sell rather than write to their superiors, a few percentage points 
of ‘output that was not’ disappear from the statistics— that is, from the only place they 
existed’.6 Again, however, this cannot explain differences in performance between 
Eastern Europe and the CIS and is highly unlikely to explain the scale of the collapse in 
Central Asia or almost anywhere else in the transition region.
3.2.5 Output collapse and the role of reform
Economists have devoted considerable effort to establishing a link between reform 
approach and renewed growth, mostly based on cross-regional econometric analyses. 
Thus, economists such as de Melo et al. (1996), Äslund et al. (1996), Berg et al. (1999), 
Hemandez-Cata (1997), among many others, have argued that rapid and radical reform 
are associated with strong subsequent economic performance.7 The merits of reform are 
undeniable, and reform is obviously important, but Chapter 6 will demonstrate that 
within Central Asia differences in reform approach between the republics have had little 
influence on economic performance.
3.2.6 Summary
The output contractions were one of the most astonishing developments in the transition 
economies, and arresting them came to dominate government attention and serve as a
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indicator of success in transition. The transition period was one of highly complex change; 
demand was clearly shifting rapidly and supply problems beset the region’s industries. 
The institutional structure also collapsed, rendering economic transactions more uncertain 
and more difficult. It would be foolish, therefore, to try to identify a single reason for 
the ouput contraction. As should be clear from this discussion, none of these explanations 
are exclusive, and economists have tended in their studies to point to a range of different 
factors to explain output performance in transition economies. Chapter 6 will look at the 
output fall in the Central Asian economies and apply these theories to explain its 
trajectory. It will argue that specialisation within Soviet production networks, combined 
with the disorganisation theory and the collapse of Soviet trading and production 
networks, explain most but not all of the variation in output performance in Central Asia.
3.3 Inflation a n d  its causes
Inflation reached truly enormous levels in the early post-Soviet period in all the 
transition economies, adding to the sense of economic chaos in the region at the time. 
This section reviews the major relevant causes of inflation in the former Soviet Union, 
concentrating on monetary overhang, the Rouble Zone and monetary expansion through 
fiscal deficits. Again, these explanations are not necessarily exclusive, but it should also 
be noted that there has been far less disagreement on the causes of inflation in the region 
than on the output collapse. This is probably because the causes of inflation are more 
explicable using standard economic theory than were the causes of output collapse.
3.3.1 Monetary overhang
Monetary overhang, a product of pre-transition policies, refers to a situation in which 
the amount of money held by consumers was more than would be appropriate given the 
quantity of goods and services available to consumers in that economy. With price 
controls in place, however, prices could not rise to reach an equilibrating level (Ofer 
1990; Nuti 1986; D*browski 1999). Where an imbalance of this kind would necessarily 
have provoked a bout of corrective price shifts in market economies, this corrective 
inflation was repressed by the maintenance of price controls on most goods in the 
command economies. A once-off adjustment was expected to occur when these price 
controls were lifted to erase the monetary overhang (Wachtel and Korhonen 2003).8
3.3.2 The Rouble zone
The newly independent former Soviet republics began to adopt their own national 
currencies in 1993. Prior to this, however, they were members of the Rouble Zone, and 
continued to use the Soviet, and later the Russian, Rouble as their currency. In theory 
the Rouble Zone members met to set parameters for monetary policy within the zone, 
but in practice the Central Bank of Russia dictated the conditions for monetary policy 
and each republican central bank ignored these conditions. In practice, the republican 
central banks were in a position to issue credit as they saw fit, and the Central Bank of 
Russia was obliged to honour this.9
When the Central Asian republics became independent, the strong flows of transfers 
from the all-Union budget to the republics were severely cut. The new republics had to
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find a new way source of finance if previous levels of government activity, and national 
trade, were to be maintained. Thus, the republican banks took to issuing credit to cover 
government spending as a substitute for the earlier flows. This, as Odling-Smee and 
Pastor (2002) note, was a classic free-rider problem. The benefits to the individual 
member country from issuing excessive credit—subsidised industry, artificially high 
levels of output and social services—were isolated to that country, but the costs, 
namely, inflation, were spread across all member countries. The unrestrained growth of 
the money supply allowed by this arrangement had serious consequences in lowering 
the real value of the Rouble in domestic and external markets (Sachs 1994; Oruzbaeva 
2000; Illarionov 1995, 1996).
The introduction of independent republican currencies meant that this form of 
subsidy and monetary expansion was brought to an end. Thus, Illarionov (1995:12) 
notes that transfers from the Central Bank of Russia had fallen to negligible levels (0.1 
per cent of a rapidly declining Russian GDP) by 1994, having previously been 
equivalent to 8.2 per cent of Russian GDP in 1992 and 3.0 per cent in 1993. As we shall 
see, inflation was, in most cases, brought under control pretty rapidly once the Rouble 
Zone collapsed. Where it was not, the explanation usually lies in the normal processes 
of monetary expansion—increased velocity of money and expansion of the money 
supply (Sachs 1997b).
3.3.3 Velocity of money
The velocity of money refers to the speed with which money is circulating in a 
particular economy and is a measure of the demand for a currency in the domestic 
market. This money demand reflects people’s confidence in money as a store value and 
a medium of exchange. Therefore, if people lose confidence in money as a store of 
value, they will seek to exchange it rapidly for assets that hold value more reliably, and 
the demand for money will fall. In Western economies, the velocity of money is 
assumed to be fairly constant over time, but in the transition economies this is less 
likely to be true. The theory proposes that people lost, or never had, confidence in the 
usefulness of domestic currencies and sought to transfer their assets to more concrete 
goods or into more reliable external currencies such as the US Dollar or the Deutsche 
Mark. Thus, the velocity of money is supposed to have increased during the initial 
transition period as people sought to exchange their domestic currencies for foreign 
currencies or assets (Sachs 1996).10
3.3.4 Monetary expansion
The inflationary impetus was substantially derived from expansionary monetary policy, 
which was itself a product of policies during the transition. This, in turn, was caused by 
the extensive fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits that were a striking characteristic of most 
transition economies.
Fiscal deficits. The widespread perception has been that growth in the money supply in 
the transition economies has been driven by pervasive government deficits. Because 
governments throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were faced with 
severe declines in tax revenue but were unable or unwilling to make equivalent
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reductions to expenditure, deficits were often unavoidable in these countries. These 
deficits were largely financed by expansion of the money supply (ie. printing money), 
which induced a decline in the real value of the currency. While this seems a likely 
explanation, the evidence is not as strong as would be expected. This is because some 
ways of financing deficits are far more inflationary than others (as noted by Komulainen 
and Pirtillä 2000).
Typically, there are three ways of financing budget deficits. These are
• borrowing from abroad—either directly or by obtaining aid-based easy credit from 
foreign states, multinational or non-governmental organisations, or through 
releasing government bonds
• borrowing domestically by issuing government bonds
• borrowing money from the central bank (ie. printing money) (Dornbusch 1992).
In the early transition period, these options were further limited. Given
underdeveloped capital markets and financial systems, and the perceived instability of 
the new governments, there was little chance of successfully financing entire budget 
deficits through releasing government bonds either domestically or externally.11 
Initially, there was simply no confidence in the new governments’ capacity to repay 
funds borrowed in this way, because there was no demonstrated history of an ability or 
willingness to repay or even to manage government debt remotely effectively. Indeed, 
there was no guarantee that the first wave of post-communist governments would be 
able to retain control, nor was there any confidence that the previous dictatorial regimes 
would not regain control and refuse to honour these commitments. At the same time, the 
ability to finance budget deficits through releasing government bonds was constrained 
by the absence of developed domestic banking and financial systems in the transition 
economies. In most developed economies the banking sector is the sector that holds 
most government bonds, so the issuance of government bonds would have to come after 
the emergence of a private banking sector in any particular economy.12 In the longer 
term, when financial sectors had developed to some extent, the release of government 
bonds was possible in many transition economies, and almost certainly contributed to 
lowering monetary expansion and inflation (Wachtel and Korhonen 2003).13
The second most favourable option was to borrow funds from foreign sources. All 
the countries of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union could hope to receive some 
credit on easy terms from multinational organisations and foreign states, but in practice 
some countries benefited more from this than others. The resources available for this were 
obviously finite, and were far more limited than some Western economists had hoped.14 
Furthermore, such loans usually had conditions attached that some states found 
unacceptable. Ultimately, foreign loans, whether in the form of foreign purchases of 
government bonds, or direct foreign loans from unilateral or multilateral sources, were a 
useful if limited source of finance for post-Soviet governments (see Illarionov 1995, 1996).
Unable to restrain deficits, and unable to access finance to fund these deficits, most 
of the transition economies were compelled to take other measures. Typically, they were 
forced to finance deficits by borrowing directly from the Central Bank; that is, by 
printing money (Illarionov 1995, 1996). The inflationary consequences of this are well- 
known (Commander 1992)— the money supply increases by more than growth in
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output, which means that the real value of the currency falls, and this manifests as an 
increase in prices as sellers demand more money for any given good. Monetised deficits 
contributed to alarming expansions in the money supply, driving the inflationary surge.
Quasi-fiscal operations. This, however, does not explain the entire situation. As 
Cottarelli and Doyle note, ‘[t]here are cases where fiscal strengthening did not 
accompany inflation stabilization. In Estonia, Latvia and Turkmenistan, the fiscal 
position prior to stabilisation was already fairly strong, and other factors underlay 
persistent inflation in that context’ (Cottarelli and Doyle 1999:17). That is, some 
countries, which were apparently quite sound fiscally, nonetheless experienced quite 
severe inflation. Turkmenistan is probably the most egregious example of this (see 
Chapter 6). In these cases, inflation was driven by at least two alternative sources of 
monetary expansion commonly known as quasi-fiscal operations:
• government and para-governmental spending not reported in the budget
• directed cheap credit issued by the central bank to favoured sectors and enterprises.
Malgorzata Markiewicz (2001) neatly summarised quasi-fiscal operations as
politically-motivated activities involving
1 subsidised lending (at below market rates) to both governmental and private 
organisations
2 financial controls (such as foreign exchange controls and credit ceilings)
3 rescue operations, such as transfers to commercial institutions that hold bad loans 
to failing enterprises (Buiter 1997; Markiewicz 2001).15
4 maintenance of reserve requirements for commercial banks that are not 
compensated by market interest rates (Markiewicz 2001; Buiter 1997)
5 a range of activities related to exchange rate controls.16
Such quasi-fiscal operations occurred to some extent in almost all the transition 
economies, but were particularly severe in some cases, such as Turkmenistan (Illarionov 
1995; Dabrowski 1999). The important thing about quasi-fiscal operations is that they 
do not appear in the government budget, even though they represent politically- 
determined government subsidies to favoured firms or sectors. They nonetheless can be 
significant contributors to monetary expansion and hence inflation.
3.3.5 Conclusion: what caused the inflation?
The literature described above raises a number of potential causes of inflation. Clearly 
monetary overhang and the rouble zone were factors early in the transition process. 
Their contributions, however, can only extend so far. Monetary overhang was erased by 
the initial price liberalisation, whereas the influence of the rouble zone extended until 
about 1995, by which time most of the Central Asian republics had left the arrangement 
(see Chapter 4 for more details). This means that the major lasting factor was expansion 
of money supply through fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits.17
Governments’ ability to restrain deficits, and to find non-inflationary sources of 
finance, was a critical determinant of inflation performance. Those countries that 
eliminated deficits or were able to avoid monetising deficits performed far better than 
those that could not. Chapter 6 will discuss this in detail with respect to the Central 
Asian economies.
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N otes
1 See also World Bank (1996) and Aslund (1994). Econometric evidence is provided by Fischer et al. (1996:61) who find that 
‘the CMEA collapse and the breakup of the Soviet Union had a major negative impact on growth’, and Christoffersen and 
Doyle (2000), who find that export market growth was an important determinant of output recovery.
2 For example, Komai (1994); World Bank (1996); de Melo et al. (1996); De Broeck and Kostial (1998).
3 This, in turn, is reminiscent of Leijonhufvud’s (1993) early criticism, in which he writes ‘many large plants depend on a 
single, or at least dominant, supplier for some of their raw materials or intermediate inputs and, similarly, have one dominant 
customer. If one such gigantic plant ceases to operate, others are left without supplies or customers. Failure in one part of the 
system, therefore, can cascade through a large part of it. Such failures are now occurring on a large scale and, in my 
judgement, constitute the most intractable part of the current crisis...’ (1993:121).
4 On international payments difficulties, see Schoors (2003:9), who notes that ‘[pjayments to the CIS were settled slowly and 
unreliably or became impossible. Compared to this, payments to third countries were relatively simple and fast’.
5 In this light, Brunetti et al. (1997) tentatively conclude that the reliability of the institutional framework is an important factor 
in growth outcomes in transition economies.
6 See also Wing Thye Woo (1994); De Broeck and Kostlian (1998).
7 The most influential of these studies have been quite usefully summarised in World Bank (2002b).
8 Using the classic Fisher equation expression of this balance, MV=PQ, where M is the money supply, V is the velocity of 
circulation of money, P is the prices of goods, and Q is the quantity of goods available in the economy, a monetary overhang 
is a situation in which MV>PQ for some reason. In a market economy, where prices are not fixed, MV>PQ would be brought 
back into equilibrium by either a rise in the quantity of goods or, more often, a rise in the price of goods. This is essentially 
what happened in the transition economies with the initial inflationary surge—prices rose to reflect the stock of money in the 
economy.
9 Although, as Schoors (2003) points out, the CBR was uncooperative and just as undisciplined as the republican banks. For a 
more general discussion of Rouble Zone’s development and collapse, see Odling-Smee and Pastor (2002), and also Pomfret 
(2002c) and Granville (2002) for alternative points of view. Another earlier analysis of the complexities of the Rouble Zone is 
provided by Pomfret (1995).
10 Anderson and Citrin (1995:50) counter this by arguing that ‘while for a few countries it is easy to point to direct factors that 
could have caused a decline in real money demand, for most others there is no obvious explanation’. They go on to point out 
that inflation was not generally associated with the introduction of new currencies, nor indeed with ‘earlier accelerations in 
monetary expansion’. Finally, they conclude that ‘the relationship between inflation and exchange rate behaviour in these 
countries does not suggest that shifts in money demand in favor of foreign currency were significant in explaining increases in 
inflation and velocity’ (Anderson and Citrin 1995:50).
11 This is discussed by Dabrowski (1999).
12 In practice, this development was constrained initially by the lack of a legal framework for such activities, and the need to 
dismantle the monobank system, through allowing entry of foreign firms and de novo domestic banks and privatising or 
corporatising sections of the previous banking system. Any domestic banks would need to accumulate a reasonable deposit 
base before it could begin trading to any useful degree in government bonds. Of course, the ability to amass a reasonable 
deposit base was hampered by the fact that most people’s savings from the Soviet era were effectively rendered worthless by 
the initial inflationary correction associated with the monetary overhang, and the ongoing inflation would then have dissuaded 
most people from holding their money in savings accounts—for which real interest rates were often negative—instead of 
assets.
13 Daniel Treisman, for example, notes that Russia was able to bring inflation under control in 1995, despite quite expansionary 
fiscal and credit policies. He argues that it was able to so because ‘the government and the central bank agreed...to reduce the 
bank’s crediting of the budget deficit, substituting government securities and foreign borrowing’ (Treisman 1998:245; 
emphasis added).
14 Jeffrey Sachs was the most vocal and prominent advocate of massive overseas aid flows. See Sachs (1993).
15 Markiewicz (2001:10-11) describes this as ‘infusion of capital into a troubled institution, assumption of non-performing 
loans, or exchange rate guarantees’.
16 See Markiewicz (2001) for a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of quasi-fiscal operations, and Rosenberg and 
Zeeuw (2001) for a discussion of the quasi-fiscal nature of Uzbekistan’s exchange rate regime.
17 See de Melo (1996) for econometric evidence for this assertion.
4 ECONOMIC REFORM IN CENTRAL ASIA
Following on from the discussion of theories of transition in Chapter 2, this chapter will 
discuss progress on key features of the ideal transition program in the Central Asian 
republics. It will discuss progress in each republic on liberalisation of prices, trade, the 
exchange rate, wages and employment, and will also consider progress in privatisation 
and the development of an institutional and governance framework for a market 
economy. As readers will recall from Chapter 2, these represent the basic elements of 
the ideal transition program, with the exception of macroeconomic stabilisation, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 6.
4.1 Reform in C entral A sia
The region’s governments have followed different reform paths. Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan have generally pursued more aggressive reform strategies, liberalising 
prices and trade rapidly, privatising both large and small-scale economic entities, and 
withdrawing subsidies from most forms of economic activity. Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan followed the opposite approach, adopting far more cautious and gradual 
reform strategies. This is not say that these countries have not reformed at all, but that 
they have been more restrained in liberalising prices and trade, have been slower to 
privatise state assets, and have retained far more extensive government subsidies in key 
sectors. Tajikistan was also slower to reform initially but has recently renewed reforms 
with vigour. This delayed approach to reform was less a product of strategy than of the 
impossibility of introducing and enforcing extensive reforms during a civil war.1
4.1.1 Comparative reform paths
Central Asia’s advanced reformers are Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan where, according to 
EBRD indices, considerable progress has been made on price liberalisation, trade and 
privatisation of small-scale enterprises (see Appendix Table 4.1). Tajikistan has 
belatedly made progress on these aspects of transition but lags behind the leading 
countries in the extent of its reforms. These countries have all adopted to a large extent 
the typical transition program advocated by Western economists and the international 
financial organisations (see Chapter 2), freeing almost all prices, liberalising trade and 
exchange rates, and making progress on privatisation of most state assets.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have chosen different strategies, preferring instead to 
retain controls on some prices, limit access to foreign exchange, and move cautiously in 
privatising state assets. The Uzbek and Turkmen governments have also chosen to
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retain extensive government and para-governmental subsidies to key groups and 
economic sectors, ostensibly to prevent worsening poverty and social and economic 
upheaval. Not coincidentally, however, these policies also serve to concentrate power 
and wealth on the ruling elite.
The Central Asian republics as a group fall behind the advanced reformers of Eastern 
Europe and the Baltics in what we might call the foundations or facilitating formal 
institutions of a market economy. There are many aspects of this area of economic 
reform, but the next section will present the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s annual indices of competition policy reform, banking sector reform, and 
non-bank financial institution reform as indicators specifically of the economic 
institutional environment in each Central Asian republic. In addition, the broader range 
of governance indicators provided by Kaufmann et al. (2003) will be presented to gauge 
the wider political and regulatory environment for market economic activity in each 
republic.
Summarising the EBRD indices, however, it is clear that Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan 
trail behind the advanced reformers of Eastern Europe. Tajikistan in turn has made less 
progress than Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan still less. It 
is arguable in this light that the bulk of the difference in reform progress between the 
leading Central Asian reformers and Eastern Europe lies in institutional aspects of 
reform in terms of both the establishment of formal institutions and the enabling 
environment for market activity more generally. The Kaufmann et al. (2003) indicators 
cannot be so easily summarised as they consider a far wider range of factors, but they 
suggest considerable differences even within Central Asia in the institutional and 
governance framework.
4.2 Kazakstan
4.2.1 Liberalisation
Prices. Price liberalisation in Central Asia was basically dictated by the price liberalisation 
program adopted by the Russian Federation on 2 January 1992, as the Central Asian 
republics were still highly integrated with Russian economy, despite their nominal 
independence. Thus, price disparities between Russia and the Central Asian republics 
would probably have led to massive flows of goods across borders to those areas where 
prices were highest (Financial Times, 2 January 1992; Reuters, 2 February 1992). The 
Russian price liberalisation freed prices on just about everything, except for staples such 
as bread, milk, salt and vodka, as well as services, transport, and fuel, and prices on 
these goods were increased towards the market level (Reuters News, 1 January 1992).
Following the Russian lead, Kazakstan undertook price liberalisation at the same 
time, deregulating prices of most goods and services, except for key products, including 
power, heat, coal, oil, gas, bread, flour, salt, sugar, housing rents.2 Prices for these 
remaining goods increased towards the market level over the following years, so that by 
the end of 1994, nearly all prices were free except for utilities prices, which remained 
heavily subsidised (EBRD 1995).3 Prices in Kazakstan are, therefore, basically free.
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Exchange rate. Until November 1993, Kazakstan remained within the Rouble Zone, a 
coalition of countries using the old Russian rouble. The Rouble Zone proved unworkable 
over the long term, however, with severe cash shortages appearing in Kazakstan in 1992 
(.Moskovskiye Novosti, 24 July 1992). The Kazak government was extremely reluctant to 
break with the Russian-controlled Rouble Zone for purely political reasons—it did not 
want a wider crisis to emerge both between Russia and Kazakstan or within Kazakstan 
between the Russian and non-Russian populations. Thus, it persisted with the Rouble 
Zone, even going so far as to issue its own currency alongside the Rouble to ease the 
supply problems in 1992 (BBC Monitoring Service: Former Soviet Union, 5 August 
1992). In October 1992, Kazakstan signed, with seven other CIS republics, an agreement 
to establish an Interstate Bank to manage the Rouble issue within the Zone, and in June 
1993 Nazarbaev was still denying rumours that a new national currency would be 
introduced. That July, Kazakstan participated in the chaotic Rouble re-issue and later 
signed a further agreement with five other CIS nations to keep the Rouble as common 
currency.4 In late 1993, however, the situation seems to have become untenable to the 
Kazak government owing to problems with the supply of the new Roubles.5 The Tenge 
was introduced on 15 November 1993, with a brief window for people to convert their 
old Roubles into the new currency, and now operates under a managed float.
Trade. A decree removing restrictions on foreign trade was promulgated early in the 
transition period. Under the new system, most of the restrictions on foreign trade were 
lifted, and all citizens were allowed to hold foreign currency bank accounts (Ekonomika 
Izhizn’, 3 February 1992). The decree also assigned to the government sole control over 
exports of some types of fuel, such as natural resources, mineral fertilisers, grain, 
cotton, wool and other strategically important goods (BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 7 February 1992).
The early years of the transition saw severe taxes on export profits in hard currency 
and mandatory sale of a proportion of hard currency revenues to the National State 
Bank of Kazakhstan.6 These were cut on many major products in March 1996, and the 
range of exports requiring government permission was reduced considerably at the same 
time to just sensitive military and nuclear materials as well as wild animals and plants 
{Reuters News, 25 March 1996). Kazakstan was accepted as an observer to GATT in 
September 1992, but has been unsuccessful so far at acceding to the WTO 
(Bukharbaeva 2003).
Wages and employment. The Soviet era liberalisation of wages and employment was 
outlined in Chapter 2. In Kazakstan, this was carried further with enactment of the Law 
on Employment of the Population 1991 (EBRD 1995), which essentially completed the 
liberalisation of wage and employment conditions. The government, in theory, retains 
control over setting the minimum wage, but workers have the right to determine freely 
their place of work and seek higher wages.
4.2.2 Privatisation
There were three basic stages to the privatisation process: (1) housing privatisation, 
often based on a coupon system and for no charge, (2) mass privatisation using a 
coupon system; and (3) case-by-case privatisation for cash (Brill Olcott 2002).
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Housing and small-scale privatisation. Housing privatisation began in 1991 (Novecon, 
4 September 1992). A coupon system was used, under which all citizens were issued 
with a number of coupons, and most housing was privatised to the occupants. 
Privatisation of small-scale enterprises also began in 1991 with selected businesses, 
mostly in the service sectors, privatised in cash auctions and voucher sales (EBRD 
1998). Progress was very rapid, and the government was able to declare the program 
complete in 1997 (Table 4.1).
Medium-scale and large-scale privatisation. The so-called ‘mass privatisation’ 
program was initiated in 1993, beginning the process of privatising medium and large- 
scale enterprises. It initially sought to divest the state of majority holdings in most 
businesses predominantly under a voucher system. Under the voucher system, citizens 
holding vouchers would lodge them with special investment privatisation funds, which 
would then use them to purchase shares in privatising companies. In any specific 
company, the majority of the shares would be available for the voucher auction, with the 
balance reserved for the firm’s workers and managers and the government (see Brill 
Olcott 2002). The voucher sales were to be completed well before the end of 1995, but 
the deadline was extended until December 1995 because public scepticism about the 
process meant that they were slow to lodge their vouchers with the funds (Brill Olcott, 
2002; EBRD 1995; Ecotass, 25 July 1995). That said, progress was quite swift, though 
slower than the small-scale privatisation program.
Privatisation of the largest enterprises has been on a case-by-case basis, and has 
proved considerably more difficult than that of small-scale enterprises, which has meant 
that the program has dragged into its second decade (Brill Olcott 2002; EBRD 2003; 
Table 4.2). It has also been more difficult because of the sensitive nature of the firms 
involved—very large firms tend to be concentrated in the industrial sector, particularly 
manufacturing, and consequently employ greater proportions skilled workers. 
Manufacturing has been the sector most harshly affected during the transition, so the 
government has had to balance the conflicting objectives of privatising industry and the
unemployment that threatens as a consequence. These firms, as Olcott (2002) points 
out, also tended to maintain a variety of social services and assets for their employees, 
which made privatisation still more difficult.
Table 4.1 Share of small-scale enterprises privatised, 1992-97
1992
P er ce n t o f  to ta l
1993 27 .3
1994 4 1 .7
1995 60 .0
1996 79.5
1997 100.0
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and D evelopm ent, various years. Transition R eport, EBR D ,
London.
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Table 4.2 Privatisation, Kazakstan, 1994-2002
Before
1994 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total units privatised 9269 4147 3143 4056 6777 3073 2318 1724 2205 1823
Of which  
Small-scale 5578 2748 2477 3393 5590 2535 2187 1642 2059 1756
Mass privatisation .. .. 147 497 1122 516 131 79 146 67
Case-by-case . . 5 28 47 13 0 3 4 2
Agriculture •• 918 513 138 18 9 4 0 25 10
Sectoral breakdown 
Industry 211 48 437 608 152 26 26 39 34
Construction 110 52 45 162 50 16 5 10 5
Agriculture 918 514 138 18 9 4 25 10
Transport 180 28 101 331 73 147 50 n.a n.a
Trans and comm. 13 17
Trade and catering 
Personal and public
1394 1358 1519 1279 287 141 69 11 4
services 587 337 280 689 169 74 54
Others 747 806 1536 3690 2267 1855 1470 2107 1753
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2003. Republic of Kazakhstan: selected issues and statistical 
appendix, Country Report 03/211, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. International 
Monetary Fund, 1998. Republic of Kazakhstan: recent economic developments, Country Report 98/84, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Agricultural sector. In the agricultural sector, agricultural organisations were rapidly 
privatised from the beginning of the transition period. A range of ownership forms was 
allowed ranging from private holdings to private collective or cooperative organisations, 
or formation of joint-stock companies. The most common forms of privatisation were 
into private peasant farms, followed by formation of industrial cooperatives. The 
privatisation of agricultural land itself has, however, been somewhat more difficult and 
controversial. In June 2003, after considerable political manoeuvring between the 
executive and the parliament, a new Land Code permitting the privatisation of land was 
passed by the parliament and signed into law by President Nazarbaev (Novecon, 27 June 
2003; Aibasov 2003; Zhikor 2003; Interfax Central Asia News, 27 June 2003).
4.2.3 Institutions
In terms of formal institutions, Kazakstan moved quickly to establish a legal basis for a 
market economy by enacting laws permitting private enterprise and trade, establishing 
bankruptcy laws, and establishing a central bank. In this sense, the formal components 
of a market economy have been in place for some time. Where Kazakstan lags, 
however, is in the enforcement, or the credibility of these institutions.
Figure 4.1, derived from Kaufmann et al. (2003) provides a rough overview of 
institutional development during the transition. The Kaufmann et al. (2003) formulation 
takes into account both formal/legal advances and results in practice, looking at such 
factors as regulatory quality, government effectiveness and rule of law. These are 
important because the can directly affect the potential cost of transactions. What their 
study indicates is that many of the political and economic institutional underpinnings of
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a mixed market economy are not developing in the way that they perhaps should. Thus, 
Kazakstan remains among the world’s worst performers in controlling corruption (see 
also Brill Olcott 2002), rule of law, government effectiveness and regulatory quality. 
Furthermore, the situation appears to have deteriorated over recent years in many cases. 
In some respects, this may be beyond government power—the government set up an 
Agency for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption in 2003, for example, but it has 
not yet proved very effective and appears to be fighting a hopeless battle given the 
incentives to corruption and economic crime in the region. In other respects, however, 
the government directly undermines public confidence in some institutions for its own 
political gain. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
The EBRD’s more specific indicators of institutional development indicate that 
Kazakstan is quite advanced compared to other Central Asian republics in developing 
foundational economic institutions—good competition policy and banking and non­
bank financial sectors (Table 4.3). At the same time, these factors remain 
underdeveloped when Kazakstan is compared with Eastern European reformers.
Figure 4.1 Institutional change, Kazakstan, 1996-2002
□  1996 
■  2002
60 80
Note: The percentile rank is the percentage of the world’s countries ranked lower than Kazakstan. 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. Available online at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wp- 
governance.html.
Table 4.3 EBRD indices of institutional development, Kazakstan, 1995-2003
Index of competition policy 
Index of banking reform 
Index of NBFI reform
1995 1996 1997 1998
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3
1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0
2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, various years. Transition Report, EBRD, 
London.
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Does this matter? As discussed in section 2.3.5, these institutional factors are what 
we might call the ‘rules of the game’. They determine how costly, or how viable, it is 
for people to engage in transactions within the economy. If people have to negotiate 
corrupt practices, or provide their own security to guarantee transactions, or are 
operating in uncertain regulatory or legal environment, the riskiness to them of engaging 
in business will be higher. At some point, the costs of operating in this environment will 
become so high that most transactions will become unviable: people will either cease 
transacting or will retreat into private, informal networks based on trust (Ericson 2002). 
On the other hand, underdeveloped financial institutions can mean that willing 
entrepreneurs are unable to access finance effectively, thus limiting their capacity to 
engage in economic activity.
Thus, the answer is yes, it does matter. The apparent institutional regression between 
1996 and 2002, in which factors such as control of corruption, rule of law and 
regulatory quality have deteriorated, can have economic impacts by increasing the cost, 
and hence reducing the viability, of transactions. This is especially important among 
individuals and smaller enterprises, who are less able to private substitutes when public 
institutions are absent. This, of course, will be comounded when the formal institutions 
of a market economy, such as a functioning financial sector, remain underdeveloped.
4.3 Kyrgyzstan
4.3.1 Liberalisation
Prices. The Kyrgyz price liberalisation was similar to that in Kazakstan in that the 
Kyrgyz government was forced to liberalise prices in reaction to the Russian 
liberalisation program. Price controls remained on some essential goods, but these were 
slowly eliminated through the 1990s. Economic crisis precipitated in 1993 a 
reintroduction of some measures, including control over profit margins and prices in 
some sectors, and state procurements at prices below the market level (Dabrowski and 
Antczak 1995). This, however, proved temporary and the process of liberalisation soon 
revived. Bread prices were finally freed in November 1994, and prices for other 
essential goods were gradually lifted towards market levels. Prices are now essentially 
free.
Exchange rate. The problems with the Rouble Zone outlined in Section 3.3.2 prompted 
Kyrgyzstan to become the first Central Asian republic to introduce its own currency, the 
Som, on 10 May 1993 {BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 11 May 1993). The 
Rouble was phased out days after the introduction of the new currency. The government 
sought initially to fix the som-dollar exchange rate, but the disparity between official 
and black market rates soon become too great, and full convertibility was introduced in 
March 1995 (Novecon, 20 July 1993; EBRD 1995).
Trade. Trade liberalisation, though not entirely successful, was initiated in the USSR in 
the second half of the 1980s (see section 2.3.2). A decree in April 1992 further 
liberalised trade, ostensibly permitting all businesses to engage in trade without special 
registration. License arangements were retained, however, for exports and imports, and 
bans kept in place on exporting or importing sensitive goods, including grain.
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International trade was further opened up in the second half of the 1990s when the 
Kyrgyz government removed most of the remaining licensing requirements on 
exporters, reduced the range of export taxes considerably, and reduced import duties 
(.Novecon, 3 August 1998; EBRD 1995). After considerable further liberalisation, 
Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO on 24 September 1998, the first CIS country to do so 
(Novecon, 24 September 1998).
Wages. Following on substantial wage and labour market liberalisation within the 
Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan pursued further liberalisation during the 1990s. The government 
officially retains control over the minimum wage, and wage levels in the state sector, 
but the labour market is totally unregulated beyond this level. The government removed 
residency restrictions (propiski) early in the reform process, allowing citizens to live 
where they choose, but it has continued an extensive system of resident registration, 
which can determine access to social services (see Bemabe and Kolev 2003).
4.3.2 Privatisation
The privatisation process was initiated in 1992, and has run through a number of stages. 
Various different methods of privatisation were adopted, based on the type of business 
being privatised, including cash auctions, direct sales to individuals or workers 
collectives, competitive bids, and transformation into a joint-stock company 
(Jermakowicz and Pankow 1995).7 By 1999, the government had apparently divested 
itself of 65.9 per cent of the enterprises slated for privatisation in 1991, with the 
majority of privatisations taking the form of conversion to joint-stock companies (25.9 
per cent), competitive sales (18.1 per cent), sales to individuals (20.6 per cent), and sales 
to collectives (23.1 per cent) (Ibadolgu 2001).
Voucher privatisation. A voucher system was introduced in 1992 to complement the 
privatisation process. All Kyrgyz citizens received a voucher whose value was 
determined by the recipient’s wage and length of employment. These vouchers could 
then be used to purchase housing, shares in enterprises and joint-stock companies, or 
other privatising enterprises.
Small-scale enterprises. Enterprises of different scales (ie. small, medium, large) were 
all sold from the beginning of the process. Privatisation of small-scale enterprises 
proceeded most rapidly, but this represented only a small proportion of economic 
activity in the republic (Jermakowicz and Pankow 1995). These enterprises were 
typically sold to collectives, individuals, or in ‘competitive bidding’ situations. 
Privatisation of ‘trade and catering’ and ‘consumer services’, sectors dominated by 
small-scale enterprise, is now nearly complete (see Table 4.4).
Larger-scale enterprises. Larger enterprises were almost all transformed into joint 
stock companies, with a proportion of the shares being distributed within the company 
to management and collectives and 25 per cent of shares being reserved for the voucher 
privatisation program (Jermakowicz and Pankow 1995). While the Kyrgyz government 
has made considerable progress in privatising larger enterprises, the pace has slackened 
and some remain to be privatised (State Committee on the State Property of the Kyrgyz 
Republic 2004). As Table 4.4 shows, after initial flurries in 1992-93, privatisation has 
essentially stopped in construction, transport and the key sector— agriculture.
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4.3.3 Institutional change
Kyrgyzstan rapidly introduced legal changes to underpin its economic reform, such as a 
bankruptcy law, civil code and a banking law. Again, however, the institutional 
environment is influenced more by flawed implementation of institutional reforms and 
the flouting of elements of the institutional framework for personal and/or political 
aggrandisement. Figure 4.2 provides the Kaufmann et al. (2003) indicators of institutional 
change in Kyrgyzstan during the transition. As noted above, these indicators should be 
treated with great caution as the error bounds are significant. They do, however, point to 
a stagnation in the formal institutional context of the transition economy.
Factors critical to the efficient functioning of a market economy— control of 
corruption, the rule of law and regulatory quality— have not really improved since early 
in the transition period. The EBRD indicators of formal institutional development show 
similar stagnation. While some progress has been made, Kyrgyzstan remains behind 
Kazakstan— and considerably behind the advanced Easter European reformers— in 
introducing well-structured banking and non-bank financial sectors (Table 4.5). As with 
Kazakstan, these indicators suggest difficulties in doing business in Kyrgyzstan. The 
formal institutional framework remains weak, with financial sector development
Figure 4.2 Institutional change, Kyrgyzstan, 1996-2002
Control of corruption
Rule of law
Regulatory quality
Government effectiveness
Political stability
Voice and accountability
□ 1996 
■  2002
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Percentile rank
80
Note: Idle percentile rank refers to the percentage of countries in the world ranked lower than Kyrgyzstan. 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. Available online at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wp- 
governance.html.
Table 4.5 EBRD indices of institutional development, Kyrgyzstan, 1995-2003
Index of competition policy 
Index of banking reform 
Index of NBFI reform
1995 1996 1997 1998
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7
1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, various years. Transition Report, EBRD, 
London.
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retarded, poor competition policy, and an underdeveloped regulatory framework. This is 
compounded by growing corruption, which imposes increased costs and uncertainty on 
transactions and business more generally, and poor legal enforcement, which means that 
traders have little recourse to the law when faced with illegal practices. Together, these 
factors serve to increase the costs and risks of doing business, a burden which falls 
disproportionately on small businesses and individuals.
Indices of political institutions also imply negative developments since 1996—both 
‘political stability’ and ‘voice and accountability’ have deteriorated. This might be 
somewhat biased by the events in Aksy District in March 2002, but seems generally to 
fit with political trends in the country over recent years. A fuller discussion of the 
deteriorating political scene in Kyrgyzstan is presented in Chapter 5.
4.4 T ajikistan
The Tajik case is clouded somewhat by the civil war there from 1992 to 1997. The 
government sought to introduce fairly radical economic reform and proposed sweeping 
liberalisation and privatisation in its Economic Reform Programme 1995-2000.8 
Ultimately, however, the civil war distracted policymakers and limited the 
government’s capacity to both implement and enforce reform. Thus, Tajikistan is a case 
of postponed or delayed liberalisation.
4.4.1 Liberalisation
Prices. As with the other republics, Tajikistan was essentially compelled by the Russian 
price liberalisation of 1992 to free up most of its prices. Some prices, however, such as 
those for bread, milk, rents and public transport, remained controlled. The government 
initiated a series of price rises for many for these goods to bring them closer to market 
prices9 before removing controls on them during 1995-96.10 This left only a small group 
of important goods and services—the most important of which were water, electricity, 
fuel, transportation—still subject to price controls (EBRD 1996, 1997), and these prices 
were adjusted on occasion.11 The government ceased state orders and freed prices for 
cotton in 1996, the last good that remained under the control system, thus essentially 
completing the price liberalisation. It did, however, retain controls on charges for 
communal services, such as electricity and water as well as some transport, but has 
periodically adjusted these over the years.
Exchange rate. Tajikistan was the last CIS republic to abandon the Russian rouble, 
introducing its own currency, the Tajik Rouble, on 10 May 1995, having earlier eased 
currency controls.12 The new currency initially operated under a floating exchange rate 
regime heavily restricted by Central Bank control over foreign currency operations, 
which, inevitably, led to a black market for currency.13 A new re-based currency, the 
Somoni, was introduced in October 2000, with the Tajik Rouble remaining legal tender 
until April 2001 (Associated Press Newswires, 31 October 2000). The exchange rate 
regime is now a managed float.
Trade. Trade liberalisation in Tajikistan was substantially delayed until 1995. In 1995, 
the government abolished quota and license requirements for all but six key goods, of 
which cotton fibre and aluminium were the most important.14 The state’s monopoly on
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exports of particular goods was also abolished, except for cotton sales (EBRD 1995), 
and the highly onerous surrender requirements for foreign currency earnings were first 
eased, then removed, in 1996 (EBRD 1996). Tajikistan has sought to join the WTO, and 
is currently working with a group of other CIS countries to negotiate a joint accession.
Wages. The 1994 constitution establishes certain freedoms with respect to labour, in 
particular the right to work and to choose one’s profession or job. The government, in 
theory, retains only the right to set the minimum wage, and other limitations on labour 
relations are forbidden.15 In practice, the government has little capacity to enforce 
minimum wage levels, and indeed has often been responsible for significant wage 
arrears to its own employees.16
4.4.2 Privatisation
Privatisation has followed a similar pattern to that seen in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan; it 
has been most aggressively pursued in the predominantly small-scale sectors (such as 
trade and catering, and services) and slowest in the predominantly large-scale sectors 
such as industry, construction and transport (Table 4.6). Although the process began 
quite early, the civil war meant that economic reforms were a low priority through 
1992-1995.17 The Economic Reform Programme 1995-2000 envisaged privatisation of 
all small-scale enterprises by the end of 1997 and of all large-scale enterprises by 2000. 
This proved somewhat ambitious, however, as enterprises were still being privatised in 
2001, albeit at a slower rate,18 and a Strategic Privatisation Plan 2002-2004 was 
released in July 2002 that outlined privatisation of more large enterprises, including the 
railways, the national airline and the Tursunzade aluminium smelter—the single most 
important enterprise in Tajikistan.19 A further privatisation program was released in late 
2003 that outlined the privatisation program up to 2007, including the 
‘denationalisation’ of all medium and large-scale enterprises by that date.20 
Small-scale and housing privatisation. Privatisation of housing and small-scale 
enterprises began in 1991, but enterprise privatisation moved slowly until the Economic 
Reform Programme was introduced in 1995. Small-scale privatisation is nonetheless 
now nearly complete, with the predominant method being sales to outsiders and
Table 4.6 Privatisation progress, Tajikistan, 1991-99
Initial stock
of state-
owned units Per cent privatised, cumulative
Industry 318
1991
0.3
1992
4.1
1993
4.4
1994
5.3
1995
8.5
1996
13.5
1997
19.2
1998
29.6
1999
37.7
Construction 422 0.2 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.8 5.0 5.7 10.0 17.3
Trans and comm. 167 0.0 4.2 4.8 4.8 7.8 9.0 12.6 18.0 27.5
Trade and catering 2546 0.7 8.4 9.3 12.3 19.0 30.7 43.8 62.3 87.1
Services 2200 0.5 23.2 25.2 34.3 41.1 52.1 60.2 75.5 88.8
Agriculture 491 0.0 0.2 0.4 2.2 3.3 6.5 18.7 46.6 87.0
Other 1252 0.0 0.8 0.8 2.4 3.4 8.9 18.7 38.8 67.4
Total 7396 0.4 10.4 11.3 15.5 20.3 29.1 38.8 55.8 76.8
Source: World Bank, 2001. Tajikistan: towards accelerated economic growth, Report No. 22013-TJ, 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
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employers. The housing privatisation was more rapid, and the majority of dwellings had 
been privatised by 1993 (EBRD 1995). By the end of 2003, the government claimed to 
have privatised 7,501 real estate properties and 222,000 apartments.21
Medium and large-scale privatisation. Although initiated at the same time as the 
small-scale privatisation program, the larger-scale privatisation programs have not 
moved as quickly. The most common process of privatisation of large-scale enterprises 
has involved initial restructuring of the enterprise into a joint-stock company followed 
by open auction of a controlling stake in the company, which is obviously a fairly 
involved and time-consuming process. In most cases, both domestic and foreign 
investors could participate in privatisation auctions.22 Privatisation of a number of 
cotton gins starting in 1999 was a particularly important step in that it addressed 
privatisation of large-scale enterprises in a highly sensitive sector.
Agricultural sector. The Law on Land Reform, issued in April 1992, provided for 
liberalisation of the agricultural sector by providing individuals and collectives lifetime 
leases of land and devolving production choices to private individuals or collective 
groups (Novecon, 18 May 1992). The law, however, specifically did not provide for 
private ownership of land. Since then, agricultural privatisation has generally been 
through hand-over to collectives or the formation of joint-stock companies (EBRD 
1995).
4.4.3 Institutions
Tajikistan introduced a range of laws to provide the legal institutional basis for 
economic activity in the early years of the transition period—for example, a Central 
Bank Law (December 1991), a Bankruptcy Law (March 1992), and Competition Law 
(1993). More broadly, the governance indicators formulated by Kaufmann et al. (2003) 
show considerable development of economic institutions between 1996 and 2002 (see 
Figure 4.3). This should not be surprising: in 1996, the civil war was still dividing the 
country and economic institutions were basically absent. Since the peace settlement was 
concluded in 1997, conditions have been far more conducive to the development of 
good governance and functioning institutions.
Indices of ‘control of corruption’, ‘rule of law’, ‘regulatory quality’ and ‘government 
effectiveness’ implied an exceptionally poor economic institutional environment in 
Tajikistan in 1996. While these indices suggest considerable improvement by 2002, 
they still place Tajikistan as one of the poorest institutional environments for economic 
activity in the region (only Turkmenistan comes close). The EBRD indices also point to 
relatively underdeveloped economic institutions in terms of competition policy and the 
banking and non-banking financial sectors (see Table 4.7). Politically, the situation has 
stabilised and there is, according to the Kaufmann et al (2003) indices, far more scope 
for ‘voice and accountability’. Chapter 5 will discuss aspects of this in more detail.
It should be noted, however, that these measures are very prone to error, and in 
Tajikistan in particular the measures of things such as rule of law and control of 
corruption are starting from an extremely low base. Nonetheless, the poor institutional 
framework is a characteristic of the Tajik economy at present (Umanov and
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Figure 4.3 Institutional change, Tajikistan, 1996-2002
□ 1996Control of corruption
■ 2002
Rule of law
Regulatory quality
Government effectiveness
Political stability
V o c e  and accountability
Percentile rank
Note: The percentile rank is the percentage of countries in the world that ranked below Tajikistan. 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance Matters III: governance 
indicators for 1996-2002, World Bank, Washington, DC. Available online at http:/www.worldbank.org/ 
wbi/governance/wp-governance.html.
Table 4.7 EBRD indices of institutional development, Tajikistan, 1995-2003
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Index of com petition policy 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7
Index of banking ref orm 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7
Index of NBFI reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, various years. Transition Report, EBRD, 
London.
Mahmadshoev 2001), and the lack of reliable financial networks, as well as properly 
functioning legal and regulatory systems, makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to operate 
and probably hampers economic activity more generally.
4.5 Turkmenistan
4.5.1 Liberalisation
Prices. Most prices were liberalised in early 1993, but price controls remained on 473 
kinds of goods (EBRD 1995). This was reduced to around 40 goods in November 1993, 
and prices of the remaining controlled goods were increased towards the market level.23 
Further reductions in the range of goods subject to price controls were enacted through 
1995-96, but controls were retained on the prices of bread, meat, baby food, sugar, 
milk, heating and housing (Larichev 1996). Procurement prices on cotton and wheat 
remained in place at levels considerably below the world price, at times causing supply 
difficulties {Reuters News, 13 January 1997). The government removed controls on the 
prices of butter, milk, meat and fodder in the second half of 1996, but retained control
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over the price of flour, bread, cotton oil, rice sugar, utilities, communal services, rents, 
petrol, transportation and building materials. Niyazov removed all charges for 
electricity, gas and water in September 1992, and repeatedly pledged not to reinstate 
them before 2020 (Reuters News, 27 September 1992; Interfax Central Asia News, 15 
August 2003, Niyazov n.d.).
Although Turkmenistan has removed controls on most prices, it has been far slower 
to do so than Kazakstan or Kyrgyzstan. It retains controls on a far wider range of goods 
than either of these countries, and unlike them continues blanket full subsidies on key 
utilities. As a result, an extensive criminal economy has developed to smuggle under- 
priced products to more lucrative markets elsewhere, which, along with the trafficking 
of drugs from Afghanistan, provides an attractive sideline for poorly paid workers and 
officials. Together, these factors have reportedly served to draw large sections of the 
bureaucracy into criminal activities, and certainly provide plenty of scope for 
corruption.
Exchange rate. Suffering, like the other Central Asian republics, from the difficulties of 
staying within the rouble zone, Turkmenistan introduced its own currency, the manat, 
on 1 November 1993 {Reuters News, 29 October 1993). Government management of 
the exchange rate meant that the official rate quickly diverged from the black market 
rate, and three different exchange rates now exist: official, commercial and black 
market. The commercial rate represents an intermediate rate, in theory available to some 
specific groups, between the fixed official rate and the true black market rate. The 
commercial rate has repeatedly been devalued to reflect more closely the black-market 
rate, and the official rate has also been devalued on a number of occasions.24 The 
government attempted to unify the exchange rates in April 1996, but this proved 
unsustainable as the value of the manat continued to slide.25 The government has 
repeatedly imposed restrictions on currency exchange since the introduction of the 
manat, usually in response to shortfalls in US dollar reserves.26 A 20 per cent tax on 
purchases of foreign currency was removed in December 1999 {Interfax, 22 December 
1999).
Trade. Foreign trade remains heavily state-dominated. The government issued a decree 
in August 1994 that forced all export transactions to be conducted through a centralised 
State Commodity and Raw Material Exchange.27 Furthermore, it imposed a mandatory 
100 per cent surrender requirement for all foreign currency export earnings in February 
1992, but reduced the requirement to 50 per cent for state industries and 60 per cent for 
gas and oil exporters in February 1994. Non-state enterprises are exempt from the 
requirement.28
In June 2000, Niyazov banned Turkmen citizens from operating bank accounts 
abroad, and required all foreign currency earnings to be repatriated to Turkmenistan.29 
In October 2002, Niyazov introduced another law that stipulated transactions made in 
hard currency between Turkmen and foreign companies had to be approved by him, the 
head of the Central Bank, and one other figure {Prime-TASS News, 16 October 2002). 
He later decreed that all hard-currency accounts be under the direct control of the 
Central Bank.30 Imports and exports still require a special license or approval by the 
Cabinet or president.
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The purpose of these bureaucratic impositions is clearly to serve personal and 
domestic political ends by extracting rents from the natural resources sector and 
redistributing them to various groups. The problem is that they curtail severely the 
incentives to engage in trade on the one hand, while driving underground any activity 
that remains.
Wages. Niyazov frequently issues decrees adjusting the minimum and average wages in 
the state sector, which, given the high proportion of workers still employed in this sector, 
have an economy-wide impact. Officially, there are no controls on private sector wages 
above the minimum level, but the government imposes a 50 per cent payroll tax on any 
wage payments above the state-determined average wage, countering any incentives for 
enterprises to pay above average wages.31 The government’s control over wage rates, 
however, is made irrelevant by its inability to pay them—Turkmenistan continues to 
suffer wage arrears long after most other transition countries have managed to bring 
them under control, with a new round of non-payments breaking out in early 2004.
The labour market in Turkmenistan is still not quite free, with children being drafted 
to take part in the cotton harvest every year {Reuters News, 13 May 2004). Furthermore, 
Niyazov recently instituted a wide-ranging draft labour scheme, under which men up to 
35 years old can be drafted to provide labour on state projects for two-years in return for 
food and accommodation, but no pay {Defense and Security, 6 September 2002; BBC 
Monitoring Fortner Soviet Union, 4 September 2002). University students have also 
been effectively drafted by Niyazov’s educational reforms, which have altered the 
standard degree to a four year course comprising two years of study and two of labour.
The official reason for Turkmenistan’s protracted liberalisation is to limit social and 
economic dislocation in the post-Soviet period, but its effect is to widen the scope for 
corruption and concentrate economic activity in the hands of a few government 
officials, over whom the populace find it difficult to assert discipline (see Chapter 5). At 
the same time, the objective of limiting social and economic dislocation appears 
unfulfilled—as Chapters 6 and 7 show, the post-Soviet period has been one of economic 
chaos and socio-economic collapse.
4.5.2 Privatisation
The Law on Privatisation and Denationalisation was adopted on 19 February 1992 and 
provided for privatisation through lease-purchase, collective buyouts, shareholder 
ownership and private ownership.32 The small-scale privatisation program has moved 
more rapidly than the large-scale privatisation program, but in truth neither has moved 
particularly quickly. It is not clear whether this is by design or complacency—President 
Niyazov explicitly repudiated rapid privatisation in the early years of the transition but 
later urged faster privatisation.33
Small-scale. The privatisation of small-scale enterprises—those with less than 20 
employees—began in December 1993. The initial aim was to privatise retail trade, 
public catering and communal enterprises in the first stage of reform.34 The process was 
slow, with less than half of all small-scale enterprises privatised by the end of 1996. The 
predominant form of privatisation was through auctions to private individuals and also 
some sales to cooperatives.
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Table 4.8 Privatisation of state enterprises, Turkmenistan, 1993-99
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Jan-Jun
1999
Consum er services 13 1003 201 45 1 1 2
Trade and catering 0 61 201 167 96 89 28
M anufacturing 0 0 0 2 3 16 22
Others 0 0 0 0 38 1 0
Total 13 1064 402 224 138 107 52
of which:
small-scale 13 1064 401 219 97 91 30
large-scale 0 0 1 5 41 16 22
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1999. Turkmenistan: recent economic developments, Country 
Report 99/140, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Medium and large-scale. A limited privatisation of medium-scale enterprises took 
place in mid-1994.35 A second stage of privatisation was introduced in December 1994 
concentrating on privatisation of enterprises involved in manufacturing consumer goods 
or construction materials, processing agricultural products or transport.36 Since then 
progress has been halting, but another round of privatisation, this time concentrating on 
industrial enterprises, with the exclusion of transport, oil and gas companies, was 
launched in March-April 1997. Some large-scale enterprises—that is, enterprises with 
more than 100 employees— have been transformed into joint-stock companies, but the 
predominant form of privatisation has been through auctions and tenders. Other 
enterprises were taken over by workers’ collectives. The government has thus far been 
unwilling to privatise enterprises in the oil and gas sectors.37
Unfortunately, up-to-date data on privatisation in Turkmenistan is difficult to find. 
Table 4.8, while not completely up-to-date, gives some indication of the privatisation 
dynamic in Turkmenistan—the government has privatised small-scale enterprises, 
particularly in the services sector, most rapidly, but little privatisation has occurred 
among large-scale enterprises.
Land ownership. Land remains the exclusive property of the state, but has been 
allocated on a leasehold basis to individuals and families. While this would seem likely 
to generate generate change in the farming sector, the production structure has changed 
little because farmers’ tenure is dependent on fulfilment of government-specified 
production targets, and this production is sold to government bodies at prices below 
world levels (Lerman and Brooks 2001; EBRD 1997).38In this case, the Turkmen 
authorities have the process precisely backwards, implementing change of ownership 
forms but leaving the incentives to farmers completely unchanged. As a consequence, 
the sector’s performance has not changed much.
4.5.3 Institutions
Not surprisingly, Kaufmann et al. (2003) find little evidence of institutional 
development in Turkmenistan. In fact, their indicators identify Turkmenistan as having 
among the worst institutional frameworks of all the economies in their study (Figure 4.4).
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These indicators suggest a very poor economic institutional environment in terms of 
control of corruption, the functioning of regulatory bodies, and the legal institutions that 
would normally provide the basis for a market economy. The concentration of power 
with the president has rendered the bureaucracy impotent and completely subject to 
Niyazov’s vacillations, and the neutered judiciary does not provide an effective and 
objective legal framework. This is compounded by the state’s control over almost all 
aspects of the economy. Such control may be fine if the state is accountable, efficient 
and not corrupt, but the Turkmen state is none of these, so the control merely provides 
the means to concentrate the republic’s wealth in the hands a few.
The EBRD indices similarly point to a very poor institutional environment for 
market-based economic activity—among other things, the financial sectors remain 
severely underdeveloped (Table 4.9).
It is probably safe to say that virtually no institutional framework exists for a market- 
based economy in Turkmenistan at present. This may not be too important because 
Turkmenistan is only barely a market-based economy anyway given that government
Figure 4.4 Institutional change, Turkmenistan, 1996-2001
□  1996 
■  2001
Government e ffec tiv en ess
Political stability
Voice and accountability
Percentile rank
Note: The percentile rank is the percentage of countries in the world ranked worse than Turkmenistan. 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance Matters III: governance 
indicators for 1996-2002, World Bank, Washington, DC. Available online at http://ww.worldbank.org/ 
wbi/governance/wp-governance.html.
Table 4.9 EBRD indices of institutional development, Turkmenistan, 1995-2003
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Index of competition policy 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Index of banking reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Index of NBFI reform 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, various years. Transition Report, EBRD, 
London.
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monopolises the major economic sectors and interferes in all others. The political 
situation is considered stable, but the economic situation relies on the controlling 
influence of the government. Should the government fall or lose control, there will be a 
void in the institutional environment that will not easily be filled.
4.6  U zbekistan
4.6.1 Liberalisation
Prices. Like the other republics of the former Soviet Union, Uzbekistan was compelled 
to liberalise prices by Russia’s move to free prices in early 1992 (Reuters, 17 January 
1992). The government resisted this, limiting for some time the price increases on many 
basic goods, presumably in reaction to the violent protests that broke out in Tashkent 
when initial price rises far outstripped increases in wages and student stipends. Price 
restrictions, however, prompted illegal exports of subsidised goods into neighbouring 
countries to take advantage of the higher prices there, eventually causing the 
government to raise prices, introduce tighter trade controls, and institute rationing for 
some consumer goods.39 The rationing system was briefly dropped, then reinstated, in 
early 1995.40
As of 2003, the government had liberalised most prices except those for essentials 
and strategic goods, such as sugar, flour, bread, butter, utilities, metals, cotton and some 
other goods.41 Alongside this, the Law on Restriction of Monopoly Activity, issued in 
September 1992, provides for regulation of minimum and maximum prices in a wide 
range of monopoly industries (Ekonomika I zhizn’, 8 September 1992; World Bank 
2003a).
Thus, like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has resisted uncontrolled rapid liberalisation of 
prices, thereby following a somewhat different path to that of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Trade. Both external and internal trade are severely constrained by government policy. 
On the external side, there have nonetheless been a number of liberalisation moves, 
starting with a reduction in the number of goods subject to export licensing in 199442 
and the replacement of the state-run foreign trade monopolies with joint-stock 
companies in 1995.43 This was complemented by steady reductions through the 1990s in 
the range and size of duties imposed on exports and elimination of bans on exports of 
some sensitive goods,44 but the government still reserves for itself control over the 
export of agricultural commodities.
Importers are constrained by a number of factors. First, the authorities severely 
restrict access to foreign currency, such that, until the most recent round of liberalisation, 
only certain favoured businesses were licensed to purchase foreign currency, and even 
they faced restricted supply.45 Second, the government has insisted that import contracts 
be registered and through this process has controlled the kinds of goods imported 
(EBRD 1997). Third, the government in 2002 imposed restrictions that force importers 
of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals to sell all imports to state-run distributors, who 
then resell them to retail outlets (WRMC Daily Analysis, 22 August 2002). Combined, 
these factors mean that the government controls and selects importers, the kinds of 
goods they import, and the distribution of their imports.
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Internally, the government retains strong formal control over the agricultural sector, 
setting production targets and procurement prices, supplying inputs, and monopolising 
purchasing and marketing of agricultural goods.46 The government’s procurement 
prices, moreover, have typically been far below world market levels, despite occasional 
increases through the 1990s.47 The sector has gradually been opened up, with cotton 
producers initially allowed to sell above-quota output privately {Reuters, 23 August 
1994) and more recently to sell 50 per cent of their output at world prices but still 
through ‘specialised trading companies’ {ITAR-TASS World Service, 16 December 
2002).
The government has also informally directed the economy by making access to 
domestic cash, foreign currency and inputs in some key industries conditional on 
membership of the relevant industry or trade association. The government dictates the 
approaches taken by, and resources supplied to, these organisations, thus maintaining a 
de facto command system in key sectors of the economy (World Bank 2003a).
Exchange rate. Like the other Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan initially sought to 
stay within the Rouble Zone, but introduced Sum coupons in November 1993 to ease 
the problems it created. These circulated alongside the rouble until the new currency, 
the Sum, was introduced in October 1994 {Reuters, 15 November 1993). Since then 
until quite recently, the government maintained an artificially high official exchange 
rate, limiting access to foreign currency and expropriating export earnings through a 
series of regulations and confiscatory exchange requirements.48 A black market in 
currency rapidly developed, in which the Sum rate diverged considerably from the 
official rate through the 1990s {Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 May 1999). There were efforts 
at liberalising the exchange rate regime—and repeated promises to introduce full 
convertibility—through the 1990s, but these were typically reversed whenever 
Uzbekistan’s external situation deteriorated (usually because falling cotton and/or gold 
prices reduced hard-currency export earnings).49 The exchange rate system was 
liberalised slightly in July 2000, when importers and exporters were allowed to 
purchase foreign currency at the market rate, where previously they had to obtain a 
license {Interfax: Banking and Finance, 26 February 2004). And, in late 2003, 
liberalisation efforts culminated in an ostensible success when the government officially 
ended the restrictions on access to foreign currency and agreed to introduce full 
convertibility {Agence-France Presse, 26 October 2003). In practice, however, the 
situation has not changed: those not favoured by the regime still find it difficult to 
extract foreign currency from official exchange desks (Economist Intelligence Unit 
2004; Reuters News, 10 March 2004).
Wages and labour. Wages have been liberalised, as in the other republics, but the 
government retains control over wage setting in the public sector and over the 
republican minimum wage. Private sector wage growth is restrained by a punitive tax 
regime on companies that allow wages to grow too much more quickly than output. 
While labour is ostensibly free, the Soviet practice of drafting labour for the cotton 
harvest continues, and workers, even school children, are rounded up every year in rural 
areas to help bring in the cotton, apparently for poor recompense {Eurasianet.org, 12 
December 2002).
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4.6.2 Privatisation50
Housing and small-scale. The first tentative steps in the privatisation program were 
taken in 1992: after a few experimental housing privatisation efforts in Tashkent in late 
1992, the government initiated a nation-wide program of housing privatisation in June 
1993.51 These were predominantly sold, or in some cases given, to the occupants. At this 
time, the government was also privatising a number of small-scale enterprises, 
predominantly in the services sector, on a fairly ad hoc basis,52 generally by selling them 
to enterprise employees (Turaeva 2002). The government claimed that privatisation of 
service-sector enterprises and housing was almost complete by the end of 1993 (Table 
4.10).53
Medium and large-scale. Uzbekistan’s approach to larger-scale privatisation has been 
more reserved than that of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan eschewed the use of 
vouchers in its privatisation program, choosing instead to use tenders and auctions to 
sell packets of shares in various companies. This has meant that medium and large-scale 
enterprise privatisation has taken far longer in Uzbekistan than elsewhere.
President Karimov announced the beginning of this second stage of privatisation in 
January 1994 {Reuters News, 22 January 1994), allowing open auctions of state property 
for the first time. Most enterprises were transformed into joint-stock companies, with a 
significant portion of the shares reserved for employees and the state and the remainder 
auctioned (BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 29 July 1994). The first rounds of 
auctions were held in March-April 1994 {Reuters News, 7 April 1994).
The government introduced the concept of Privatisation Investment Funds in 1996 to 
push the privatisation program along. The Privatisation Investment Funds—holding 
companies that could release shares to the general public—were to purchase shares in 
companies undergoing privatisation (Petzold and Markovicova 1998; Thoenes 1996, 
World Bank 1999b).54That is, individuals would not invest directly in privatising 
enterprises; instead, they would purchase shares in the Privatisation Investment Funds,
Table 4.10 Corporatised and partially privatised enterprises, Uzbekistan, 1992-98
Small
Num ber of 
state-owned  
enterprises prior 
to 1993
52782
1993
33577
Cum ulative privatisations 
1994 1995 1996 1997
40226 47435 48093 48868
1998
49003
M edium 7059 600 3325 3499 4608 5033 5348
Large 4706 400 770 898 1046 1077 1078
Total 64547 34577 44321 51832 53747 54978 55429
Per cent of initial stock 
Small 64 76 90 91 93 93
M edium 8 47 50 65 71 76
Large 8 16 19 22 23 23
Total 54 69 80 83 85 86
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2000. Republic of Uzbekistan: recent economic developments, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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which would use the finance thus raised to purchase shares in the privatising firms.
Table 4.10 gives some indication of Uzbekistan’s progress up to 1998 in denationalising 
its industrial sector; it does not, however, give any indication of the true extent of 
privatisation. World Bank analysts, for example, assert that only about 20 per cent of 
corporatised medium and large-scale enterprises had actually been fully privatised by 
2003 (World Bank 2003a).
Since 1998, the privatisation program has continued on a case-by-case basis, 
alternating between setbacks prompted by lack of interest and excessively high starting 
prices and government-driven attempts to sell off, or be seen to be selling off, more 
enterprises {Reuters News, 15 December 1999). Recent years have seen moves to 
privatise assets in more sensitive sectors of the economy such as transport (Railways of 
Uzbekistan), banks, chemicals, and oil and gas.55 Even the National Bank for Foreign 
Economic Activity of Uzbekistan and Uzbektelecom have been proposed for 
privatisation {UzReport.com, 7 July 2003; Novecon, 19 September 2003). Over 700 
enterprises were reportedly privatised in 2001, 1,912 in 2002, and 1029 in January- 
September 2003 {Novecon, 23 January 2002; UzReport.com, 10 November 2003; 
UzReport.com, 30 January 2003).
Agricultural sector. The government began reform in the agricultural sector in early 
1993 by attempting to transfer control over less-profitable or loss-making farms to 
groups and individuals, predominantly collectives or farmers’ associations.56 As 
Ilkhamov (1998) points out, however, this merely transformed the soviet-era sovkhozy 
into kolkhozy, and the effect of this was to remove them from direct reliance on the state 
budget but leave the basic conditions of agricultural production unchanged. The 
kolkhozy then became privatised, generally as some form of collective enterprise (see 
World Bank 1999b, Kandiyoti 2002, Ilkhamov 1998).57 Independent private farming is 
also possible, and the government has increased the amount of land available for this 
kind of farming, but restrictions remain on the amount of land private farmers can hold. 
Land itself has not been privatised, and all farmland remains leasehold. Officially, 
almost all agricultural production is now conducted by the non-state sector.58
4.6.3 Institutional change
Formal institutional development is stagnant, and governance indicators indicate stasis 
in the overall institutional environment in Uzbekistan. Control of corruption, rule of law 
and regulatory quality all remain poor but are generally better than in Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. This, in many ways, is a function of both government regulation of the 
economy, which opens up the scope for corrupt practices, and excessive state power, 
which subverts the legal and regulatory framework (see Chapter 5). The institutional 
basis for economic development in the longer-term thus remains unclear, but, as with 
Turkmenistan, it arguable that this matters very little because economic activity is so 
dominated by the government.
The EBRD indices also point to underdevelopment of formal economic institutions. 
Financial institutions remain retarded owing to the slow pace of government reform and 
its heavy-handed approach to economic matters generally, a situation which must make 
financing new enterprises quite difficult. That said, however, Uzbekistan seems more
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Figure 4.5 Institutional change, Uzbekistan, 1996-2002
Note: The percentile rank refers to the number of countries in the world ranked lower than Uzbekistan. 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance Matters III: governance 
indicators for 1996-2002, World Bank, Washington, DC. Available online at http://www.worldbank.org 
/wbi/governance/wp-governance.html.
Table 4.11 EBRD indices of institutional development, Uzbekistan, 1995-2003
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Index of competition policy 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7
Index of banking reform 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Index of NBFI reform 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, various years. Transition Report, EBRD, 
London.
advanced than either Turkmenistan or Tajikistan, and basically on a par with 
Kyrgyzstan in this respect (Table 4.11). What this tentatively points to is a lack of 
institutional development towards those conditions perceived to underpin a market- 
based economic system. This is hardly a shock given that Uzbekistan’s leadership has 
explicitly identified its priority as maintaining the old system while building the new 
system.
The only notable and significant change between 1996 and 2002 was the massive 
perceived decrease in political stability, most likely influenced by the bombings in 
Tashkent in 1999.59 This, along with other aspects of post-Soviet Uzbekistan’s political 
development will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
4.7 Conclusion
It should be clear from this that the Central Asian republics have each adopted different 
programs in transition. Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan are the region’s most advanced 
reformers, having adopted extensive price and trade liberalisation, the region’s most 
aggressive privatisation programs, and extensive institutional reform and development.
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Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan represent the opposite approach—the so-called ‘gradual’ 
reform approach. In these republics, some prices remain under state control, both 
exchange rates and trade remain more-or-less under state control, privatisation has 
proceeded slowly, and institutions remain poorly developed. Tajikistan represents an 
intermediate case: until 1997, the civil war prevented sustainable reform from taking 
place. Since 1997, however, considerable reform has taken place, leaving Tajikistan 
close to the region’s leading reformers in terms of liberalisation and privatisation, but a 
laggard in terms of institutional development.
The republics all suffer retarded institutional and governance development. This has 
been identified with weaker, or shallower, economic growth because the lack of 
institutions makes economic transactions riskier and more costly. The next chapter will 
extend this by discussing political developments in the Central Asian republics. 
Chapters 6 and 7 will then relate the reform approach adopted in each republic to 
economic and socio-economic performance to determine what role, if any, economic 
reform has played in this performance.
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Table A4.1 EBRD transition indices
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Price liberalisation 
Kazakstan 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Kyrgyzstan 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Tajikistan 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
Turkmenistan 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Uzbekistan 3.7 3.7 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Foreign exchange and trade liberalisation
Kazakstan 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Kyrgyzstan 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Tajikistan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uzbekistan 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7
Small-scale privatisation 
Kazakstan 3.0 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Kyrgyzstan 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Tajikistan 2.0 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7
Turkmenistan 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Uzbekistan 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Large-scale privatisation 
Kazakstan 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Kyrgyzstan 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Tajikistan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uzbekistan 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Enterprise reform  
Kazakstan 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Kyrgyzstan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Tajikistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uzbekistan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Com petition policy  
Kazakstan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Kyrgyzstan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Tajildstan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uzbekistan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7
Infrastructure reform 
Kazakstan 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
Kyrgyzstan 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Tajikistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uzbekistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.7
Banking sector reform  
Kazakstan 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0
Kyrgyzstan 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Tajikistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uzbekistan 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
NBFI reform  
Kazakstan 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Kyrgyzstan 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Tajikistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uzbekistan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, various issues. Transition Report, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London
5 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Democratisation was assumed to be a major part of transition, accompanying or even 
facilitating economic change. This is understandable given that the ‘transitions’ began 
in Eastern Europe as democratic openings, but the assumption of democratisation has 
proved tenuous in parts of the former Soviet Union and untenable in Central Asia. 
Importantly, democracy is not a precondition for a functioning market economy.
Because democratisation was an assumed feature of the transition period, the 
following chapter will describe aspects of political developments in Central Asia. It will 
argue that the Central Asian republics are not democratising and that the region’s 
leaders probably have no intention of pursuing wider democratisation. Democratic 
processes remain underdeveloped or are deliberately thwarted. As a consequence, no 
president of a Central Asian republic has yet been removed from power by democratic 
process, even though all have held a number of elections, and other aspects of a 
functioning democracy remain weak. This chapter investigates some of these aspects, 
concentrating on elections, political contestation, freedom of the media, and judicial 
function. This is of course hardly an exhaustive list of aspects of democratisation; the 
chapter essentially seeks to use these factors to provide an insight into change in the 
region since 1992.
5.1 O verview of democratisation in  C entral A sia
The Central Asian republics have all adopted constitutions containing provisions to 
underpin a democratic system. Typically, they provide inter alia for the respect of 
human rights, freedom of speech and association, and free elections. Thus, all of the 
CARs have adopted constitutions that set out the legal conditions for the development 
of civil society and opposition groups (through freedom of religion/creed and ideology), 
all set out the separation of state powers and provide for independence of the judiciary, 
all establish the right to disseminate ideas and opinions and the right to engage in 
demonstrations, rallies and meetings, all prohibit the use of torture or inhumane 
treatment, and all establish the right to free elections to determine the people’s 
representatives (Table 5.1).
So, this essentially provides the formal requirements for the development of the 
facets of democracy—namely, civil society, political society, and the rule of law. Since 
1992, however, governments in all the Central Asian republics have grown increasingly 
repressive—commitments to human rights have been abrogated, the critical press has 
been repressed, and parliaments have been eclipsed in favour of increased presidential
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Table 5.1 Constitutions of Central Asia, key provisions
K azakstan K yrgyzstan Tajikistan T urkm enistan  U zbekistan
Free elections, w ith  
un iversa l suffrage
A rticles 41 
an d  51
A rticle 1 A rticle 27a A rticles 89 
an d  92
Article 117
Separation  of pow ers A rticle 3 A rticle 7 A rticle 9 A rticle 4 A rticle 11
R espect for ideological 
and  political d iversity
A rticle 5 A rticle 16 A rticle 8 A rticles 11 
an d  26
A rticle 12
Secularity  of the state A rticle 5 A rticle 8 A rticle 8 A rticle 1 A rticle 12
U niversal equality A rticle 14 A rticle 17 A rticles 17 
an d  18
A rticle 46
H u m an  righ ts  and  freedom s A rticle 12 A rticles 15 
an d  16
A rticles 5 
an d  17
A rticle 3 Article 13
Freedom  of association A rticle 23 A rticle 8 A rticle 28 A rticle 28b A rticles 34 
an d  56-62c
Freedom  of re lig ion /creed A rticle 19 A rticle 16 A rticle 26 A rticle 11 Article 31
Right to take p a r t in m eetings, 
rallies an d  dem onstra tions
A rticle 32 A rticle 16 A rticle 29 A rticle 27 Article 33
Freedom  of sp eech /p ress A rticle 20 A rticle 16 A rticle 30 A rticle 26 A rticles 29 
and  67
Private p ro p e rty /o w n ersh ip A rticles 6 
an d  26
A rticle 4 A rticle 32 A rticle 9 A rticle 36
Protection  from  arbitrary 
state interference
A rticle 5 A rticle 39 A rticle 23 A rticle 27
Protection from  torture, 
inh u m an e  trea tm en t A rticle 17 A rticle 18 A rticle 18 A rticle 21 A rticle 26
Notes: aThis article does not explicitly stipulate that elections must be free.b There is ample scope for 
political misinterpretation in Article 28 of the Turkmen Constitution.c Article 57 of the Uzbek 
Constitution allows considerable scope for interpretation.
Sources: Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted 28 January 1993, revised 1995), 
Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (adopted on 5 May 1993), Constitution of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Constitution of Turkmenistan, Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
power. In all cases, the state and political power have come to revolve around the 
presidential figure. Elections, when held, have usually not been free or fair, and 
opposition groups, such as exist, are harassed, intimidated and repressed. As a result, the 
critical feature of democratisation in the region is not the constitutional existence of 
aspects of a democratic system, but the way in which these factors have developed in 
practice2
Critically, however, the ‘window of opportunity’ discussed by radical economists 
(see Chapter 2) did not open in Central Asia. There was no break with the past, and no 
temporary displacement of old elites by reformers. No opposition movement emerged to 
take power and initiate change. Instead, reforms in Central Asia were adopted by the old 
nomenklatura, which was concerned to ensure political and social stability and
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economic continuity. Thus, the political economy of transition in Central Asia very 
different to that in Eastern Europe and the Baltics.
The following section will analyse select components of the political situation in 
each of the Central Asian republics—democratisation and elections, political 
contestation, freedom of the media, and the rule of law.
5.2 K azakstan
5.2.1 Democracy and elections
Two presidential elections have been held in Kazakstan since 1991. The first, in 
December 1991, was won unopposed by Nursultan Nazarbaev. Nazarbaev’s presidential 
term was extended by general referendum in April 1995, so he did not have to contest 
the presidential elections that would otherwise have taken place in 1996. A 
constitutional amendment in October 1998 extended the Presidential term from 5 to 7 
years and removed the age limit of 65.
A further presidential election was held in January 1999. Although contested by a 
range of candidates, it was not widely regarded as free and fair, given that it was held at 
short notice, opposition candidates and movements were harassed and prevented from 
organising for dubious legal reasons, and the most prominent opposition candidates 
were disqualified or discouraged from participating on various spurious legal grounds 
(see OSCE 1999a and also Buluktaev 2002).
Parliamentary elections were held in March 1994. The resulting parliament turned 
out relatively independent-minded in fulfilling its role as a legislature and alternative 
focus of power within the political structure. The parliament was, however, sadly short 
lived. The Constitutional Court annulled the election on 6 March 1995 in a move that 
was rumoured to have been orchestrated by Nazarbaev in the face of the parliament’s 
increasing ‘assertiveness’ (see Brill Olcott 1997). Re-elections were held in December 
1995, and the resulting parliament was more amenable to the President’s needs, with 
around 60 per cent of the deputies associated in some way with the structures of power 
(Kurtov 2001). Irregularities were reported in the conduct of the election.2 Parliamentary 
elections were held again in 1999, for the Senate on 17 September and the House of 
Representatives on 10 and 24 October. As with earlier elections, the 1999 elections did 
not reach the standards hoped for. Opposition politicians and media outlets were often 
subject to violence and harassment, and prominent opposition figures were distracted by 
legal matters.3 The post-Soviet period has also seen a strong shift towards Kazak 
dominance of power structures. In this regard, Kurtov (2001) points out that Kazaks 
occupied 75 per cent of seats in the 1995 parliament, which could have consequences in 
terms of ethnic unease, particularly in northern areas of the country, which have a higher 
proportion of Slavs.
The Central Election Commission, the body responsible for conducting and 
overseeing elections in Kazakstan, and notionally the body responsible for ensuring the 
legitimacy of the electoral process, is elected by the Majilis from candidates proposed 
by the President. This clearly is not ideal. Given that the members of the CEC are 
beholden to the President for their jobs, can the public reasonably expect them to
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discharge their duties impartially? Unfortunately, given this situation, even if the 
Commission succeeded in organising a fair and unblemished election, most people 
would still view the results with suspicion.
5.2.2 Political contestation
Although the Constitution guarantees a diversity of ideological standpoints and free 
contestation of political space, opposition groups’ ability to operate is in reality severely 
circumscribed. Currently, only seven political parties are officially registered—Aq Zhol, 
Otan, the Civic, Agrarian, Aul Social Democratic and Communist parties, and the Party 
of Patriots (RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 15 April 2003). Changes in the registration 
process (see below) prevented a number of other prominent parties from re-registering 
in April 2003.
Opposition movements, including political parties and NGOs, are routinely harassed 
by officials, often fall foul of mendacious rules on association, and are subject to 
violence and arbitrary incarceration.4 One favoured way of limiting political 
contestation in Kazakstan was to charge opposition leaders with attending unsanctioned 
meetings or demonstrations. The authorities, of course, demonstrated no particular 
enthusiasm or zeal for sanctioning the meetings or demonstrations held by their 
opponents. Conviction then precluded that person from participating in future elections. 
The government used this law to prevent prominent opposition candidates Akezhan 
Kazhgeldin and Murat Auezov from contesting the January 1999 presidential elections, 
thus removing the most likely electoral threats from the competition. The law was 
subsequently changed in July 1999 to prevent abuse of this kind (Interfax Central Asia 
News, 6 August 1999). Since then, the way of discouraging dissenting campaigners has 
been to charge, convict and imprison opposition figures on tax evasion and ‘abuse of 
power’ allegations.5 Opposition parties’ meetings and demonstrations are frequently 
broken up or denounced by various levels of authority.
The Law on Social Associations prohibits unregistered associations from operating, 
and prevents the formation of associations that infringe the ‘moral foundations of the 
citizenry’.6 Registration as a social association is an awkward procedure under the 
purview of the Ministry of Justice or its local subsidiaries and attracts an official fee.7 
The Law on Political Parties, introduced in mid 2002, stipulates an initial conference of 
1,000 people representing two-thirds of Kazakstan’s oblasts, the collection of 50,000 
signatures of support, and 700 members in each of the 14 oblasts and the two special 
cities, Almaty and Astana.8
Registration as a presidential candidate requires signatures of support collected from 
2 per cent of the constituency drawn from two-thirds of the oblasts, Almaty and Astana. 
Collection entails gathering the signatory’s full name, date of birth, ID document 
numbers, and address.9 Not surprisingly, opposition candidates find it difficult to gamer 
the required number of signatures. Candidates must also pass a test of fluency in Kazak, 
which not only excludes the majority of Russians from contesting the presidency but 
also potentially large numbers of educated Kazaks, the very group from which most 
candidates would be drawn. Candidates must also pay a fee equivalent to one hundred 
times the minimum wage.10 Senate candidates must collect the signatures of no less than
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10 per cent of voters, drawn from all the districts, but no more than 15 per cent in any 
given district, and also pay a fee equal to twenty-five times the official minimum 
salary.11 Candidates to the Majilis also have to pay a fee.
These legal obstructions have made it difficult for opposition groups to organise 
officially as political parties, contest elections, and serve as a critical counterweight to 
the entrenched regime. At the same time, any individual who presents as a possible 
alternative to the incumbent regime faces a string of disincentives, ranging from 
increased attention from tax police, to arbitrary restrictions on movement, to being 
beaten and/or imprisoned on dubious grounds or having their family subjected to 
politically-inspired violence. In short, the political space in Kazakstan is not properly 
contested, and will not be until the barriers to entry into the political arena are 
substantially lowered, law enforcement is made non-partisan, and the threat of violence 
is removed from public political life.
5.2.3 Free media
The Kazak Constitution guarantees freedom of expression (see Table 5.1). In practice, 
however, this has not translated to an open and critical media sector. As with opposition 
politicians, the critical media face politically-motivated legal obstructions, personal 
violence, harassment and imprisonment.
At the soft end of the spectrum, critical media outlets tend to face legal obstacles to 
continuing their activities. Recent examples have been the suspension of Tan TV in 
March 2002 for ‘technical violations’, and fines imposed on it allegedly for copyright 
violations. Pavlodar independent local TV station, Irbis, had transmission suspended for 
three months in 2001 for allegedly violating the law on mass media by failing to 
broadcast sufficient Kazak language content. The government revoked its broadcast 
license in 2002 (Blua 2002; Interfax Central Asia News, 19 November 2002). Nachnem 
s Ponedelnika had publication suspended by a district court in Almaty in March 2002 
for ‘failing to indicate the paper’s address and print run on each issue’ (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 6 March 2002).
Some critical newspapers have found it difficult to access printing facilities in 
Kazakstan. For example, XXI Vek was prevented from publishing through the publishing 
house owned by the Agricultural Ministry in November 1999. Similarly, Vremya-PO 
was prevented from printing in September 2000, and, in February 2002, Respublika- 
delovoe obozrenie was prevented from printing with the state-owned publishing house 
Dauir {RFE/RL Newsline, 9 December 1999, 8 February 2002; RFE/RL (Un)civil 
Societies, 7 September 2000). Some newspapers have attempted to continue publishing 
by printing outside Kazakstan, but this has not been entirely successful, as Kazak 
customs officials have been diligent in finding reasons to prevent importation. For 
example, they prevented distribution of an issue of Nachnem s Ponedelnika in May 
2000 by confiscating it as it crossed the border {RFE/RL Newsline, 26 May 2000).
The most notorious legal infringements of the principles of freedom of expression 
and the press reside in the rules surrounding the dignity and honour of the president. 
Article 318 of the Kazak Criminal Code proscribes ‘public insult or other offence 
against the honour and dignity of the President...’ as a criminal offence punishable by a
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large fine or up to three years’ imprisonment,12 though the law does specify that 
speeches critical of the president’s policies are not liable. Similar, but less severe laws 
are in place for offences against the honour and dignity of other public officials (Article 
19 2002a), and these laws have been used repeatedly as a means of silencing 
journalists,13 media outlets14 and opposition politicians.15
The most alarming aspect of developments within the media has been the threat of 
extra-legal physical violence as retribution for criticising the regime. This takes many 
forms, ranging from intimidation to destruction of equipment and property, to physical 
attacks on reporters and editors.16 Its effect is to make dissent from the regime’s position 
not only difficult to publish, but actually dangerous.
5.2.4 Rule of law
Kazakstan has a three-tier court system comprising local/district courts, oblast 
(province) courts, and the supreme court.17 Local courts have responsibility for less 
serious crimes. Oblast courts usually handle more serious crimes and appeals from local 
verdicts. The Supreme Court is the court of appeal for all cases dealt with in the lower 
courts (Jurist n.d.). These three levels are surmounted by the Constitutional Council, 
which decides on the constitutionality of legislation passed by the Parliament and 
international treaties signed by the government. It also decides disputes regarding the 
correctness of elections, and on the incapacitation or treason of the president.
The system of appointing judges to the three levels of courts is shown in Figure 5.1. 
The President has the power to appoint members of the district and oblast courts, on the 
recommendation of the Qualification Collegium of Justice and the Supreme Judicial 
Council respectively. This situation compromises the lower courts, because the 
President is legally entitled to form or dissolve them as necessary;18 and so has control 
over lower level judges’ careers and livelihoods. Thus, only an exceptionally foolhardy 
or brave court is likely to make judgments contrary to the President’s interests. The 
Supreme Court is appointed by the Senate, on the recommendation of the Supreme 
Judicial Council. As the diagram shows, the President appoints most members of the 
Supreme Judicial Council, the only exceptions being members appointed by the Senate. 
Seven of the 39 Senators, however, are also appointed by the President, who is therefore 
very unlikely to encounter a Supreme Court that ignores his interests when making 
judgments. The Constitutional Council consists of seven members appointed jointly by 
the President (two members and the chairperson), the Majilis and Senate (two members 
each).
In practice, no level of the judiciary is independent of the president. This might be 
workable if the president were the apolitical head of state of a functioning parliamentary 
democracy, but as it stands the president is not apolitical, nor is the parliament an 
effective arena for the contest of ideologies. The judiciary, as currently constituted, 
cannot be relied upon for impartial, non-partisan decisions, hence Kazakstan cannot be 
considered to have effective separation of powers or rule of law.
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Figure 5.1 Patronage in the Kazak judicial system
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5.3 Kyrgyzstan
5.3.1 Democracy and elections
While it was justly touted as the region’s pre-eminent democracy in the first half of the 
1990s, recent years have seen a slide towards decreased levels of freedom and fairness.|g 
In spite of this, it remains the region’s most democratic country, with a comparatively 
free political scene and active opposition, and has among the most strident and vocal 
media organisations in the region.
Kyrgyzstan has had a number of parliamentary elections in the post-Soviet period. 
Askar Akaev, independent Kyrgyzstan’s only president so far, was elected President as 
a compromise candidate in a closed election of the Supreme Soviet in 1990. In October
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1991, he was elected unopposed as President of the republic at a general election (OSCE 
1995), and re-elected in December 1995 and October 2000, even though under the 
constitution \  ..[t]he same person cannot be elected President for more than two 
consecutive terms’.20
The 1995 presidential elections were contested by three candidates, and Akaev won 
with 73.9 per cent of the vote. The elections themselves were held ahead of schedule, 
raising questions about their constitutional correctness. Furthermore, a number of 
candidates were barred from contesting the election on registration technicalities, and 
the rushed nature of the elections also meant that the time available for potential 
candidates to collect the required 50,000 signatures, and mount campaigns, was severely 
limited. Nonetheless, the election overall was considered satisfactory (Anderson 1999).
The same cannot be said of the October 2000 presidential election, which saw 
considerable exclusion of potential candidates and harassment of opposition politicians 
and journalists. Some candidates were excluded by imposition of language tests, others 
mired in legal proceedings, or excluded by the registration requirements. Two 
candidates, for example, were unable to collect the required 50,000 signatures (OSCE 
2000b). The OSCE also reported significant pressures on state employees to collect 
signatures for Akaev’s campaign, and some state employees and students were 
reportedly pressured to vote for Akaev under threat of reprisals (OSCE 2000b). Among 
other discrepancies, one ballot box was found to contain 700 votes for Akaev before 
voting had even begun (OSCE 2000b).
Parliamentary elections were held in February 1995, and again in February 2000. As 
with the presidential election, some candidates’ efforts in 2000 were hampered by legal 
diversions.21 The campaigning and voting itself were relatively free and open, but OSCE 
(2000a) observers reported pockets of voter intimidation, vote buying, and other 
varieties of electoral fraud. Several opposition candidates were deregistered between the 
first and second rounds, most notoriously Daniyar Usenov (see OSCE 2000a; Interfax 
Central Asia News, 8 March and 11 March 2000).
Kyrgyz law provides extensively for an effective, efficient and transparent hierarchy 
of commissions to oversee elections.22 The President, however, has constitutional 
responsibility for appointing the Chairman and one-third of the members of the Central 
Committee on Elections and Conduct of Referenda (that is, the Central Election 
Commission), the other two-thirds of its members are appointed independently by the 
Assembly of People’s Representatives and the Legislative Assembly.23
The Central Election Commission bears responsibility for overseeing all lower-level 
election commissions (Oblast and Bishkek, territorial, raion, precinct),24 which arguably 
exposes the electoral system to bias in favour of the incumbent president, much as in 
Kazakstan.
5.3.2 Political contestation
The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic provides for open political contestation and 
freedoms of association, religion and speech. Candidature for presidential elections is 
curtailed, however, by registration requirements. Any candidate has to collect 
supporting signatures of 50,000 voters, at least 3 per cent of which must be from each
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oblast and Bishkek city (OECD 2000b). The population of Kyrgyzstan is estimated at 
around 4.9 million, so 50,000 signatures represents a significant burden merely to begin 
campaigning. The process is further complicated by the requirement that the president 
be competent in Kyrgyz. All would-be candidates’ proficiency was tested in the 
registration process for the 2000 presidential election, leading to the elimination of eight 
potential candidates and withdrawal of two others—some candidates were fluent in 
spoken Kyrgyz, but failed the writing test (OSCE 2000b; see also Curtis 2000). Another 
candidate, Professor Kubanychbek Apas, was barred because he had not lived in the 
Kyrgyz Republic for the required 15 years. Participation is further constrained by a 
registration fee set at 1,000 times the Kyrgyz minimum monthly wage (OECD 2000b). 
Together, these requirements essentially ensure that any candidate must be very 
wealthy, ethnically Kyrgyz, and have an extensive team scouring the entire country for 
willing supporters.
Registration procedures for the parliamentary elections are much less stringent, and 
consequently those elections have been much more widely contested. Nevertheless, in 
the 2000 parliamentary elections, candidates in the single-mandate constituencies had to 
lodge a deposit of 30,000 som with the Central Election Commission (OSCE 2000a), 
and also submit a declaration of their income and assets (OSCE 2000a). Several 
prominent opposition parties, including Feliks Kulov’s Ar-Namys Party, were prevented 
from contesting the 2000 parliamentary elections for failing to satisfy registration 
requirements (see OSCE 2000a).
Effective participation by opposition figures and groups is compromised by legal and 
extra-legal harassment and intimidation. The most prominent opposition candidate in 
the 2000 presidential elections, Feliks Kulov, was mired in legal proceedings relating to 
dubious charges of abuse of power and forgery when Minister of National Security.25 
Kulov in September effectively disqualified himself by refusing to take the language 
examination, but subsequently threw his weight behind the campaign of Omurbek 
Tekebaev, Speaker of the Lower House and Chairman of the Ata-Meken Party (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 7 November). Another prominent opposition politician, Topchubek 
Turgunaliev, chairman of the Erkendik Party, experienced similarly spurious legal 
diversions in the run-up to the elections.26 He was charged, with nine others, with 
conspiring to assassinate President Akaev. The trial ended on 1 September, two months 
before the presidential election {RFE/RL Newsline, 4 September 2000), and 
Turgunaliev’s sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment thus prevented him from taking 
part.27
5.3.3 Free media
Freedom of the media is guaranteed by Article 16 of the Constitution. The post-Soviet 
period has seen the persistence of a strident critical private press alongside a more 
docile state-owned press and largely apolitical TV and radio (Alisheva 2003).
The government, however, engages in a number of measures to control or sideline 
the critical media, ranging from legal obstacles to withholding registration, violence, 
and intimidation. The most efficient way of shutting down critical voices is to use the 
libel and slander laws. For example, as early as 1995, journalists from the newspaper
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Res Publica were sentenced for libel after publishing an article critical of President 
Akaev (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 July 1995).28 Res Publica journalist Yrysbek Omurzakov 
was convicted of slandering the president in June 1996, and sentenced to two years’ 
jail.29 Zamira Sydykova and three other journalists from the newspaper were convicted 
of libel again in May 1997, after publishing articles criticising Dastan Sarygulov, head 
of Kyrgyzstan’s state gold company (Idinov and Pannier 1997). Res Publica was fined 
for libel in March 2000, and again in October 2000 for an article criticising the Ministry 
of Justice.30
Similarly, the newspaper Kriminal was banned in January 1997 for publishing 
articles that ‘insulted’ government officials. Another newspaper, Asaba, was sued for 
libel in 2000 for repeatedly criticising Turdakun Usubaliev, former Kyrgyz Communist 
Party First Secretary, and ordered to pay 5 million som in compensation {RFERL 
(Un)Civil Societies, 19 October 2000). It should be noted, however, that Akaev 
attempted to transfer the libel law from the Criminal to the Civil Code, and remove 
imprisonment as a punishment for it in 2003 (President of the Kyrgyz Republic 2003). 
The bill would, had it passed parliament, also have imposed a 5 per cent deposit for 
plaintiffs on beginning their action (IRINnews 2003). Unfortunately, the Kyrgyz 
parliament rejected the bill in June 2004 (Agence-France Presse, 8 June 2004).
Another way to threaten critics is to launch tax inspections against them. For 
example, Alexander Kim, editor of Vechemii Bishkek, was arrested for tax evasion in 
August-September 1999, and later resigned. {RFERL Kyrgyz Report, 21 September 
1999).
The registration procedures provide another way of stifling critical voices. All media 
outlets must register with the Ministry of Justice,31 pay a fee,32 and divulge their sources 
of finance.33 Registration can be refused if the organisation’s aims are deemed to 
contradict the Constitution,34 and can be suspended for violations of Article 3 of the law 
against divulging state or commercial secrets, ‘propagating war, violence...cruelty, 
fanning national, religious intolerance or strife to other nations or people’, offending 
individuals’ dignity and honour, and distributing false information.35 Media outlets can 
be deregistered for repeatedly infringing the Law on Mass Media.36
The registration requirements and Law on Mass Media have been used against a 
number of media outlets. Radio Almaz, purportedly Kyrgyzstan’s first independent 
radio station, was in 1997 temporarily prevented from re-registering by the National 
Communications Agency, which demanded documents additional to those usually 
required {RFERL Newsline, 4 March 1998). In 2001, moreover, the Justice Ministry 
ordered all media outlets and political organisations to re-register. In the process, it 
initially permitted, then annulled, the registration of 16 media outlets, including the 
opposition newspapers Agym and Moya Stolitsa.
The physical process of printing has until recently represented a major constraint to 
critical newspapers. Before November 2003, Kyrgyzstan had only one high-quality 
printing shop available to newspaper publishers—the state-run Uchkun printing house 
(Jumagulov 2003). Uchkun has frequently, often arbitrarily, refused to print issues of 
opposition newspapers.37 The situation became sufficiently serious in the late 1990s that
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a number of international organisations, with financial backing of the US government, 
brokered an agreement with the Kyrgyz government to establish an alternative printing 
house (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2003).
5.3.4 Rule of law
The Kyrgyz Constitution provides for a free judiciary subject only to the Constitution 
and the Law,38 with a Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Higher Arbitration Court, 
and local courts.39 Judges in the Constitutional Court are nominated by the president and 
elected for a term of 15 years by the Legislative Assembly and the lower and upper 
houses of the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) respectively. Judges of the Supreme and 
Higher Arbitration courts are nominated by the president and elected for a term of ten 
years by the People’s Representative Assembly. The president appoints judges of the 
lower courts.40
The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over constitutional matters, deciding the 
constitutionality of legislation and the validity of presidential elections.41 The Supreme 
Court is the highest judicial body for civil, criminal and administrative court 
proceedings and administers the local-level courts.42 The Higher Arbitration Court is the 
apex of a system of arbitration courts whose remit is to deal with ‘disputes in the 
economic area.. .based on different forms of property’.43
Since appointments to the lower level courts are made directly by the president, 
officers of these courts are likely to favour the president even if he places no pressure 
on them. The Kyrgyz parliament remains quite independent and sometimes antagonistic 
towards the president, which means that upper-level judicial appointments are more likely 
to deliver politically impartial judgments. Problems arise, however, when the appeals 
courts are flooded with appeals against politically-motivated lower court decisions. The 
process subjects appellants to ever more expensive and time-consuming appeals at the 
higher levels of the system, and to incarceration for long periods before their appeal is 
heard, which can be a form of non-violent bureaucratic repression of critical voices.44
In practice, the judiciary is frequently perceived as favouring the president and his 
associates. While the system of appointment at the higher levels of the judiciary is 
probably as good as possible in the circumstances, there is no obvious reason why the 
president of the country should be so intimately involved in appointments to lower-level 
courts.
5.4 T ajikistan
5.4.1 Democracy and elections
Although Tajikistan suffered five years of extremely violent civil war following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, two presidential and two parliamentary elections have 
been held. The first presidential election, held on 6 November 1994, was won by 
Imomali Rahmonov with 58.3 per cent of the votes; his opponent, Abdumalik 
Abdulajanov, garnering 35.0 per cent. Rahmonov had been appointed president by the 
Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan in November 1992, and the 1994 vote can hardly be 
considered legitimate given the conditions of war and social disorganisation prevailing
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at the time. The election campaign was marred by violence, including bombings in 
Dushanbe, and complaints of fraud (BBC Monitoring Service: Former Soviet Union, 9 
November 1994; BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 8 November 1994). The 
major political parties were excluded from the political process at the time under a ban 
imposed by the Supreme Court in June 1993 (BBC Monitoring: Former USSR, 22 June 
1993).
A power-sharing peace agreement was concluded in 1997, and Tajikistan’s second 
presidential election was held on 6 November 1999. Rahmonov won again, this time 
with 97 per cent of voters favouring him over his opponent, Davlat Usmon (2 per cent). 
The 1999 election’s legitimacy did not exceed that of its predecessor. Of the three 
opposition candidates—Sayfiddin Turayev (Party of Justice), Sulton Quvvatov 
(Democratic Party of Tajikistan), and Davlat Usmon (Islamic Rebirth Party)—the first 
two were excluded from registering by the Supreme Court, which also initially barred 
Usmon for failing to gather the required 145,000 signatures, then reinstated him even 
though he freely admitted his failure {Reuters, 22 October 1999). Usmon, in turn, initially 
refused to contest the elections, in protest against the way the election campaign was 
conducted (Djavadi and Pannier 2000),45 but then changed his mind hours before voting 
began (Reuters, 5 November 1999). The OSCE declined to observe the election,46 the 
campaign was tom by violence,47 and the election day was reported by some to be 
characterised by electoral abuses, including multiple voting {Reuters, 8 November 1999).48
The Presidential term of office was extended from five to seven years by 
constitutional referendum on 26 September 1999, but this referendum also introduced a 
one-term limit on the presidency {Reuters, 3 September 1999). A further referendum, in 
2003, however, removed this restriction, allowing the incumbent president, Rahmonov, 
to serve a further two seven-year terms after his current term (Solovyov 2003).
Two parliamentary elections have been held since Tajikistan gained independence. 
The first was in February/March 1995, and the Communist Party of Tajikistan, then 
aligned with president Imomali Rahmonov, won an overwhelming majority in the 
unicameral parliament. Again, other major parties were excluded from the political 
process by a Supreme Court ban.
The 1999 referendum established the constitutional basis for making the parliament a 
bicameral body consisting of the Majlisi Namoyandagon (Assembly of Representatives) 
and the Majlisi Milli (National Assembly). Under the new structure, the primary 
legislative body, the Mailisi Namoyandagon, is elected directly by the general populace. 
Sixty-five per cent of its seats are elected in single-member constituencies, 35 per cent 
are elected on a proportional basis in an all-republican electoral district.49 For the second 
chamber, the Majlisi Milli, three quarters of the members are elected by voting among 
People’s Deputies of representative organs of the country’s regions, cities, and districts, 
the other quarter is appointed by the president.50 The heads of these regional legislatures 
are themselves appointed by the president. As a consequence, the chamber is a support 
to, rather than a constraint on, the president (OSCE 2000c; Jabborov 2004).
Elections for the Assembly of Representatives were held in February/March 2000. 
The People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the pro-presidential party, won the most 
seats (30), followed by the Communist Party of Tajikistan (15), independents (15) and
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the Islamic Rebirth Party (2). Violence marred the election campaign: Shamsullo 
Dzhabirov, Deputy Security Minister and parliamentary candidate, was blown up by a 
car bomb (BBCNews, 16 February 2000); Dushanbe Mayor, Mahmadsaid Ubaidullayev, 
was injured in the same incident (BBCNews, 16 February 2000); and Deputy Prime 
Minister Akbar Turajonzoda was shot at but not harmed (BBCNews, 9 February 2000). 
These are merely the gravest examples of the violence the preceded the election (see for 
example Pannier 2000). Complaints about vote-rigging and other violations were raised 
but generally not acted upon {BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 10 March 2000, 29 February 
2000; BBC Monitoring Service: Former Soviet Union, 3 March 2000) In a similar vein, 
the Central Election and Referendum Commission annulled the election of a number of 
opposition candidates before the election,51 and others after the first round.52
5.4.2 Political contestation
It is difficult to address the question of political contestation in post-Soviet Tajikistan. 
The civil war itself could be considered an unfortunate manifestation of pluralism, 
contrasting as it did the desires of Islamic groups and the secular post-Soviet 
reincarnation of the Communist Party. Pluralism was not, however, a feature of the 
formal political system during the civil war; opposition parties were banned from 21 
June until after conclusion of the peace agreement in 1997 {BBC Monitoring Service, 22 
June 1993). The peace agreement provided for a certain number of powerful positions to 
be held by representatives of the opposition movements {BBCNews, 24 December 
1997), and led the Supreme Court to lift the ban on opposition parties in August 1999— 
almost two years after the peace agreement was signed {BBC Monitoring Central Asia,
12 August 1999).53 The very existence of this coalition of political actors ensures that 
the political space in Tajikistan is more open to competing points of view than is the 
case in either Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. The referendum of 16 September 1999 
formally allowed groups based on religious platforms to register as political parties 
{Reuters, 25 September 1999), which was interpreted as a substantial concession to the 
largely Islamic opposition.
Candidates in presidential elections must be nominated by one of a variety of bodies, 
typically a political party or a Council of People’s Deputies,54 or without the support of 
these bodies if they can collect the signatures of 5 per cent of the population of Tajikistan.55 
The 1999 presidential elections were not generally regarded as fair, for the reasons 
discussed above. Purely legal grounds were used to exclude all opposition candidates 
except one, and he was so hampered in the lead-up to the election that he declined to 
take part until days before the vote. His eventual registration as a candidate was actually 
illegal because he had been unable to gather the required number of signatures.
Six parties contested the 2000 parliamentary elections, but the Supreme Court and 
the Ministry of Justice had already refused to register a further six parties in 1999 for 
violating the Law on Political Parties.56
5.4.3 Freedom of the media
The Tajik Constitution and Tajik media law provide for freedom of expression and the 
press,57 but this is limited by sanctions on revealing state secrets; inciting violent 
overthrow of, or change to, the political and social system; promoting ‘war, violence
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and cruelty, racial, ethnic and religious intolerance’, and distributing pornography. 
Encroachments on people’s rights and dignity are also forbidden.58
The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media stipulates that mass media must register 
with the relevant body (not specified in the law, but in practice, the local State notary 
(Article 19 2002b)) and pay a fee before they begin operations.59 This requirement could 
be a bottleneck for establishment of media outlets, and provides unnecessary scope for 
government interference. An example of this bottleneck effect is the attempts of Asia- 
Plus to set up a private radio station in Dushanbe. It reportedly submitted all the relevant 
documents in 1998, but was not cleared to begin broadcasting until late 2002 {BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia, 30 July 2002). Registration can be terminated for repeated 
contraventions of Article 6 detailed above, most significantly for encroaching on a 
person’s honour.60
Slandering or insulting the honour and dignity of individuals is proscribed under 
Articles 135 and 136 of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan, with punishment ranging from 
fines to imprisonment for up to two years. Disturbingly, Article 137 specifically 
penalises insulting the honour and dignity of the President, with punishment of up to 
five years’ imprisonment. Fortunately, the libel laws do not seem to have been misused 
as readily in Tajikistan as in Kyrgyzstan, but some high-profile cases have occurred 
nonetheless. For example, Tajik authorities sought the extradition from Moscow of 
Tajik journalist Dodojon Atovulloyev in 2001 for allegedly insulting the President. The 
Russian government detained him for some days, but refused the request, and the Tajik 
prosecutors dropped the case against him in July 2002.61 Also Ruzi Nav has also been 
harassed under this legislation, leading the printing house Sharqi Ozod to refuse 
publication of the newspaper (Pannier 2004).
There is little scope for independent, commercial media to develop. There are no 
daily newspapers, and very little of the print media is privately-owned (OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media 2002; Human Rights Watch 1999). Asia-Plus 
became in 2002 the first private radio station in Dushanbe; some very small-scale media 
outlets do exist in the regions {BBC Monitoring Media, 24 April 2003), and there are 
many non-state television stations at the regional level (OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of the Media 2002). Unfortunately, the country’s general poverty makes it 
difficult for media outlets to survive without government financial support.
There are several printing houses in Tajikistan, but only one, Sharqi Ozod, is of 
sufficient quality for most publications. It is government-run and handles the printing of 
most newspapers in Tajikistan (OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 2002). 
Consequently, it could represent a media bottleneck, as Uchkun has in Kyrgyzstan, but 
in practice this has happened less often than in Kyrgyzstan. Sharqi Ozod, however, 
refused to print the weekly newspaper Ruzi Nav in late 2003 without giving reasons but 
seemingly because of the newspaper’s ongoing legal proceedings.62 A similar situation 
occurred with the newspapers Vecherniye Vesti and Biznes i Politika in late 1997, and 
Junbish in 1999, all of which had attempted to publish favourable articles about 
opposition politicians {RFE/RL Feature Article, 17 November 1997; RFE/RL Media 
Matters, 17 May 2002).
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Journalists are also subjected to violence and intimidation. During the civil war so 
many journalists were killed that country came to be one of the most dangerous in the 
world for journalists (see Committee for the Protection of Journalists 2002; RFE/RL 
Media Matters, 17 May 2002). Since the civil war ended, the extent of the violence has 
diminished, but cases still occur, and officials are not shy of trying to intimidate 
journalists and media outlets that raise uncomfortable issues. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Jumahon Hotami, for example, a TV journalist who concentrated on exposing 
corruption in Tajikistan, was assassinated on 4 July 1999. Nematulloi Nurullo was 
dragged off the street, beaten, and detained for interrogation on 27 August 2000 
(RFERL Report (Un)Civil Societies Report, 14 November 2000). And, in October 2002, 
three journalists who had aired a television program critical of military conscription 
procedures were reportedly forcibly drafted into the army (RFERL Media Matters, 8 
November 2002).
5.4.4 Rule of law
The constitution provides for an independent judicial power,63 comprising the 
Constitutional, Supreme, Supreme Economic and Military courts, the Court of Gomo- 
Badakshan Autonomous Oblast, and local-level courts. The Constitutional Court is the 
highest court and decides on the legality of lower-level court decisions, and of actions 
by executive government, the legislature, or other state bodies.64
The President nominates and dismisses—subject to ratification by the Supreme 
Assembly—the chairman, deputy chairman, and judges of both the Constitutional and 
Supreme courts, the Procurator-General and his deputies.65 The president’s role at the 
centre of the judicial system opens up scope for distrust of the system because the 
Supreme Assembly is no real constraint on his exercise power. Thus, even if the 
appointments are fair, and the appointees are legitimate, the perception will remain that 
they are political placements.
While the extent of the judiciary’s independence cannot be fully assessed, some 
incidents give cause for concern. For example, there has recently been a spate of 
prosecutions of people who fought for the United Tajik Opposition during the war.66 In 
many such cases, it is impossible to discern clearly whether or not the verdicts are 
legitimate, but the preponderance of cases brought against former opposition members 
is disturbing. As noted above, however, the Supreme Court also lifted in 1999 the ban 
outlawing four main opposition parties—the Democratic Party, the Islamic Renaissance 
Party, Rastokhez and Lali Badokshon (BBC Monitoring Service: former USSR, 23 June 
1993)—which suggests that there is some scope within the court system for fairness, 
politically at least.
5.5 Turkmenistan
5.5.1 Democracy and elections
A new constitution redesignating the Turkmen Supreme Soviet as the Majlis was 
adopted in May 1992. By dint of this, the First-Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Turkmenistan since 1985, Saparmurad Niyazov, became the first president of
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independent Turkmenistan. Presidential elections were then held on 21 June 1992, in 
which Niyazov was elected unopposed, with 99.5 per cent of the vote (Reuters News, 22 
June 1992). The constitution at the time set presidents’ terms at five years and 
prescribed not more than two consecutive terms.67
In January 1994, a referendum, reportedly passed with near 100 per cent support, 
extended Niyazov’s term for five more years, allowing him to remain in power until 
2002 without having to face an election {Reuters News, 15 January 1994). In December 
1999, the Khalk Maslakhaty (The People’s Council)68 passed a law designating Niyazov 
as perpetual president, even though Niyazov himself had earlier pointed out that this 
contravened the constitution {Reuters News, 28 December 1999).69 Niyazov made 
numerous announcements in 2001 calling for multi-candidate elections somewhere 
between 2010 and 2007-08, but these were rejected first by the People’s Council and 
later, briefly, by the president himself {Agence-France Presse, 16 February 2001; 
Reuters News, 21 June 2002).70
An election for the Majlis was held in December 1994. Officially, 99.8 per cent of 
voters turned out to cast their ballot, but this figure was contested by some {Reuters 
News, 12 December 1994). Fifty candidates, all members of the only legal party, the 
Democratic Party, were registered to contest the fifty seats, and, unsurprisingly, all were 
elected.71
A second parliamentary election was held on 12 December 1999. This time, 
alternative candidates were allowed, but had to stand as independents, as the 
Democratic Party remained the only legal one {BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 16 
November 1999). The 50 seats were contested by 104 candidates, the majority of whom 
were members of the Democratic Party. The OSCE refused to observe the election, 
arguing that the one-party system was not democratic, and no other international 
observers attended {Reuters News, 10 December 1999; BBC Monitoring: Former Soviet 
Union, 13 December 1999).
Elections for local councils and for 65 seats on the People’s Council, contested by 
147 candidates, were held in April 2003. A 99.7 per cent turnout of eligible voters was 
claimed {Dow Jones Newswires, 6 April 2003; Associated Press Newswires, 6 April 
2003). Pro-government forces proclaimed the elections a move towards democracy, but 
opposition groups again denounced them as fraudulent {BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 
7 April 2003). On 18 August 2003, the People’s Assembly voted unanimously to 
institute Niyazov as its Chair for life—an indication, perhaps, that the elections did not 
open up any great pluralism in Turkmen political life {Associated Press, 18 August 
2003).
5.5.2 Political contestation
There is no scope for political contest in Turkmenistan. There is only one legal political 
party—the Democratic Party, headed by Niyazov. He has talked of allowing other 
political parties at some stage in the future, but no progress has ever been made {BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia, 20 December 1998). His resistance in this regard seems to be 
grounded in a misguided conflation of the government and the state, thus he has argued 
that
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Parties cannot be created just by three or five, 20 or 30 persons. Nobody will allow such parties 
to interfere in state affairs, since they start with declarations about their opposition to state 
policy. Such parties start by leading ordinary people to demonstrations and violations of the law 
over any kind of hardships (Niyazov 1998)
He has also noted that: ‘Any kind of party other than political organizations with 
religious ideologies can be created in the future.. .However, they will not become 
political opposition to the party of power and will act as partners’ (Interfax Central Asia 
News, 29 December 1999). This seems to suggest that political parties will be allowed 
insofar as they do not hold policies contrary to his, a condition that clearly renders them 
pointless. Again, the emphasis is on establishing the formal requirements of a 
democracy but neutralising the content.
Because of repression within Turkmenistan, most of the opposition, and all the active 
opposition, is based outside the country (Safronov 2002; International Crisis Group 
2003a). Most of the major opposition leaders are in exile. Avdy Kuliev, for example, 
defected from the regime in 1992 to found the United Turkmen Opposition, and Boris 
Shikhmuradov, with a number of other high-ranking officials, left the government in 
2001 to found the National Democratic movement of Turkmenistan (International Crisis 
Group 2003a). Neither has been able to launch an effective counter to Niyazov’s power 
from exile (see, for example, Safronov 2002). Kuliev was arrested when he travelled to 
Turkmenistan to make ‘contacts with the Turkmen leadership’, but released four days 
later (BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 22 April 1998). Turkmen authorities 
accused Shikhmuradov of misappropriating state funds and theft and unsuccessfully 
tried to convince Russia and later the United States to extradite him to Turkmenistan 
(Associated Press, 14 February 2002; Agence-France Presse, 12 May 2002).
Other exiled Turkmen opposition members, such as Murat Esenov and Khalmurat 
Soyunov, have used Radio Liberty to broadcast the only non-state news reports in the 
Turkmen language. This has been an irritation to the regime (Karavan-Blitz, 12 June 
1995), which it has tried to remove through intimidation and spurious extradition 
requests. The families of exiled politicians in particular remain a source of vulnerability: 
Shikhmuradov apparently returned to Turkmenistan to prevent his family being tortured, 
while Saparmurat Yklymov claimed that his family had been evicted from their home, 
and it is thought that the authorities were torturing his sons in early 2003.72
The opposition’s credibility is compromised by the fact that many of the leading 
opposition figures are former associates of Niyazov. Boris Shikhmuradov is the most 
obvious example, but other former officials who have tried to exert pressure from exile 
include Nazar Soyunov, Khudaiberdi Orazov, and Nurmukhammet Khanamov 
(International Crisis Group 2003a; Interfax Central Asia News, 5 February 2002). While 
their opposition to the regime is genuine—few people would be reckless enough so 
obviously to endanger themselves and their families without genuine reason—the 
preponderance of former officials among opposition figures can only bolster the 
impression that political contest in Turkmenistan is over who gets to control power and 
resources, rather than over a difference in ideology or approach; a point made by 
opposition politician Avdy Kuliev.73
Alongside these figures stands a range of longer-lasting political or social parties. 
Agzybirlik, a moderate nationalist movement among the intelligentsia, is the most
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prominent of these. Its leader, Nurberdy Nurmamedov, was arrested in February 2000 
after he described government changes to the constitution as undemocratic and 
unconstitutional. He was sentenced to five years’ in prison, but amnestied in January 
2001 on condition of renouncing his earlier activities (IPR Strategic Information 
Database, 29 February 2000, 4 January 2001)
Opposition political activity appeared to be increasing during 2002, with some 
serious defections,74 purges among top officials,75 and efforts at cooperation among the 
exiled opposition groups.76 The situation changed completely, however, following an 
apparent failed assassination attempt on Niyazov on 25 November 2002. Niyazov took 
the opportunity to accuse a wide range of individuals and groups of complicity, from 
opposition politicians to foreign states, and initiated hundreds of arrests, which were 
followed by a series of dubious confessions. Suspicion quickly arose that the 
assassination attempt was staged.77
Niyazov initially accused Shikhmuradov, Khudaiberdy Orazov, Nurmukhammed 
Khanamov, and Imamberdy Yklymov of involvement. He then accused the Russian 
government of involvement, had a Turkmen businessman, Guvanch Dzhumayev, and 
many others arrested, as well as a number of Chechens, Turks, Azerbaijanis, and a US 
citizen {Agence-France Presse, 26 November 2002; Interfax, 25 November 2002; 
Associated Press Newswires, 2 December 2002). In their fervour to root out Turkmen 
dissidents, Turkmen authorities raided the Uzbek embassy compound, sparking off an 
international dispute. They then arrested former foreign minister Batur Berdeyev, 
former parliamentary speaker, Tagan Khalyev, and former head of the state television 
service, Serdar Rasimov (Associated Press Newswires, 17 December 2002; Agence- 
France Presse, 18 December 2002). Later, they arrested Boris Shikhmuradov, who for 
some reason was in the country {BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 26 December 2002), 
tortured him until he confessed to organising the assassination attempt with others, and 
sentenced him to 25 years in jail.78 These, however, were just the most prominent 
figures—diplomats and human rights organisations reported that over 300 people had 
been arrested by the height of the purge {Financial Times, 17 December 2002). The 
assassination attempt has proven useful over quite a prolonged period. When the Turkmen 
ambassadors to Armenia and the United Kingdom, Toyli Kurbanov and Chary Babayev, 
defected in mid-1993, they were quickly denounced as conspirators in the plot.
The consequences for the opposition of the assassination attempt are not yet clear. 
Many leading opposition politicians have been imprisoned or have disappeared (OSCE 
Rapporteur 2003), and what little resistance there was in Turkmenistan prior to the 
assassination attempt has apparently ceased. The events seem, however, to have instilled 
a renewed urgency in coordination among exiled resistance groups (Ponomarev 2003).
5.5.3 Freedom of the media
There is no independent media organisation in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen media are 
completely dominated by state-run outlets, whose output is uncritical and hagiographic. 
They provide no scope for criticism, but do publish accounts of Niyazov’s contribution 
to Turkmenistan so ludicrously overblown that even Niyazov pretends to be 
embarrassed {BBC News, 25 January 2001).
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Such critical Turkmen media as exist are all based outside the country. They 
comprise mainly the Turkmen language services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty— 
run by exiles—and the websites of dissident Turkmen politicians.79 The websites are not 
easily accessed within Turkmenistan, for technical and economic reasons, so RFE/RL 
represents probably the only alternative news source accessible to ordinary Turkmen.
This has been a source of irritation to the regime, which in late 2003 allegedly detained 
RFE/RL’s Ashgabat correspondent, Saparmurat Ovezberdiev, beat and drugged him, 
and warned him not to continue creating problems {BBC Monitoring Media, 27 October 
2003).
The Turkmen regime is also quite willing to assert its authority outside 
Turkmenistan. For instance, Turkmen RFE/RL journalist Murat Esenov was beaten up 
in Moscow on 8 October 1994, and, in 1995, the authorities tried to goad Russia into 
extraditing him and fellow journalist Khalmurat Soyunov back to Turkmenistan on 
spurious charges {Karavan-Blitz, 12 June 1995). More recently, RFE/RL journalist 
Sanazar Berdiev reportedly evaded a kidnap attempt in October 2002, and was beaten 
outside his Moscow apartment in September 2003. His father, Mukhamedgeldy 
Berdiev, also a journalist with RFE/RL, was assaulted in July 2003 (Panfilova 2003a). 
The government also attempted to extradite Orazmukhammet Yklymov from Russia in 
connection with the supposed assassination attempt in 2002 (IPR Strategic Information 
Database, 19 January 2003).
Opposition websites are of limited use because the population of Turkmenistan has 
very little access to internet facilities. Nonetheless, the authorities are reasonably 
diligent in preventing those few who have access from seeing things that contradict 
Niyazov. Turkmenistan has since 2000 had only one internet provider— 
Turkmentelekom—which routinely blocks foreign websites that contain material critical 
of the regime. Turkmentelekom blocked opposition leader Avdy Kuliev’s website in 
early 2002, then destroyed it in May 2002 {IPR Strategic Information Database, 12 
May 2002), and blocked the website of Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda 
after it published an article critical of Niyazov (IPR Strategic Information Database, 1 
May 2002).
5.5.4 Rule of law
The Turkmen constitution provides for a separate and independent judiciary.80 The court 
system comprises the Supreme Court, the High Commercial Court, and lower-level civil 
and military courts.81 An Arbitration Court was established in February 2000 {Interfax, 
15 February 2000). The president appoints all judges for a term of five years, but the 
right to remove judges resides with the court system, except for chairs of the Supreme 
and High Commercial courts,82 who are appointed and can be removed by the President 
with parliamentary consent.83 Given that the parliament is barely capable of wielding the 
proverbial rubber stamp, it hardly represents a constraint on the abuse of presidential 
power over the judiciary. As a consequence, the judiciary is totally beholden to the 
president for their position, their livelihood, and in truth probably existence. In practice, 
Niyazov has not hesitated to use his control of the various wings of power to remove 
judges, including the head of the Supreme Court in August 1996 and again in January
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1999, a judge of the Supreme Court,84 and many lower level judges. Allegations of 
corruption, probably based in fact, are the basis of some of these dismissals, but one is 
tempted to view with suspicion the selective nature of dismissals on this basis.
5.6 U zbekistan
5.6.1 Elections and democracy
Islam Karimov, briefly First Secretary and head of state of the Uzbek SSR prior to 
independence, was elected President of Uzbekistan (after the country’s formal 
declaration of independence on 1 September 1991) on 30 December 1991, gamering 86 
per cent of the vote. He was opposed by only one candidate, Mukhammed Solikh of the 
Erk Party.
In a referendum held on 26 March 1995, 99.6 per cent of those voting were reported 
as approving extension of Karimov’s term, due to end in 1997, to 2000.85 The 
Constitution prohibits presidents from serving more than two terms consecutively, and 
the extension was thought to be a way of prolonging Karimov’s first term86 though 
official explanations spoke of ensuring the ‘consistency of reforms’ and synchronising 
the parliamentary and presidential elections.87
The next presidential election, held on 9 January 2000, was a farce, even by Central 
Asian standards. Of the five parties allowed by the Central Election Commission, four 
nominated Karimov, and only one—the People’s Democratic Party—nominated an 
alternative candidate, Abdulhafiz Dzhalolov.88 This slim pretence of a contest was 
further discredited when Dzhalolov revealed that he supported Karimov’s re-election 
and claimed to have voted for him.89 The OSCE refused to send an observer mission, 
justly claiming that voters were not given a genuine choice.90 Karimov won with a 
surprisingly slight 91.9 per cent of the vote (Agence-France Presse, 10 January).
Uzbekistan held another referendum on 27 January 2002, to introduce a second 
chamber of parliament and extend the presidential term from five to seven years.91 The 
first proposal was supported by 93.65 per cent of voters, the second by 91.78 per cent.92
Elections for the unicameral parliament, the Oliy Majlis, were held on 25 December 
1994. Of the 643 candidates registered to contest the 250 single-member electoral 
districts, 438 were members of the pro-presidential People’s Democratic Party and 115 
were members of the Progress of the Fatherland (Homeland) Party. The true opposition 
parties, Birlik and Erk, could not take part after the government blocked their efforts to 
register.93 The head of the Fatherland Progress Party, Rustam Usmanov, was banned 
from taking part after calling for dual citizenship for ethnic Russians.94 Nonetheless, the 
US Ambassador to Uzbekistan claimed that the elections met international standards 
and ‘could be declared valid’.95 One curious feature of the electoral system was that 
regional bodies (that is, local-level councils, etc) could nominate candidates. The results 
were seen as a sort of win for the regional bodies because party nominees picked up 
only about 34 per cent of the vote, and candidates nominated by regional bodies picked 
up most of the rest. Most of these candidates, however, were members of the People’s 
Democratic Party anyway, so it made little difference.96
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Parliamentary elections were held again on 5 December 1999. This time, the election 
involved five parties—the Fidokorlar National Democratic Party, the Milliy Tiklanish 
(National Renaissance) Party, Adolat (Justice), the Homeland Progress Party, and the 
People’s Democratic Party.97 New legislation provided for non-party citizens’ initiative 
groups to nominate independent candidates.98 Of the 1,019 eventual candidates, 133 
were nominated by these groups and all others were nominated by political parties or 
‘executive bodies’ such as local councils. The OSCE sent only a limited observation 
mission, citing the wide gap between OSCE requirements and Uzbek practice.99 The 
People’s Democratic Party won the most seats (48), followed by the Fidokorlar Party 
(34), the Fatherland Progress Party (20), Adolat (11), and the others. Candidates 
nominated by ‘executive bodies’ won 110 seats, and candidates nominated by Citizens’ 
Initiative Groups 16 seats (OSCE 1999b). Voter turnout was 95 per cent.100
The successful referendum in 2002 introduced a bicameral parliament consisting of a 
Senate and a Legislative Chamber, but this will not be implemented until December 
2004 (.Interfax Central Asia News, 14 December 2002). As of July 2004, the structural 
details of the new parliament were still being drafted, but it appears that the Legislative 
Chamber will consist of 120 seats, 16 of which are filled by presidential appointees, the 
rest by general election (BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 28 June 2004), and will be a 
full-time professional legislative body. The Senate will review legislation passed by the 
Legislative Chamber and will ‘consist of experienced people’s representatives’
(Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 28 June 2004).
5.6.2 Political contestation
As in the other Central Asian republics, political contest in Uzbekistan is circumscribed 
by formal and informal constraints. Opposition groups are constrained principally by the 
Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Political Parties, which proscribes parties that 
seek ‘violent change to the constitutional order’ or stand against the ‘sovereignty, 
integrity and security of the Republic of Uzbekistan, [and the] constitutional rights and 
freedoms of its people’. Parties that agitate for war or social, national, racial and 
religious unrest, attack the health and morals of the people, or are based on nationalist 
and religious principles are also forbidden.101 In practice, this article can be interpreted 
so widely as to encompass any opposition party.
Article 8, on registration of political parties, imposes a further barrier to political 
contest. To register with the Ministry of Justice, the would-be political party must 
supply among other things the signatures of 20,000 citizens of Uzbekistan who wish to 
join it.102 This would be difficult even under propitious circumstances, but, given the 
Uzbek government’s rough treatment of opposition activists, most people would 
hesitate to add their name to such a list. Moreover, according to the law, each citizen 
can be a member of only one political party at a given time,103 which effectively 
prohibits formal alliances of opposition parties.
The Ministry of Justice can refuse to register parties whose statute, aims or methods 
contradict the constitution, the Law on Political Parties, or any other legislation,104 or if 
it finds evidence of falsification of the signatures. Repeated infringements of the
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constitution or laws of Uzbekistan by registered parties can lead to the suspension of 
that party’s activities, during which the party is forbidden to use the media, undertake 
political activities or take part in elections.105
Candidates in elections to the Oliy Majlis are nominated by registered political parties 
or directly by citizens through ‘initiative groups’. Political parties must present the 
signatures and personal details of at least 50,000 voters who support their participation in 
the election, or the signatures of 8,000 people from a particular voting district.106 Initiative 
groups also have to present the signatures of no less than eight percent of voters— drawn 
proportionally from each individual mahalla, kishlak and aul— in their particular voting 
district.107 Again, the Ministry of Justice can refuse registration if it deems any part of the 
signature document falsified.
Those serving a criminal sentence cannot participate, nor can those who have lived 
permanently outside Uzbekistan in the five years before the election, or who are serving 
in the armed forces or secret service. Importantly, professional workers of religious 
organisations or groups cannot participate either.108
The right to nominate candidates for president belongs to political parties and the 
representative organs of government.109 Political parties can nominate members of their 
own party or unaligned individuals; representative bodies can nominate anyone.110 As 
with the parliamentary elections, the Ministry of Justice handles the procedure for 
registering candidates. Political parties must present the signatures (and personal 
details) of 1 percent of all voters in Uzbekistan, or eight percent of voters in a single 
electoral district, in support of their candidate.111 The provisions on falsification of 
signatures apply here as well; and people who have been sentenced for a ‘premeditated 
crime’ are excluded, as are those under investigation in relation to crime, or working for 
religious organisations.112
Thus, the legal framework is a serious barrier for political opposition. The Law on 
Political Parties in particular establishes substantial barriers to political contest, 
providing considerable scope for bureaucratic malevolence in registering political 
parties, and excessive legal scope for politically-motivated decisions regarding parties. 
This is important because the procedures for nominating candidates for parliament or 
the presidency privileges political parties, a privilege modified in theory, but not 
practice, for parliamentary elections by allowing ‘initiative groups’ to nominate 
parliamentary candidates. The laws pertaining to political parties and elections in 
Uzbekistan seem designed specifically to exclude outsiders and to serve insiders in the 
power structure. This is not democracy.
Alongside the formal means of reducing political contest, a number of informal 
disincentives are applied. Primary among these are litigation and violence. Article 158 
of the Criminal Code sets prison terms or the death penalty for attacks on the president’s 
life and prison terms for lesser attacks, accompanied in each case by confiscation of 
property, and also specifies penalties for insulting or slandering the president.
Article 159 of the Criminal Code prohibits attempts to overthrow the government 
using non-constitutional means, seize power, or remove from power legally elected or 
appointed representatives. It also forbids unconstitutional transgressions on the unity of 
territory of Uzbekistan. Materials advocating such matters are forbidden, as are actions
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that seek to impede the legal activities of constitutional bodies or replace them by 
parallel structures of power not provided for by the constitution. Conspiracy to seize 
power or overthrow the constitutional order is punishable by a 10-20 year jail sentence 
and the confiscation of property.113
The special protections implied here may be justifiable for physical attacks on the 
President, but the special laws on slander and libel are less valid. Insofar as the 
president is merely the chief representative of the people in a supposed democracy—and 
therefore one of the population rather than apart from the population—it is not obvious 
why the person occupying the position should be protected by especially draconian laws 
above those that are extended to the rest of the population. Again, this is symptomatic of 
a spurious conflation of the state structure with those who hold positions within it.
The authorities also try to intimidate opposition activists into silence. It is common 
for opposition politicians to be robbed or attacked by strangers. This is not new; 
Abduranim Pulatov, head of the opposition Birlik Party, was beaten up in Tashkent in 
June 1992 {Reuters, 30 June 1992). Former vice-president Shukrulla Mirsaidov claimed 
to have been beaten by Karimov supporters in September 1993 {Reuters, 19 September 
1993), and the then head of Erk, Samat Murot, was apparently beaten up in October 
1993 {Reuters, 14 October 1993). Several Uzbek opposition activists were beaten up in 
an apartment in Moscow apparently by Uzbek secret service agents in November 1993, 
114 and Mirsaidov’s son was kidnapped and beaten in November 1996 {Reuters, 12 
November 1996).
The violence and arbitrary exercise of state power continues to this day. Yelena 
Urlayeva was reportedly arrested, beaten, and then committed to a psychiatric hospital 
in April 2001 {Associated Press Newswires, 12 April 2001). Outspoken opposition 
journalist, Ruslan Shapirov, was reportedly attacked in January 2002 {Agence-Franee 
Presse, 1 February 2002). Journalists for RFE/RL and Voice of America, Khusnutdin 
Kutbetdinov and Yusuf Rasulov, were beaten up when they tried to cover an opposition 
protest in Tashkent in March 2003 {Agence-Franee Presse, 7 March 2003). Human 
rights activist Surat Ikramov was beaten up in Tashkent in August 2003 {Associated 
Press Newswires, 28 August 2003), and the head of the Zealous Women club, Motabar 
Tojiboyeva, was beaten up, along with several fellow protestors, after picketing a 
District Prosecutor’s Office in Ferghana.
5.6.3 Media
Legal requirements are the first level of constraint on freedom of the media. All media 
outlets, except state and government institutions, must be registered.115 Registration can 
be refused if, among other things, the aims and goals of the organisation are not in 
accordance with the Constitution or if any of the owners live outside Uzbekistan.116 
Article 139 of the criminal code covers cases of libel and slander, setting fines, 
‘corrective labour’, or jail terms up to five years. Article 140 deals with insults 
demeaning to the honour or dignity of individuals, again providing for punishment by 
fine, ‘corrective labour’, or imprisonment. Article 158 deals specifically with insults, 
slander and libel directed at the president, setting as punishment ‘corrective labour’ or 
imprisonment for up to five years.117
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In practice it has proved extremely difficult since 1994 for independent media 
sources to set up in Uzbekistan.118 The OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media 
(2002) noted that, of 557 registered newspapers at the time in Uzbekistan, only 84 were 
commercial and two religious; all others were published by the state or by public 
institutions. Similarly, of the 165 registered magazines, 106 were state-controlled. 
Although there are many privately-owned media outlets in Uzbekistan, there are almost 
no major legal opposition media outlets, and those that do take a more critical tone have 
tended to encounter problems.119 It is very difficult for critical media outlets to register 
and stay registered. Consequently, the major opposition parties, Birlik and Erk, print 
newspapers outside Uzbekistan and smuggle them into the country (thus exposing 
themselves to criminal charges), and also run websites from outside the country, which 
are often blocked in Uzbekistan by the authorities.120
Until mid 2002, the government controlled media content through the State Press 
Committee—in practice, Uzbekistan’s media censor. This body was transformed into 
the Agency for Media and Information and its role as censor was officially abolished,121 
with responsibility for media content handed to the individual editors and proprietors.122 
Formally, the new body is specifically prohibited from censoring the media; instead, its 
role is to ensure ‘freedom of speech and the press’ and to ‘monitor the observation of 
constitutional rights and laws’.123 It also has responsibility for registering media 
outlets.124 The change is not expected to make much difference to media freedom 
because editors and proprietors will continue to self-censor the material they publish to 
avoid government ire.
There are informal factors too. The authorities readily apply violence and court 
proceedings based on dubious grounds to intimidate or eradicate critical voices.
Probably the most notorious example of this is the arrest and imprisonment of Ruslan 
Sharipov on charges of sodomy and interfering with minors. What sets the Sharipov 
case apart, however, is that sodomy remains a crime in Uzbekistan and Sharipov is 
openly homosexual (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 14 August 2003). Other 
journalists have been arrested on far more tenuous charges.125 Critical journalists are 
sometimes violently attacked. In a recent example, Yusuf Rasulov, Khusniddin 
Kutbitdinov and Mirasror Akhrorov all local reporters for international news agencies, 
were attacked by a group of people while covering a protest in Tashkent, in what 
appears to have been a set-up (RFE/RL Press Release, 10 March 2003, Agence-France 
Presse, 7 March 2003). Robiya Yuldasheva was threatened in her home by a masked 
man. Similarly, a gang broke in to the home of Evgeniy Dyakonov and, finding him not 
at home, decided to beat up some of his relatives instead. Interfax reporter Sergei 
Grebenyuk was killed and dumped in a canal in Tashkent (Committee to Protect 
Journalists 1996). Emin Usman, a well-known writer was arrested in 2001 on charges of 
‘disseminating documents threatening...social security’, and died while in custody. 
Suicide—or ‘cerebral tumour’, depending on which official is doing the talking—was 
the official cause of death, but torture the more probable (Ponomarev 2001:n.p.).
As a consequence of the intimidation, legal or otherwise, the Uzbek press is heavily 
repressed, and those critical voices that remain are hampered by the threat of violence 
and imprisonment. The Constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression is insufficient
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to protect journalists, and is contradicted by government practice, which aims 
consistently to quell dissent.
5.6.4 Rule of law
Uzbekistan’s Constitution formally provides for a judiciary independent of the executive 
and the legislature. 126 The report of the Central and East European Law Initiative Report 
on Uzbekistan summarises concisely and damningly the actual situation there:
Judges are generally unwilling to protect individual liberties, are dominated by the President 
and procuracy, and only rarely decide cases against the interests of the state. Corruption is 
reported to be rampant. Low salaries, lack of secure tenure and non-transparent methods of 
appointing, disciplining, and removing judges contribute to these problems. On the positive 
side, Uzbekistan has relatively strong procedures in place for training judges and ensuring they 
know the law (ABA/CEELI 2002).
There are three judicial hierarchies in the Uzbek system, excluding the military court 
system: local-level courts (Courts of General Jurisdiction), regional-level courts, and the 
Supreme Court. The lower courts deal with most criminal, civil and administrative 
matters, and the Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal in this stream. 127 There are 
also local-level economic courts and a Higher Economic Court; these deal mostly with 
disputes between business entities (including slate-owned businesses). The 
Constitutional Court scrutinises the constitutionality of legislation (ABA/CEELI 
2002).128
Although the legal structure provides for judicial independence, 129 the Uzbek 
judiciary is not considered independent. There are two main reasons for this: the 
appointment system and the hazards of deciding against the authorities. Judges of the 
Supreme, Higher Economic and Constitutional courts are nominated by the president 
and appointed by the Oliy Majlis. 130 As we have seen, the Oliy Majlis is hardly a 
constraint on the president, so this amounts to direct presidential appointment. Lower 
court judges are appointed by the president on the basis of a joint proposal by the 
Minister of Justice and the President of the Supreme Court or Higher Economic Court— 
all, of course, appointed by the president.
The president can propose for ratification by the Oliy Majlis the dismissal of judges 
of the Supreme and Higher Economic courts, 131 and can dismiss lower court judges in 
accordance with representations from the Minister of Justice with the concurrence of the 
President of the Supreme Court or Higher Economic Court. 132
The Uzbek system, like the other Central Asian systems, could conceivably work if 
the supposed systemic ‘checks and balances’ worked. They do not. Hence, the system 
does not. It can be, and is, used only to the advantage of those in power.
5.7 D iscussion and conclusion
This chapter has reviewed developments in the political sphere in Central Asia, 
concentrating on elections, political contestation, freedom of the media and rule of law. 
The Central Asian republics, collectively, have not performed well in these aspects of 
democracy. Freedom House, for example, argues that all of the Central Asian republics 
are not free and, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which was rated ‘partially free’ in the
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early years of the transition, have been so since gaining independence (Freedom House 
2003). There is, of course, variance in the severity of authoritarianism in the region, with 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan at the softer end, Tajikistan in the middle, and Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan at the harder end. In the best cases, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan, elections 
are highly dubious: opposition politicians are allowed but find it difficult to operate. In the 
worst cases, no credible opposition politicians are permitted to take part. The same is true 
of political contestation. In Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, opposition politicians are 
intimidated by official and unofficial violence and legal harassment. In the other republics, 
this kind of intimidation can take more extreme forms, the worst example being 
Turkmenistan, where many opposition politicians have disappeared and most others have 
fled into exile.
The media face a similar situation. Although the republican constitutions provide for 
freedom of expression, expression is nowhere free in Central Asia. There are, of course, 
some differences between the republics in the methods and severity of repression. The 
Kyrgyz and Kazak authorities prefer to intimidate critical journalists through 
bureaucratic and procuratorial mendacity, but violence against journalists and media 
outlets has occurred often. The other republics tend to prefer violent intimidation. No 
republic in Central Asia is safe for critical journalists, and in some cases—Turkmenistan in 
particular—the only media critical of the regime are based outside the country.
Judiciaries in all the republics are supposed to be independent and impartial, but in 
practice none are. Instead they are controlled, through official or unofficial channels, by 
the presidents and the power structures that surround them. Politically, this further limits 
the accountability of government, compounding the problems generated by weak 
political contestation. It also affects the economic situation by generating a perception 
that judiciaries are not fair or reliable, and this in turn compels people either to provide 
private legal enforcement or avoid transactions, neither of which have positive social or 
economic consequences.
The Central Asian republics are not becoming more democratic, and there is nothing 
to suggest that their leaderships ever intend to make them more democratic. The 
presidents frequently talk of democracy but are rather less willing to implement it, citing 
the ‘special conditions’ in the region, their countries’ democratic immaturity, or other 
convenient excuses. They use these with good reason: they seek alliance with the West, 
or rely on flows of aid from the West or from multilateral agencies, which expect to 
hear these words. This external exigency, and little else, prompts the region’s leaders to 
talk this way.
5.7.1 Political reform and economic reform
Political reform and transition. Democratisation was assumed to be a key part of the 
transition, actually forming a key aspect of some theories of transition. The assumption, 
however, was not a strong one. Democracy is not necessary for a strong market 
economy (Singapore and Hong Kong for most of its history are examples of this), nor is 
it sufficient.133 Papua New Guinea represents a salient example, being a quite robust 
democracy and yet having an economy distorted by resource wealth poor macroeconomic 
management.
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From a political economy perspective, we can see how unsuited to the Central Asian 
situation many transition theories were. We cannot talk of a ‘window of opportunity’ in 
these countries—no such window has yet opened. We cannot talk of radical reform 
removing the old bureaucracy or elite—they are precisely the people now in power in 
the republics, and they are the ones who have introduced such reform as has occurred 
(see Chapter 2). Thus, there has been no brief opportunity to be seized by radical 
reformers. Instead, the transition period in Central Asia has basically been one of political 
continuity, mitigated by faux democracy and in some cases moderate tolerance of critical 
voices. Such reform as has occurred, both politically and economically, has been directed 
towards sustaining this continuity, as we shall see in Chapter 6.
The intersection of political and economic reforms. The relationship between political 
and economic reform is complex. A number of points need to made, however, relating to 
the compatability of political and economic reform and to the impact of political reform on 
institutional development.
As the discussion in this and the previous chapter indicates, progress on economic 
reform is near perfectly correlated with that on political reform in the Central Asian 
republics. On both fronts, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan are the most advanced reformers, 
Tajikistan the intermediate, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the slowest reformers. At 
a basic level, this is probably obvious—governments that seek to retain extensive 
control over economic activity are also likely to want to retain control over political 
matters. As noted earlier, democracy is not a necessary condition for a market economy, 
but the relationship in the other direction is not so clear-cut— increased democratisation 
would probably spur decreased state control over the economy. Elites in all the 
republics, but particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, retain substantial control over 
those economies because it serves their interests to do so. Control over economic 
resources— and substantial financial flows— is still held by the state in these republics. 
Given the opacity of these regimes, this provides substantial scope for personal 
enrichment and wider political largesse to family and other favoured groups. In such 
circumstances, true democracy, in which politicians can genuinely expect to be voted 
out of office, is unlikely to occur because it would expose elite groups to the possibility 
of losing control over considerable flows of wealth.
In a sense, then, democratisation could spur economic reform.134 The possibility of 
losing power and control over this wealth would likely impel politicians to remove such 
flows from the public sphere to prevent them being taken up by subsequent 
governments. In the worst case scenario, obviously, they would privatise it to 
themselves. While no threat of losing power exists, and hence no chance of losing 
control of the economic resources concentrated in the state, there is no great incentive 
for politicians to initiate reforms that would disperse these resources.
Second, the lack of political reform is hampering the development of institutions and 
good governance.135 In the first, and most obvious, sense, governments in the region have 
subverted legal and judicial systems to serve their own interests. The courts are pliant, and 
bureaucracies subservient, which limits the authority of these institutions. If judicial 
systems are perceived to be unfair or interested only in serving the elite, people will avoid 
relying on or using them. As noted earlier, however, such institutions are critical to the
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proper functioning of a market economy—they enforce the ‘rules of the game’. Where 
they are weak, transactions become more costly and economic activity is retarded (North 
1993). In this respect, the issue is not so much a lack of democratisation per se, but a lack 
of political reform to make policymaking and bureaucratic processes more transparent, 
and to make such institutions more independent of the government.
This relates to another factor: accountability. At present there is no functioning 
mechanism to discipline politicians and public institutions. There is no threat to the 
political executives of losing office, there is in most cases no check on government and 
the bureaucracy from a vocal parliament or an independent judiciary, and the critical 
media are severely repressed. As a consequence, there is no way for citizens to express 
their disatisfaction with the structures of power, there is no feedback from individuals 
and groups regarding the poor performance of political and bureaucratic institutions, 
and there is no way to prevent political elites abusing office for personal gain (Olson 
1993; Sen 1999a, 1999b; World Bank 2000b). While democracies are far from perfect in 
this regard, where they work properly there is at least some avenue for feedback on 
government and institutional performance, and some way of constraining politician’s urge 
to abuse their power. In authoritarian states this is absent; the only limit they face is the 
threat of revolution.
For this reason, democracy is far more likely than authoritarianism to deliver 
institutions—regulatory bodies and bureaucracies, judiciaries, and so forth—that 
function well. It is also more likely to generate public services, such as health, education 
and utilities, that funtion properly and reliably because it ties more closely politicians’ 
continued power to prividing these things to the public’s satisfaction. In authoritarian 
regimes no such disciplining factor exists.
Thus, the argument here is not that democratisation and economic reform necessarily 
co-exist; indeed, the link between the two is tenuous. Rather, democratisation can 
provide a complement to economic reform by dispersing control of economic resources 
away from entrenched political elites, by providing counterbalances in political power, 
and by introducing disciplining feedback to the exercise of economic and political 
power by governments and bureaucracies.
5.7.2 The human context of political developments
Turning to the other key theme of the thesis, we may ask: are Central Asians better off 
now than they were before independence? Has the political situation improved? 
Nothwithstanding the considerable differences in political repression across the Central 
Asian republics, it is clear that in the best cases little has changed, and in the worst cases 
there may have been a deterioration in political conditions since the end of the Soviet 
era. Despite the introduction of formal frameworks for a democratic system in all the 
republics, elections are nowhere free and fair. Political participation is repressed more or 
less severely in all the republics, so there is very little scope for competing ideologies or 
even checks on government power. Similarly, in none of the republics can people safely 
express and publish opinions that contradict or attack the government. And no judiciary 
in the region is truly independent from the executive government. At a broad level, this 
indicates stasis in political developments in the region. At the republican level,
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Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are arguably no freer than under the late-era Soviet Union, 
and egregious human rights abuses suggest they may actually be worse. In Tajikistan, 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, the answer is not so clear: while the political space has 
opened up somewhat, there is still little scope for opposition, either from politicians or the 
media, and the instruments of power remain unaccountable to the populace. There has 
been little change, other than the occasional formality of casting a vote, in the political 
situation for the ordinary citizen.
Thus, we may conclude that, in terms of the political situation, the average citizen of 
Central Asia is probably no better off than under the late-era Soviet Union, and may 
indeed be worse off.
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6 MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
From Eastern Europe to Central Asia, the transition period has been associated with 
extreme macroeconomic instability. Massive contractions in economic activity were 
accompanied by extended outbreaks of severe hyperinflation and worsening external 
balance. The transition period, as a result, would appear to the ordinary person in the 
region to be one of inexplicable and unanticipated economic chaos, in which none of the 
certainties of the Soviet era remained. As Chapter 3 showed, however, economists have 
advanced a number of theories to explain both the output collapse and the inflationary 
surge. The peculiar economic circumstances in Central Asia, discussed in Chapter 1, 
mean that macroeconomic instability there— in terms of ouput and inflation— has been 
associated foremost with economic structure and the region’s geographic constraints.
6.1 Output decline in Central A sia
In Chapter 3, a number of theories were outlined which seek to explain the output decline 
in transition economies. These ranged from supply-side to demand-side and institutional 
theories of output behaviour. This chapter will analyse economic outcomes specific to the 
transition in Central Asia and place them in the context of the framework detailed in 
Chapter 3. It will find that the most plausible explanation for the varied GDP profiles in 
Central Asia relates to their economic structure and their relative dependence on the 
maintenance of trading relationships and markets for their products. This emphasises the 
explanations provided by theorists such as Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Komai 
(1994). In making these arguments, however, I do not seek to undervalue the importance 
of institutional change, trade reform, and democratisation in the economic and political 
development of these countries.
In terms of output levels, the most striking thing is the divergence in the republics’ 
performance in the period 1989-99— while all the republics experienced GDP declines, 
the scale and profile of their declines varied greatly (Figure 6.1). Tajikistan, clearly, had 
by far the worst fall in GDP during the transition period. Uzbekistan represents the 
opposite extreme, suffering only a limited fall in GDP— the best performance in the 
region and one of the best among all the transition economies. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Turkmenistan shared declines of roughly the same extent, performing better than 
Tajikistan but worse than Uzbekistan. That the more advanced reformers, Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, only performed as well as or worse than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, two 
of the transition region’s slowest reformers, seems at first blush to throw into doubt the 
claims of the more exuberant proponents of radical reform. But this should not be seen as
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Figure 6.1 Real GDP/NMP, Central Asian republics, 1989-2002 (Index 1989=100)
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Source: UNECE, various years. ‘Statistical appendix’ , Economic Survey of Europe, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva.
vindicating the claims of the ‘gradualists’ . Explanations o f differing GDP performance 
are, as noted above, not to be found in reform speed or approach; instead they are rooted 
in country-specific conditions— economic structure, external constraints, leading export 
goods, and political stability.
6.1.1 Uzbekistan: shallow decline with little reform
Uzbekistan has clearly suffered the smallest and shallowest output decline in the region. 
At its nadir, Uzbekistan’s output level, according to statistics produced by the UNECE, 
reached 80.5 per cent of its 1989 level. As was shown in Chapter 4, reform in Uzbekistan 
has not been particularly rapid or radical. In fact, it has been limited, occasional and 
subject to some reversals. Thus, Uzbekistan’s relatively shallow output decline and 
eventual recovery— which has been remarkable in the region, but also throughout the 
transition countries— over the course of the decade cannot be ascribed to a radical 
approach to economic reform. This has prompted something of a search for explanations 
as to why Uzbekistan has performed relatively well. Taube and Zettelmeyer (1998) and 
Zettelmeyer (1998), in a strong attempt to counter the gradualist position, argue that the 
stability of output in Uzbekistan is not due to the explicitly gradualist economic policy 
adopted there, but rather to the pure good fortune of having readily exportable products 
available which could command relatively high prices on world markets during the 
transition period.
Looking more closely at the sectoral breakdown o f GDP, it is clear that the GDP 
decline in Uzbekistan up until 1995 was driven predominantly by declines in both
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agricultural and industrial production. While the industrial sector has remained moribund, 
renewed GDP growth has been driven by recovery in the agricultural sector and to a 
lesser extent by growth in trade (Figure 6.2). A number of developments are in play here. 
First, Uzbekistan’s major export product, cotton, was little influenced by the collapse of 
supply chains within the former Soviet Union because it could be rapidly redirected to 
trade on world markets. That said, Uzbek cotton production in fact fell slightly in the 
transition period, but this was offset, albeit briefly, by favourable world cotton prices in 
the mid 1990s and improved terms of trade in the shift from Soviet prices (Baffes 2004). 
Second, gold was a major component of Uzbekistan’s industrial production, and its 
primary industrial export. It too was little affected by the collapse in Soviet trading 
networks because it could simply be redirected to world markets, generating hard 
currency income for the country. Both major exports lie at the base of manufacturing 
processes and, not being as highly specified as manufactured goods, are not as vulnerable 
as more refined products to the decline in demand resulting from the collapse of the 
Soviet industrial sector and trade networks.
The sector in Uzbekistan that was bound into Soviet production networks— the non­
extractive industrial sector— declined from its 1989 level and has not recovered in spite of 
government subsidies and protectionism. Some industrial recovery, however, has been 
driven by growth in construction.
Figure 6.2 Uzbekistan: sectoral dynamics in GDP decline and recovery, 1992-2001
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Figure 6.3 Uzbekistan: agricultural production, 1992-2003
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Table 6.1 Uzbekistan: the role of cotton exports, 1993-99
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Cotton exports (% of total exports) 40.7 51.3 45.6 43.5 37.6 41.5 ..
Cotton y ield  (tons/hectare) 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.4
W heat y ie ld (ton s/h ectare) 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.6
Source: International Monetary Fund. 1999. Republic of Uzbekistan: recent economic developments, 
IMF Staff Country Report 00/36, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
One further note needs to be made about decline and recovery in Uzbekistan. 
Uzbekistan has tried to pursue a policy of self-sufficiency, directing the hard currency 
earned by cotton and gold exports to support domestic industry and increase the country’s 
domestic food supply. In this respect, the government has sought to increase the 
production of grain to decrease the country's reliance on imports. As a result, agricultural 
growth, the primary contributor to GDP growth in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, has not been 
through increased production of cotton itself, which as noted above has actually 
decreased, but by the rapid growth of grain cultivation (Figure 6.3). Cereal production, 
predominantly wheat, has more than doubled during the post-Soviet period. Interestingly, 
fruit and melon production, in which the country historically had a comparative 
advantage, has not grown in this period—testament perhaps to the government-driven 
nature of this change.
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This overall scenario fits in well with the theories advanced by Kornai (1994) and 
Blanchard and Kremer (1997). Uzbekistan was largely able to avoid the disorganisation 
that accompanied the collapse of trading relations during the transition period, and hence 
did not suffer anywhere near the decline seen elsewhere in the CIS. Existing production 
could be simply redirected to world markets at little cost in terms of capacity-building— 
which requires time and investment— leaving producers relatively unaffected by the 
change in circumstances (IMF 2000c).1 Uzbekistan’s stability has derived from a unique 
set of circumstances: it had relatively little dependence on all-Union production processes; 
its major products, especially cotton and gold, could be readily directed to world markets; 
and the hard currency gained from cotton and gold sales could be re-allocated to slow the 
collapse of the industrial sector. Because Uzbekistan has been such a slow reformer, we 
can safely say that radical reform has played no role in either the shallowness of the 
decline or the subsequent recovery.
6.1.2 Tajikistan: civil war and postponed reform
Tajikistan has suffered the most severe and prolonged output decline in Central Asia, and 
among the worst in the entire transition region (Figures 6.1,6.4). The extended civil war, 
continuing problems with regional neighbours (both Afghanistan and to some extent 
Uzbekistan), and mass movements of refugees have all disrupted economic activity and 
contributed to collapse. At its lowest, in 1996, Tajikistan’s GDP reached around 30 per 
cent of its 1989 level.
Figure 6.4 Tajikistan: sectoral impacts on real GDP dynamic, 1992-2001
Real GDP/NMP Proportion of
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Sources: UN Economic Commission for Europe. 2003. ‘Statistical Appendix’, Economic Survey of 
Europe, l:224. Asian Development Bank, 2002. Key Indicators 2002, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila.
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As noted in Chapter 4, reform in Tajikistan was delayed by the incapacity of the state 
to properly implement its reform program. Thus, it could easily, but erroneously, be 
argued that Tajikistan’s post-Soviet economic performance is associated with a lack of 
reform. In truth, however, the GDP decline was prompted by falls in both agricultural and 
industrial production (see Figure 6.4), which suggests an across-the-board economic 
catastrophe that was mostly likely a consequence of the civil war. The war had a number 
of economic impacts—it disrupted production by making economic activity more 
dangerous, it drew labour and scarce investment funds away from productive uses, and it 
cut supply and transport networks, leaving people unable to source supplies or take 
products to market.2 It also impinged on the state’s capacity to enforce and regulate 
economic activity, so legal systems collapsed, regulatory agencies did not function, and 
bureaucrats and politicians turned to corruption to supplement meagre legal incomes.
It is important to note, however, that Tajikistan’s economic problems are not all derived 
from the civil war. In economic terms, Tajikistan can be seen as the opposite of the 
situation in Uzbekistan—it had a poor endowment at the beginning of the transition and 
faced severe external constraints. In terms of external constraints, Tajikistan has uniquely 
difficult transport conditions. Road links to the outside world are dangerous, subject to 
banditry, and often cut by snow during winter. Rail links with the rest of the CIS, and 
hence the world, are similarly problematic as they pass close to the Afghan border and 
through Uzbekistan, whose authorities have frequently shut them down for security 
reasons. Flights are infrequent, highly expensive, and generally only travel to other CIS 
countries, which means that any goods exported in this way have to be off-loaded and 
shipped on after arrival in the CIS country.
Tajik industry is dominated by a single aluminium smelter. While aluminium 
production has been relatively stable, it has not been a very strong contributor to 
economic growth and has not been successful in attracting large amounts of hard currency 
in the way that Uzbekistan’s cotton production has. The smelter is a clear product of the 
Soviet system, which is the source of most of its problems. In the Soviet era, bauxite was 
mined elsewhere in the Soviet Union or imported, and processed into alumina in plants 
located in Ukraine, Russia, or Kazakstan. The alumina was then transported to Tajikistan 
for further refining into aluminium before being transported all the way back to the rest of 
the USSR, including the European republics, for eventual sale. Little has changed in the 
post-Soviet era. The smelter is forced to import alumina for processing as Tajikistan has 
no economically viable natural bauxite deposits of its own and no alumina processing 
plant. Thus, even though Tajik aluminium is sold on international markets, roughly 45 per 
cent of the revenue earned must be sent on to alumina suppliers elsewhere, predominantly 
a plant in Ukraine (Table 6.2). The finished aluminium is then transported back across the 
CIS to markets in Western Europe.
The Tajik aluminium industry was therefore particularly vulnerable to external shocks, 
and these shocks inevitably occurred. First, rail links to Tajikistan were closed in 1992, 
cutting supplies of alumina and other raw materials and consequently causing the smelter 
shut down (Financial Times, 20 November 1992, 11 December 1992). It would not have 
mattered, however, had the plant sufficient reserve supplies because the closed rail link 
prevented finished aluminium from being exported anyway. Second, in 1993-94, the
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Figure 6.5 Tajikistan: principal industrial products, 1992-2001
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Source: Asian Development Bank, 2002. Key Indicators 2002, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Table 6.2 Tajikistan: the role of aluminium, 1993-98
Export revenue from a lum inium  sales
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
(per cent o f total export revenue) 
A lum ina im port costs as a proportion
50.44 55.99 50.06 34.16 33.78 39.93
of alum inium  export revenues (per cent) 45.22 45.05 48.21 42.21 42.46 47.01
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2000. Republic of Tajikistan: recent economic developments, 
IMF Country Report 00/27, International Monetary Fund, Washington. DC.
European Community imposed quotas on aluminium imports from the CIS, including 
Tajikistan, on the basis that cheap aluminium from the former Soviet Union was 
undercutting world markets. Thus, the value of aluminium exports declined during the 
1990s, reflecting these difficulties as well as interruptions due to the civil war (IMF 
2000d). Because aluminium plays such a large role in Tajikistan’s exports, and hence 
economy, any external difficulties can precipitate economic crisis. Consequently, although 
aluminium production continues, it does not represent the opportunity that Uzbekistan had 
with its cotton and gold production at the beginning of the transition period.
Cotton also plays an important role in Tajik exports, but has not established significant 
revenue growth. The case of cotton production is more clear-cut than in the industrial 
sector. Cotton production dropped considerably, only properly recovering around the turn 
of the century. This has a number of probable causes, primary among which would be the 
interruptions to planting and harvesting prompted by civil war and the loss of transport 
networks out of the country. For example, disruptions to transport networks meant that
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fuel supplies to cotton harvesters were cut, which meant that harvests had to be gathered 
by hand. They also meant that exports were frequently interrupted/ So, again, Tajik 
cotton was in theory readily exportable to world markets, but production was hampered 
by civil war and exports by interruptions to trade links. The rapid growth of grain 
production from 1996 onwards suggests, however, that farmers also began reverting to 
subsistence grain and food production as soon as possible given unreliable trading 
conditions (see Figure 6.6). The civil war and its attendant economic dislocation drove 
this shift, not reform— farmers shifted production in a logical response to the uncertain 
supply conditions and income flows.
As noted in Chapter 3, many of the production systems in the Soviet Union were 
highly specified— some factories could source their inputs from only one supplier, and 
many others had only one potential purchaser— and these production lines often crossed 
the notional boundaries of the Soviet republics. Tajikistan was highly dependent on raw 
materials imported from elsewhere in the Soviet Union, and remains highly dependent on 
imports from the CIS today, notwithstanding efforts to diversify alumina suppliers. When 
CIS payments systems collapsed, and barriers to trade were erected, the basis for Tajik 
industry was cut and Tajikistan suffered an exogenous shock that it found difficult to deal 
with.
It is unlikely that a more aggressive economic reform program would have produced 
better economic performance given the circumstances. The civil war diverted labour, 
capital and other resources away from non-military uses and, not surprisingly, has
Figure 6.6 Tajikistan: principal agricultural products, 1992-2003
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Source: FAOSTAT data, 2004.
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occupied more administrative attention than economic matters. In addition, the initial 
economic endowment represents a critical constraint during the transition. Tajik 
production was intimately tied into Soviet-era economic processes and relied on the 
Soviet centre to ensure input supply. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Tajikistan had 
nowhere to go, and has had to struggle to overcome this unhappy initial constraint though 
investment in new products and production processes.4 Even though cotton and 
aluminium can be, and is, sold on world markets, poor transport has constrained this 
severely. Again, the crucial determinant of output decline in Tajikistan was not radical or 
gradual economic policy. Instead, conditions largely beyond policymakers' control were 
responsible for the economic outcomes— civil war, a poor resource base, and 
geographical constraints on exports.
6.1.3 Turkmenistan: confounded expectations
Early in the transition period, many observers (for example, Pomfret 1995; Tarr 1994) 
expected Turkmenistan to be able to exploit its major asset, extensive natural gas reserves, 
and thereby ensure output stability. This has not happened; the decline in Turkmenistan’s 
GDP has been almost as severe as that experienced by the comparatively more rapid 
reformers, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan (Figures 6.1,6.7). Decreased agricultural output 
and intermittent declines in industrial production have driven the overall decline in GDP 
in the transition period. I f  we are to believe the Turkmen statistics— and there is ample 
reason not to— the recovery has similarly been driven by renewed growth in the industrial 
and agricultural sectors (Figure 6.7).
Figure 6.7 Turkmenistan: sectoral influence on real GDP, 1993-2000
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Looking beyond this broad scale, we may ask what exactly has happened here. Why 
have the predictions of Turkmen stability not been borne out? Natural gas is a relatively, 
though not completely, ‘homogenous’ product. As such, production of natural gas should, 
all other things being equal, be easy to redirect to satisfy world demand rather than just 
demand within the post-Soviet markets. In short, the demand for Turkmen natural gas was 
theoretically not particularly subject to the collapse in demand within the former Soviet 
Union. For Turkmenistan, given its initial endowment, the transition represented an 
obvious opportunity.
Sadly, all other things have not been equal. Turkmenistan’s ability to export natural gas 
has been hampered by external factors. It has been constrained in its ability to actually 
export natural gas by Russian and Ukrainian unwillingness to allow Turkmen gas through 
Soviet-built pipelines at anything approaching a proper market price.5 Furthermore, where 
it has been physically able to export gas through these pipelines, it has often encountered 
problems being paid in return, with the Ukraine and Georgia the most egregious non­
payers (IMF 1999b). According to statistics collated by the IMF, Turkmenistan’s export 
revenues from natural gas were cut by two-thirds between 1996 and 1997, falling from 
US$1021.9 million in 1996 to US$27.3 million in 1997 and US$71.7 million in 1998 
(IMF 1999b: 118). This has been only slightly offset by increases in crude oil production 
and exports (Figures 6.8-6.9). Clearly, when natural gas exports are strong, the Turkmen 
economy is strong, when they are weak, the economy nosedives. Thus, the Turkmen 
economy is particularly sensitive to externally imposed shocks to transport conditions.6
On the agricultural side, if we are to believe the production statistics, growth has been 
driven predominantly by increased wheat production, with cotton production fairly
Figure 6.8 Turkmenistan: exports, 1993-2002 (US$ million)
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Figure 6.9 Turkmenistan: production of major industrial goods, 1992-99
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Figure 6.10 Turkmenistan: production of major agricultural goods, 1992-2003
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constant over time. The strange growth profile of cotton fibre, particularly the apparent 
collapse in production in 1996, is partly corroborated by IMF-collated statistics for 
Turkmenistan’s exports. Cotton fibre exports were fairly steady around US$330-430 
million until 1996, plummeted to US$86.6 million in 1997, but only partly recovered in 
1998 to US$135.4 million. In this light, these statistics should be interpreted with extreme 
caution, but the notion that cotton production has stagnated while wheat production has 
continuously increased is not unreasonable as such, though the scale of growth from 2000 
onwards in wheat production looks suspicious.
Thus, Turkmenistan’s initial opportunity, its economic endowment, has been countered 
by an externally-imposed constraint— the inability to export the republic’s key product in 
return for hard currency, and sometimes to export at all. Recent years have seen moves to 
overcome this constraint through political and diplomatic efforts, but also through 
investment in alternative means of exporting natural gas (such as through Iran, and by 
developing new pipeline routes to Europe and South Asia). Crucially, economic reforms 
had very little to do with this. Put bluntly, Turkmenistan could have become the most 
liberal economy in the world and the Ukraine would still have been unable or unwilling 
to pay for its imports of Turkmen natural gas. It could be argued that more reform would 
have attracted more foreign investment, but history suggests that a well-functioning 
market economy with a sound institutional environment is not a critical issue in energy- 
sector investments (see section 1.8.3).
To summarise, Turkmenistan’s performance has been driven not by reform speed or 
approach, but by structural and geographical factors— the dominance of natural gas 
exports and the economy’s consequent sensitivity to transport interruptions. Turkmenistan 
has needed, and will continue to need, to develop more extensive transport networks to 
overcome the constraints imposed by its geography and neighbours.
6.1.4 Kazakstan: the problems of resource exploitation
Kazakstan’s output profile is similar to those of Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, but 
substantially worse than that of Uzbekistan (Figure 6.1). The sectoral dynamic, however, 
differs somewhat in that Kazakstan’s GDP decline was spurred by the simultaneous 
collapse of both agriculture and manufacturing, but its recovery has been driven 
principally by recovery in the industrial sector (Figure 6.11). This generalisation, 
moreover, conceals considerable changes within the industrial structure.
Starting with the agricultural sector, we can see that the decline was predominantly in 
grain production. Kazakstan is in fact the only Central Asian republic where grain 
production has shown almost unremitting across-the-board decline. Production of both 
wheat and barley, Kazakstan’s most important crops, declined precipitously in the early 
years of transition, and only wheat has recovered to any extent (Figure 6.12). Perhaps we 
should not be surprised at this given the over-extension of grain production in Kazakstan 
during the Soviet era (see Chapter 1), but similar reductions in meat production suggest 
that the changes are not being driven by a reversion to animal husbandry in the region— 
between 1991 and 2000, egg and meat production fell 60 per cent and milk production 
fell by over 30 per cent (Goskomstat Rossii 2000). This points to a more general 
stagnation of the agricultural sector.
6 MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 143
Figure 6.11 Kazakstan: sectoral influence on real GDP profile, 1992-2001
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Figure 6.12 Kazakstan: principal agricultural products, 1992-2003
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The Kazak industrial sector shows a similarly unusual pattern of decline and recovery. 
The decline was prompted by a collapse in manufacturing industry—the sector linked 
most closely with Soviet production processes— but the recovery does not seem to have 
occurred primarily in this sector. Instead, industrial production has revived through the 
long-term development of the industrial raw materials sectors such as mining, oil, and 
natural gas (see Figures 6.13-6.14). This basically accords with what we would expect to 
happen under theories of disorganisation and CIS trade collapse: those industries that 
were most closely integrated into Soviet production processes declined inexorably, 
whereas those industries that did not rely on Soviet supply and demand have thrived.7
Two points: first, Kazakstan’s industrial production was much more integrated into, 
and reliant on, Soviet production processes than most of the other republics. When the 
Soviet Union collapsed, breaking up trade linkages and production networks, Kazakstan’s 
industry found itself without its traditional market. New markets for the old products were 
difficult to find. The result was industrial decline. Second, new forms of industrial 
production have emerged, concentrated in the oil and natural gas industries, but these 
have required extensive investment, and this has taken a long time to materialise. As Jones 
Luong (1999:37) has argued, moreover, the Kazak government’s concentration on 
exploiting oil and gas has had profound negative consequences in terms of giving a false 
impression of oil as a ‘panacea for all that ails’, enabling excessive current borrowing to 
cover short-term exigencies, and diverting attention away from other sectors of the 
economy.
Figure 6.13 Kazakstan: principal industrial products, 1992-2001
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2002. Key Indicators 2002, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
6 MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 145
Figure 6.14 Kazakstan: principal manufactures, 1992-2001
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Often overlooked is that Kazakstan has actually been as aggressive as Kyrgyzstan in 
its approach to economic reform (see Chapter 4). Together, they are the region’s most 
advanced refomers. Unlike Kyrgyzstan, however, Kazakstan is endowed with a range of 
resources that can potentially be exploited to sustain economic growth. Given this 
endowment of resources, why has Kazakstan’s GDP performance more closely 
resembled that of Kyrgyzstan than that o f Uzbekistan? Again, the answer lies in country- 
specific constraints— transport and capacity-building.
While Kazakstan has not really faced the same problems as Turkmenistan in exporting 
its natural resources, and has a more diverse resource base to draw on, it too is concerned 
by reliance on Soviet pipeline routes. The post-Soviet period, as a result, has seen strong 
efforts to develop alternate routes for Kazak oil and natural gas. The sector also suffers 
some legacies of the Soviet period. Kazakstan’s major oilfields are on the Caspian coast in 
the far West of the country, but its oil refineries were set up in the northeast during the 
Soviet period to process crude imported from Russia’s West Siberian fields. At 
independence, Kazak oilfields were not connected by pipeline to its refineries. Thus, 
Kazak oil was exported to Russia rather than refined in Kazakstan, and Siberian oil was 
imported into Kazakstan to be refined. As a consequence, considerable investment has 
been needed in pipeline development, as well as in expanding extractive capacity.
Although foreign direct investment has poured into the country, the need for it has 
limited the speed with which production for exports can be boosted. It takes time for 
investors to assess opportunities, negotiate with governments, and develop industries. 
Thus, there has been a kind of interim, in which old sectors have collapsed but the new
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sectors have not begun developing.8 In this respect, Kazakstan’s initial endowment was 
not as opportune as Uzbekistan's in that time and investment has been required for it to be 
realised, and a resource that can be exploited with little or no investment is qualitatively 
more attractive than one that cannot.
Kazkastan’s economic decline, therefore, was a product of its integration into, and 
reliance on Soviet production processes. Similarly, the agricultural decline in the post- 
Soviet period can be seen as an economically (and environmentally) sensible reaction to 
the excessive development of grain production in the Soviet period. Its recovery has been 
driven not by reform, as some economists would argue, but by the country’s good fortune 
in sitting on an unusually large supply of oil and natural gas. Developing these assets, 
however, has taken considerable time. Kazakstan w ill obviously continue to grow, its 
economy driven by exploiting its natural resource reserves, but its growth w ill be 
dependent foremost on the continued strength of oil and gas prices and the geopolitical 
constraints of transport. Reform, and even governance, w ill be incidental so long as 
corruption and government interference remain within a range tolerable to resource 
companies.
6.1.5 Kyrgyzstan: exploiting minimal opportunities
Kyrgyzstan’s GDP performance, like that of Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, has been 
unimpressive. GDP declined considerably, driven predominantly by the fall in industrial 
output, but also to a lesser extent by fluctuations in agricultural activity. Recovery has 
come through renewed growth of both the industrial and agricultural sectors (Figure 6.15).
Figure 6.15 Kyrgyzstan: sectoral influence on GDP performance, 1992-2001
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As with Kazakstan, however, this generalisation conceals some significant sub-sectoral 
shifts. In industry particularly, production has shifted from a diverse structure with some 
extractive industries and some manufacturing industry to a concentration almost 
completely on a single extractive industry— gold mining. The reasons for this can be 
found in the Soviet-era structure of the economy. Kyrgyzstan was more heavily 
industrialised than other Central Asian republics except Kazakstan, with a few key 
manufacturing plants that were heavily bound to Soviet production processes. With the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, this manufacturing sector collapsed because of 
interruptions to trade and payments systems and a lack of ready markets for its products. 
In the second half of the 1990s, gold mining— a far simpler form of industrial 
production— came to replace the old industrial sector.9
Gold mining has driven the recovery. Kyrgyzstan’s transition recession ended in 1997 
when the Kumtor gold mine began production, and growth has remained intimately 
bound up with the fortunes of the mine since. In fact, the Kyrgy z economy is now so 
dependent on the gold mine that, when activity there was shut down in 2002 following a 
very serious accident, Kyrgyz GDP growth collapsed from 5.3 and 5.4 per cent in 2000 
and 2001 respectively to 0.0 per cent in 2002. When the mine was reopened, GDP 
growth recovered to 5.2 per cent in 2003.
Agricultural production also suffered somewhat in the transition period but nowhere 
near as much as industry. Most major agricultural products either showed no decline, or 
have grown strongly since early in the transition (Figure 6.16). Barley is the exception, 
and this points to substitution away from barley production towards wheat, tubers and
Figure 6.16 Kyrgyzstan: production of principal agricultural goods, 1992-2003
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Table 6.3 Selected indicators of livestock production, Kyrgyzstan, 1992-2003 
(metric tons ‘000)
1992 1995 1998 2001 2003
Eggs 33.1 8.3 9.8 12.8 15.0
Meat 227.7 179.9 190.5 196.8 201.4
M ilk 961.0 864.2 972.7 1142.1 1192.7
Source: FAOSTAT, 2004 data.
Figure 6.17 Kyrgyzstan: production of major industrial sector goods, 1992-2001
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vegetables, most likely for subsistence consumption. Livestock production has been 
slightly different in that an initial decline was followed by recovery, but only milk 
production has risen above 1992 levels so far. Agriculture is the mainstay of the Kyrgyz 
economy, employing about half the population, but it has not been a critical contributor to 
economic growth.
Instead, as noted above, growth has been driven by the industrial sector. The economic 
decline was related to Kyrgyzstan’s industrial integration into Soviet production 
processes, but, unlike Uzbekistan, it did not have goods that could immediately and 
readily be redirected to world markets. So, when Soviet trade and payment systems fell 
apart, and Soviet industrial demand collapsed, Kyrgyz industry was left with no market 
for its products. The post-Soviet period has seen efforts to develop alternatives, but 
substantial investment has been necessary to build anything approaching an effective 
export industry. In the Kyrgyz case, the majority of this has gone into development of 
gold production facilities— the Kumtor project. As with Kazakstan, development of new 
Kyrgyz industry has taken time. The Kumtor gold mine first started producing marketable
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gold in 1997, five years after the holding company Cameco took its initial stake in the 
mine site. There was a prolonged period, therefore, in which Kyrgyzstan’s old Soviet 
industry collapsed, but new industry had yet to emerge. Kyrgyzstan’s problem is hence 
the same as Kazakstan’s in terms of initial endowments.
Kyrgyzstan’s decline therefore was driven by the kind of disorganisation and trade 
collapse described by Komai (1994) and Blanchard and Kremer (1997). Its recovery has 
not been a product of reform but instead the belated opening of a simple extractive 
industry— gold mining—whose products can be sold readily on world markets. Arguably, 
reform may have played a role in this by making Kyrgyzstan a more attractive destination 
for investors, but this seems unlikely because natural resources investment seems to be 
driven more by extractive opportunities than the economic environment in the target 
country (see Chapter 1). Reform, as a consequence, cannot be seen to have played much 
of a role in Kyrgyzstan’s transition GDP performance: the decline was initiated by 
exogenous factors, such as the trade and payments collapse coupled with Kyrgystan’s 
reliance on Soviet markets; and the recovery has been driven primarily by a single gold 
mine. As with Kazakstan, reform in Kyrgyzstan did not release resources from the old 
Soviet sectors to be taken up by newer, more efficient industries. Rather, labour has been 
released into underemployment in the agricultural sector, and the capital formerly supplied 
from the all-Union centre has vanished. The replacement has essentially been a single 
industry that uses limited domestic labour and is financed by capital imported from 
overseas, including the international financial institutions.
6.1.6 Output declines in transition
One of the important things to note in the decline in output during transition is the relative 
unimportance of transition strategy. As shown in Chapter 4, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan 
were the region’s advanced reformers, Tajikistan was a case of delayed reform, and 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were slow reformers. Factors outside the policy making 
sphere have driven changes in output in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan was 
fortunate to have an economic structure concentrated on products that could be readily 
directed to world markets, thus insulating it from the collapse of Soviet trade and 
payments systems, and the fall in Soviet industrial demand. Tajikistan, on the other hand, 
suffered a serious civil war that disrupted all kinds of economic activity, and an 
unpropitious mix of major products at independence. This situation was compounded by 
severe disruptions to transport networks, which prevented its major exports from being 
directed to world markets. Turkmenistan’s economic difficulties were almost completely 
associated with transport difficulties imposed by CIS neighbours. Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan both experienced collapse in their old industrial sectors, and it has taken time 
for these countries to develop new industries viable in world markets, predominantly in 
natural resources extraction. Thus, GDP profiles in the Central Asian republics were 
determined by economic structure, transport constraints, and trade flexibility, not by 
reform approach
Economic structure. Of the countries surveyed here, Kyrgyzstan and particularly 
Kazakstan were arguably most closely integrated into the Soviet economic space, 
occupying a more extensive role in supply chains, particularly in terms of intermediate
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levels of production, of the Soviet era production processes. Following Blanchard and 
Kremer’s (1997) theory, this means that they would be more exposed to disorganisation 
through disruptions in trading patterns and more exposed to the collapse in demand 
throughout the Soviet industrial sector. This represents an obvious constraint. It was 
difficult for these countries to arrest the output decline precipitated by the Soviet break-up 
by re-orienting trade to world markets, and they have seen their old industries collapse as 
a result. It has taken time, and considerable investment, for replacement industries to 
develop. In theory, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan all could have avoided 
collapse to some extent owing to their lighter dependence on Soviet production networks, 
but other factors have dragged down GDP performance in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
Trade flexibility. Given the propensity to disorganisation as the Soviet system fell apart, 
the importance of being able rapidly to redirect exports to world, rather than traditional, 
markets cannot be understated. The collapse of traditional trade patterns severely limited 
demand for traditional products within the Soviet Union. First, most products could be 
sourced more cheaply elsewhere. Second, the transition process was accompanied by the 
collapse (intentional or otherwise) of vast sections of the Soviet industrial sector. This, 
inevitably, would have a profound effect on demand for inputs—the bulk of Central 
Asian production in both the natural resources and manufacturing sectors. If a country’s 
traditional exports could be rapidly redirected to, and be competitive on, world markets, 
there would be less of a disruption in demand. This is effectively what happened in 
Uzbekistan, which was able to redirect its cotton production toward world markets, then 
use the income derived from this production to assist other industries and maintain social 
expenditures, among other things. Table 6.3 provides evidence that Uzbekistan moved 
earlier and more aggressively than the other republics to redirect exports to non-CIS 
destinations. Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan were less able to achieve this owing to the nature 
of their product mix at independence.
Transport. Transport has been a critical determinant of performance, and both Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan have suffered because of difficulties with transport. While the civil war 
was the primary cause of Tajikistan’s economic crisis, its major industry, an aluminium 
smelter, was completely dependent on functioning transport linkages with the outside 
world, and its other major economic activities, such as cotton production, are also highly 
dependent on them delivering inputs and as a route for exports. Transport is particularly 
vulnerable in Tajikistan because the terrain prevents many routes being developed. It does 
not take much for all the economically viable routes out of Tajikistan to be cut; and when 
they have been, Tajikistan’s economy has suffered. Turkmenistan represents a similar 
scenario. Its major product, natural gas, is readily marketable outside the CIS, but it has 
suffered problems because it is effectively constrained by existing transport networks to 
sell its gas to either Russia or Ukraine. Difficulties with transporting its gas through these 
nations, or extracting payment from them for gas sold, have led to severe interruptions in 
Turkmen gas exports and consequently to repeated crises in the Turkmen economy. 
Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has not suffered any of these problems. Its major 
exports—cotton and gold—are readily exportable to world markets both because there is 
demand for them there, and because it has faced few problems in physically delivering 
them to those markets.
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Reform has had little influence on economic performance in Central Asia. Kazakstan 
and Kyrgyzstan experienced economic decline because of their economic structures, 
which were highly integrated into, and reliant on, Soviet trade and production networks. 
Tajikistan’s economic crisis was caused primarily by civil war and secondarily by 
interruptions to transport links with the rest of the world. Turkmenistan’s problems were 
also created by transport and payments difficulties, which led to the collapse of its major 
export and the keystone of its economy—natural gas. Uzbekistan represents the opposite 
scenario: it has not experienced difficulties substituting world markets for Soviet, and it 
experienced few difficulties physically transporting its products to those markets. Thus, 
the Central Asian republics’ GDP performance in the transition period has been 
determined by transport constraints, civil war in Tajikistan, and structural factors, 
particularly the flexibility of major exports, all of which lie beyond the influence of 
domestic economic reform.
6.1.7 A number of questions
The discussion above raises a number of questions for future research. First, is it possible 
that reform approach is not a relevant factor in output performance in the Central Asian 
context? The Central Asian economies are all, to some extent, reliant on natural resource 
extraction for the bulk of their output and, even more so, their trade. Commodities are 
notoriously vulnerable to external developments, and arguably unusually so in Central 
Asia.
Second, is there a critical mass to reform? While I have labelled Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan as aggressive reformers in regional terms, they are not considered so in the 
general transition context. It is possible that, while these countries have made much 
progress in reforms, they have not crossed some threshold level of economic reform or 
have not made progress in some critical aspect of reform, and consequently not reaped the 
rewards of reform.
Third, are there specifics of reform elsewhere that are not being applied in Central 
Asia? The current economic fashion for institutions and good governance may be one key 
avenue of further research; as Chapter 4 demonstrated, the Central Asian republics have 
not moved far in establishing a healthy institutional environment for a market economy.
6.2 Inflation
6.2.1 Overview of Central Asian performance
All the Central Asian republics suffered at least some period of hyperinflation early in the 
transition period. What is striking, however, is how brief the inflation outbreaks actually 
were. All the republics except Turkmenistan had brought inflation rates down by 1996, 
and Turkmenistan seems to have brought it down by 1997.10 Kyrgyzstan was clearly the 
most successful at limiting the inflationary impetus, suffering brief and relatively moderate 
inflation in the period 1992-95. Turkmenistan had the worst inflationary episode, 
experiencing the highest and most prolonged bout of hyperinflation in the region. 
Hyperinflation there lasted from around 1992 until 1997, and probably later though the 
available statistics do not show it. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan experienced reasonably brief
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spikes of hyperinflation early in the transition process, followed by high to moderate 
levels of inflation throughout the decade, with Tajikistan performing more poorly than 
Uzbekistan. Kazakstan managed to control inflation by 1995-96, reaching a level 
basically equivalent to that in Kyrgyzstan, after a bout of hyperinflation lasting at least 
three years (Figure 6.18).
6.2.2 Causes of inflation in Central Asia
Chapter 3 presented in detail a number of theories drawn from the general transition 
literature to explain inflation in the transition economies. These included monetary 
overhang, easy credit under the Rouble Zone conditions, and monetisation of fiscal and 
quasi-fiscal deficits.
It is critical at this point to recall that all the Central Asian republics were heavily 
subsidised by the Union centre (see Chapter 1) during the Soviet period. It difficult to 
establish clearly the level o f this subsidy, but Orlowski (1995) has calculated levels in the 
order o f 15-25 per cent of GDP just prior to independence. In the post-Soviet period, the 
republics have had to deal with removal of this budget support— basically an exogenous 
budget shock. The republics dealt with this external shock in different ways, but their 
essential aim was to ensure continuity of government spending after the loss of the 
subsidy. Some were more successful in this respect than others.
Figure 6.18 Inflation in Central Asia, 1992-2003 (per cent per annum)
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-------Kyrgyz Ftepublic
Tajikistan
-------Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Source: International Monetary Fund. 2003. World Economic Outlook Database, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, September.
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Monetary overhang. The quantity of money in circulation in the Soviet Union is thought 
to have far exceeded the appropriate level given the quantity of goods available. In a 
market economy, as explained in Chapter 3, this would lead to a decrease in the value of 
money— that is, inflation—to bring the two disparate levels back into equilibrium. In the 
Soviet system, this was prevented by price controls, under which prices could not rise to 
the equilibrium— a monetary overhang. When prices were freed, however, inflation could 
realign the value of the currency to reflect the quantity of goods available. It is likely that 
this monetary overhang explains some of the initial burst of inflation in the transition 
economies, but the initial price rise should correct price disequilibrium developed under 
the monetary overhang. More prolonged inflation needs other explanations.
The Rouble Zone. The republics saw the Rouble Zone as a substitute for the explicit all- 
Union subsidies withdrawn following the Union’s collapse, and used it to expand credit 
to domestic enterprises and services at the expense of the other Zone members. The 
profile of inflation in the Central Asian republics certainly suggests a role for difficulties 
with the Rouble Zone in causing price instability. As we saw in Chapter 4, all the 
republics except Tajikistan had introduced their own currencies and left the Rouble Zone 
by October 1994. By 1995, inflation in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was 
brought back to moderately high (rather than hyperinflationary) levels. The reduction of 
inflation in Kyrgyzstan after 1993 seems to coincide with the introduction of the national 
currency in the middle of that year. Similarly, control of inflation in Uzbekistan in 1995 
seems ostensibly to be related to the introduction of its single national currency in mid 
1994. The other republics’ performance is not so easily related to the Rouble Zone. 
Moreover, some caution is required here it in that it is very difficult to disentangle 
monetary expansion under the Rouble Zone from monetary expansion purely within the 
each independent republic.
Fiscal position. A major factor underlying inflation in the transition economies has been 
the monetisation of deficits and quasi-fiscal deficits. Thus, a priori, we would expect 
deficits in Central Asian republics to correspond closely to inflation outbreaks.
Figure 6.19 shows the overall budget position of the Central Asian republics. In terms 
of fiscal position, Turkmenistan appears to be the best performer overall. There are, 
however, a number of reasons to doubt this. First, even though these statistics are from the 
Asian Development Bank, that bank relies on the national authorities to provide the basic 
data, and it is wise to be very sceptical about claims made by the Turkmen government.11 
Second, a great deal of government activity in Turkmenistan is not included in the 
government budget. The Central Bank of Turkmenistan systematically lends at extremely 
concessional or zero interest rates to selected projects, so the government budget may not 
reflect actual levels of spending.12 The growth of the money supply, discussed later, seems 
to indicate that this is the case.
The Uzbek performance does seem to fit nicely with changes in their inflation path in 
that a significant decline in the budget deficit appears to precede the major fall in inflation. 
Tajikistan’s performance also fits reasonably well, with a decline in inflation following the 
major decrease in budget deficit. Kazakstan’s performance does not fit so closely, 
although it may be possible to associate the deterioration in budget deficit until 1995 with 
the prolonged high inflation seen there until that year.
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Figure 6.19 Overall surplus/deficit o f central government budget, 1993-2001 
(per cent of GDP)
Fter cent 
of GDP
-------Kazakstan
-------Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
-------Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Sources: Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003: education fo r  global participation, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila. Available online at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ 
Key_Indicators/2003/default.asp [accessed 19 June 2004). Gürgen, E. et al., 1999. Economic Reforms in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. IMF Occasional Paper 183, 
IMF, Washington, DC.
Perhaps surprisingly, Kyrgyzstan has not been especially good at restraining budget 
deficits. The Kyrgyz government has struggled to lim it the fiscal imbalance, only really 
bringing it under control by the turn of the century. Its fiscal performance has certainly not 
been spectacular compared to that o f other Central Asian republics. During the extreme 
inflationary period of the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan’s fiscal deficit was of the same 
magnitude as seen in the other Central Asian republics (Figure 6.19).
Extrapolating from this general overview, we would expect ( if we disregard our 
scepticism) to find that Turkmenistan experienced minimal inflation; Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan experienced short bursts of hyperinflation in the early years of transition 
followed by a slow decline in Uzbekistan, and a renewed burst of inflation in Kazakstan 
in 1998-99 associated with a deterioration in the government’s fiscal position in 1998. We 
would also expect Kyrgyzstan to have experienced protracted inflation at higher levels 
than seen in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan given its inability to restrain large budget deficits. 
And Tajikistan would have had very prolonged high inflation.
This has not happened. So, we must ask: why have deficits not always translated into 
inflation? The answer is that not all ways of financing deficits have the same impact; the 
critical factor is whether deficits change the money supply. Thus, where governments 
have been able to avoid monetising deficits, inflation has usually been controlled.
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Growth of the money supply. Money supply dynamics bear this out to some extent. 
Kyrgyzstan was able to curtail rapidly the expansion of its money supply, substantially 
reducing emissions by 1994, and further in 1996. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan experienced 
massive expansions in the money supply in the early years of the transition period but 
brought these under some control in 1995— the same year that inflation was initially 
reduced in these republics, giving credence to the theory that monetised deficits were 
responsible for the brunt of inflation (Figure 6.20).
Turkmenistan, as we would expect, maintained a far looser monetary policy, 
apparently bringing monetary emissions under control only in 1997-99. There is little 
doubt that the prolonged hyperinflation in Turkmenistan was due to poor monetary policy. 
The money supply grew by over 500 per cent in 1995 and was still growing at over 200 
per cent per annum in 1996. As mentioned before, this is despite the ostensibly healthy 
budget performance. Two factors are key here. First, off-budget operations, particularly 
Central Bank credit, dominate most of the country’s major economic sectors, directly 
contributing to money supply growth (IMF 1999b). Second, the statistics are probably 
false. It is difficult to know how far to credit the Turkmen statistics, but I am inclined to 
believe that quasi-fiscal deficits, growth of the money supply and inflationary pressure 
remain prevalent in Turkmenistan. The evidence for making this judgment is mixed. 
Natural gas exports have revived since 1997, providing a source of revenue to the
Figure 6.20 Central Asia: changes in money supply, 1992-2001 (per cent per annum)
------- Kazakstan
------- Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
------- Turkmenistan
------- Uzbekistan
Sources: Asian Development Bank, 2003. . Key Indicators 2003: education for global participation, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila. Available online at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ 
Key_Indicators/2003/default.asp laccessed 19 June 2004], Asian Development Bank, 1997. Asian 
Development Outlook, 1997 and 1998, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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government and its agencies. On the other hand, until 2001 the black market value of the 
manat persistently declined against the US dollar, reflecting either decreased value or 
decreased confidence in the currency, which implies the currency was losing value 
through inflation.13 Furthermore, measures of inflation in Turkmenistan are distorted by 
the repression of this inflation through continuing price controls on key goods.
Tajikistan represents a puzzle in that it appears to have controlled the money supply 
even in the early years of transition. A number of explanations for the inflation there may 
tentatively be advanced: (1) the statistics are wrong, (2) disruptions caused by the civil 
war may have caused non-monetary price rises, and (3) Tajikistan’s continued use of the 
Russian Rouble may have had effects not accounted for under the money supply measure 
used here.
How is it that Kyrgyzstan was able to control the money supply, despite persistent 
budget deficits, when other Central Asian republics could not? The answer lies in the forms 
of deficit finance discussed in section 3.3— internal finance could be obtained through 
domestic borrowing and monetisation; external finance through external borrowing, 
including foreign aid. The choice of finance for budget deficits was an integral 
determinant of inflation performance. Governments that could borrow money controlled 
inflation; governments that had Lo rely on printing money to finance deficits did not.
So, controlling inflation did not just come down to controlling deficits (although that is the 
simplest way), the speed with which governments could adopt less inflationary forms of 
deficit finance was critical. In Central Asia, this typically meant foreign loans and/or bond 
issues.
6.2.3 The special role of foreign loans
Kyrgyzstan has been the region’s stand-out performer in accessing foreign loans to 
finance budget deficits, usually on concessional terms (Table 6.4).14 Kyrgyzstan, and later 
Tajikistan, have replaced Soviet-era subsidies from the Union centre with borrowing (on 
concessional terms) from foreign sources. As Askar Akaev, President of the Kyrgyz
Table 6.4 Central Asian republics: foreign financing of budget deficits, 1993-2001 
(per cent of all finance)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Kazakstan n.a n.a n.a n.a 75.3 37.2 47.0 125.7 35.1
Kyrgyzstan 21.2 55.9 45.6 52.4 82.1 93.4 127.1 24.9 -65.1
Tajikistan3 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.3 32.9 62.0 103.1 507.0 539.7
Turkmenistan n.a 5.0 -3.0 -115.2 -1627.8 -2.8 n.a n.a n.a
Uzbekistan -10.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 27.9 n.a n.a n.a
Note: a Tajikistan has large net negative levels of domestic finance in 2000-2001, which suggests that 
the government was borrowing from external sources to repay domestic sources in these years.
Sources: Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003: education for global participation, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila. Available online at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ 
Key_Indicators/2003/default.asp [accessed 19 June 2004]; International Monetary Fund, 1999. 
Turkmenistan: recent economic developments, IMF Staff Country Report 99/140, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; International Monetary Fund, 2000. Republic of Uzbekistan: recent 
economic developments, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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Republic, has written, ‘[c]learly international assistance to Kyrgyzstan has compensated 
for the loss of the annual subsidies provided by Moscow in the Soviet era’ (Akaev 
2001:84). This has allowed it to avoid monetising its persistent deficits, and consequently 
allowed it restrain inflation.
In this regard, Kyrgyzstan was able to limit the large external shock imposed by the 
withdrawal of subsidies from the Union centre. None of the other republics have been 
able to access foreign lending so extensively and on such favourable terms as has 
Kyrgyzstan. This is a clear pay-off from the reform approach, and more recently a pay-off 
from the judicious sale to the United States and Russia of the right to establish military 
bases in the country. Unfortunately, the pay-off has resulted from the appearance of 
progress given by the aggressive reform program, assiduously marketed to international 
lenders, rather than by actual structural change.
6.2.4 Inflation and reform in Central Asia
Proponents of big-bang reform have argued that rapid reforms, particularly privatisation, 
are instrumental in reducing budget deficits and consequently inflation (see Chapters 2 
and 3). At first sight, the Central Asian experience would seem to support this:
Kyrgyzstan, one of the region’s most advanced reformers, managed to control inflation 
rapidly and early. And one of the region’s tardiest reformers, Turkmenistan, has been the 
slowest to control inflation (see Chapter 4).
Far from supporting this, however, the Kyrgyz case contradicts it. Inflation there was 
controlled before the extensive reforms really began, and reforms there were singularly 
unsuccessful in influencing budget deficits (see Timirbaev 2004). What the reforms did 
do, however, was induce a willingness amongst international organisations and donor 
agencies, and some foreign governments, to finance an unsustainable deficit. It is this 
finance, quite extraordinary in the region, that has effected the seemingly spectacular 
inflationary performance. As a simple mental exercise, one could ask what would have 
happened if Kyrgyzstan had, like the other Central Asian republics, been unable to access 
external, concessional, finance. Quite simply, expenditures would necessarily have been 
sharply reduced, exacerbating the already disastrous levels of poverty, or the government 
would have been compelled to borrow money from the central bank, just as the other 
Central Asian governments were forced to do. This, obviously, would have led to a 
serious outbreak of inflation.
Two points need to be made here. Kyrgyzstan’s unusually good inflation performance 
is as much due to external factors—in this case, the willingness of external creditors and 
donors to finance Kyrgyz government budget operations, but not those of other Central 
Asian governments— as was Uzbekistan’s ability to limit the output decline. If this were a 
case of pure foreign aid, Tajikistan surely would have received more aid and lending given 
the scale of its economic collapse and the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the civil war. 
This did not happen, and Kyrgyzstan received, per capita, 2.5 times the amount of foreign 
grants and concessional loans that Tajikistan received during the 1990s (see section 6.3.8).
Kyrgyzstan was able to overcome the disruption created by the withdrawal of Soviet 
subsidies, not by actual structural change (in terms of the budget deficit, this has not really 
happened yet), but by appealing to international institutions’ ideologically-determined
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willingness to lend. There is no doubt that, had these institutions chosen to assist 
Uzbekistan and not Kyrgyzstan, we would now be marvelling at Uzbekistan’s excellent 
inflation performance and maligning Kyrgyzstan’s execrable performance. Thus, 
Kyrgyzstan’s ability to take up externally-provided opportunities was a deciding factor in 
its impressive inflation performance.
Second, while foreign lending has allowed Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to control or avoid 
inflation in the short term, in the longer term it presents another, possibly worse, problem— 
foreign debt. Both countries are heavily in debt, with accumulated debt exceeding gross 
national income (see section 6.3.8). Foreign debt peaked in 1999 at more than 140 per 
cent of gross national income in Kyrgyzstan, and more than 120 per cent in Tajikistan.
The level has dropped in recent years, reflecting improved national income figures, but 
debt and debt repayments will still present a problem for policymakers in the future.
6.2.5 Conclusion
Inflation in the Central Asian republics, as in most economies, is closely related to growth 
in the money supply. Transition theory suggests that growth in the money supply in 
transition economies is associated with fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits, and that the speed 
and extent of reform were critical factors in reducing the levels of these deficits. The 
Central Asian experience generally supports the idea that fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits 
are important determinants of inflation performance, but provides some key exceptions. 
Some republics were able to continue running deficits but avoid monetising by accessing 
foreign loans. Kyrgyzstan and later Tajikistan were the prime examples of this strategy; 
they were able to take advantage of exogenous opportunities presented by external bodies 
to postpone the shock occasioned by disruption of Soviet subsidies.
6.3 T r a d e  a n d  e x t e r n a l  b a l a n c e
6.3.1 Central Asian merchandise trade
The disruption of trade relations is widely regarded as one of the most important 
contributing factors to the decline seen throughout the FSU.15 The Central Asian 
Republics have, generally, been able to redirect trade to new partners over the course of 
the 1990s. Merchandise trade volumes have increased in all the Central Asian republics, 
but most spectacularly in Kazakstan.
Goods trade has followed different paths in the various Central Asian republics. 
Merchandise trade values— for both exports and imports— have generally increased in all 
of the republics since the transition period began. The one exception to this general trend 
is Uzbekistan, where both imports and exports increased in value during the late 1990s 
but subsequently fell back to around their initial levels (Table 6.5). The most striking trade 
growth has taken place in Kazakstan, where both imports and exports have grown 
considerably. The value of Kazakstan’s imports has doubled, and the value of its exports 
tripled, over the period 1994-2002. Kyrgyzstan has increased both imports and exports at 
about the same rate, occasionally suffering trade deficits. Tajikistan shows a similar 
pattern. There, imports increased from US$0.25 billion in 1992 to US$0.72 billion in 
2002, close to 300 per cent growth; but exports have grown even more strongly from
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Table 6.5 Central Asian republics: merchandise exports and imports, 1992-2002 
(US$bn)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Merchandise imports
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
3.56 3.81 4.24 4.30 4.24 3.68 5.05 6.36 6.49
0.42 0.45 0.32 0.52 0.84 0.71 0.84 0.60 0.55 0.47 0.59
0.25 0.63 0.55 0.81 0.67 0.75 0.71 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.72
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
1.47 1.36 1.01 1.18 1.01 1.19 1.78 2.25 2.12
2.60 2.75 4.71 4.19 3.13 3.01 2.85 3.02 2.45
Merchandise exports
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
3.23 5.25 5.91 6.50 5.34 5.59 9.13 8.65 9.71
0.32 0.40 0.34 0.41 0.51 0.60 0.51 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.49
0.19 0.35 0.49 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.60 0.67 0.78 0.65 0.74
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
2.15 1.88 1.68 0.75 0.59 1.16 2.50 2.70 2.85
2.55 2.82 4.21 4.03 3.22 3.03 3.23 3.11 2.65
Source: UNECE, 2004. Economic Survey of Europe, UNECE, Geneva.
US$0.19 billion to US$0.74 billion (389 per cent growth) over the same period.
Tajikistan achieved trade surpluses, albeit slight, more frequently than did Kyrgyzstan. As 
usual, the Turkmen data should be treated with suspicion, but the figures are not entirely 
implausible: export values fell considerably and more rapidly than import values in the 
blockade years of the late 1990s but both recovered through 1999-2002. Uzbekistan 
shows the opposite path, with both exports and imports increasing through the mid 1990s 
and falling subsequently. Uzbekistan has shifted to running trade surpluses fairly 
consistently since 1998, which may be a product of President Karimov’s drive for self- 
sufficiency but could equally indicate an improvement in Uzbekistan’s terms of trade.
All the republics have diversified export destinations away from CIS partners towards 
the rest of the world, but the extent and speed with which this has occurred has differed 
considerably. Similarly, all the republics except Tajikistan have diversified their import 
sources away from the CIS (Table 6.6-6.7). In the transition period, the ability rapidly to 
diversify exports away from CIS destinations often determined whether these countries 
received hard currency for their exports or even got paid at all for their products (see 
section 6.1).
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have all diversified export markets, but 
Uzbekistan pursued this far more rapidly than either Kazakstan or Kyrgyzstan. We might 
also tentatively note that Turkmenistan’s data are not inherently implausible—they suggest 
that Turkmenistan continues to direct a far higher proportion of its exports to CIS partners 
than its Central Asian neighbours, which is quite likely to be true given that Turkmenistan’s 
major export is natural gas, which is sold predominantly to Russia, the Ukraine and other 
CIS members. Tajikistan, according to the data, has decreased the share of its exports to 
CIS countries from approximately 43 per cent to 25 per cent. It is likely that this was a 
consequence of the war, which interrupted all production processes but was concentrated 
in the cotton-growing areas. This left aluminium as the primary export, and this was sold 
to Western countries.
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This pattern of diversification of exports reflects the fact that many of the region’s 
major products— gold, natural gas, oil and also aluminium— are also produced in the 
Russian Federation, the dominant economy in the region. The Russian Federation was the 
world’s sixth largest gold producer in 1999, its largest natural gas producer, its third 
largest producer of crude oil, and its second largest aluminium producer (Levine and 
Wallace 2000). There are, as a consequence, few trade complementarities between 
Central Asia and Russia—Central Asian production tends to form an adjunct to lower- 
cost domestic supply sources in the Russian Federation. The exception to this is of course 
raw cotton, of which the Russian Federation is the world’s eighth largest importer 
(.Australian Cottongrower 2000). On the other hand, given that total exports are 
increasing, the decreasing CIS share in exports reflects the success of the region’s 
economies in diversifying export destinations and finding new markets for their major 
products.
The CIS share in imports to the Central Asian republics has declined less rapidly 
(Table 6.7). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have moved furthest in this respect. The data 
suggest that the CIS share of imports reached approximately 35 per cent of all imports to 
Turkmenistan and 37 per cent to Uzbekistan in 2002. The pattern differed slightly 
between these countries. The CIS share of Uzbek imports followed a U-shape profile, 
falling away rapidly in the mid 1990s and recovering slightly at the turn of the century, 
whereas the profile of CIS share in Turkmen imports shows a more jerky profile: serious 
declines in 1995 and 1998 were followed by partial recoveries, a pattern which would 
seem to be associated with Turkmenistan’s difficulties exporting natural gas. Tajikistan, on
Table 6.6 Central Asian republics: merchandise exports to CIS countries as
proportion of total republican exports, 1992-2002 (per cent)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kazakstan 58.0 54.9 53.8 45.9 39.3 26.1 26.0 30.4 22.9
Kyrgyzstan 75.7 71.7 65.6 65.8 77.8 52.8 44.9 40.3 41.2 35.3 34.6
Tajikistan 43.5 35.1 18.9 33.6 43.0 36.6 34.0 46.9 47.6 32.5 25.4
Turkmenistan 77.0 49.4 63.7 60.1 25.6 50.3 52.0 51.9 51.9
Uzbekistan 62.1 39.3 21.1 33.2 24.6 26.8 35.3 34.1 26.4
Source: UNECE, 2004. Economic Survey of Europe, UNECE, Geneva.
Table 6.7 Central Asian republics: merchandise imports from CIS countries as 
proportion of total republican imports, 1992-2002 (per cent)
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
61.1 69.7 69.5 54.2 47.2 43.3 54.6 52.0 46.7
83.1 75.0 66.2 67.8 58.1 61.5 52.4 43.3 53.8 55.0 55.0
48.0 40.6 42.6 59.0 57.3 64.3 62.7 73.1 83.0 78.2 75.9
46.7 54.6 55.5 55.1 47.4 34.1 38.2 37.8 34.9
53.8 40.7 32.2 27.2 27.8 29.0 36.8 36.4 36.7
Source: UNECE, 2004. Economic Survey of Europe, UNECE, Geneva.
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the other hand, has actually increased the share of its imports sourced from CIS 
economies. The explanation for this can be found in the composition of Tajik imports, 
which are dominated by fuels and chemical products, most of which continue to be 
sourced from neighbours. This, however, does not explain why the CIS share would have 
been so low in the early years of the transition. The slower decline in imports sourced 
from the CIS in the Central Asian republics probably reflects exchange rate variations— 
imports of CIS products are inevitably far cheaper than the equivalent sourced outside the 
CIS.16
6.3.2 Kazakstan
Kazakstan’s merchandise trade has been dominated by rapid growth in exports, 
particularly the increased share of oil and gas in the value of exports. In this regard, 
mineral product export values have risen from US$1533 million in 1995 to US$5951 
million in 2002—over two times larger than the next most important Kazak export (base 
metals), and over ten times larger than the third (chemical products). The share of 
manufactured goods in Kazak exports has fallen considerably, driven by a fall in the 
proportion of chemicals and other manufactured goods’, reflecting the overall hollowing 
out of the manufacturing sector in Kazakstan (Asian Development Bank 2003).
Kazakstan’s import structure has shown staggering change. Approximately 75 per cent 
of all Kazak imports are now manufactured goods, up from 58.3 in 1995 (UNCTAD 
n.d.). The bulk of this increase has occurred in imports of machinery and transport 
equipment. Animals and animal product imports have increased strongly, as have those of 
vegetable imports—by 240 per cent in the case of animal products—which corresponds 
with the fall in domestic meat production noted in section 6.1.4. This has been offset by 
decreased imports of mineral products and especially fuels— fuel imports fell from 25.1 
per cent of all imports in 1995 to 12.7 per cent in 2001— reflecting the development of 
Kazakstan’s oil and gas sector, production of which grew 72 and 95 per cent respectively 
over 1995-2000 (CIS Statistics Committee 2001; UNCTAD n.d.). What seems to be 
happening in Kazakstan is a shift towards the production and export of raw materials, 
particularly oil and natural gas, and the extensive development of this sector has required 
imports of large volumes of industrial equipment, that is, manufactured goods, which are 
increasingly sourced outside the CIS.
6.3.3 Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan has diversified its export markets, but has done so more slowly than either 
Kazakstan or Uzbekistan. Its import sources have shifted more slowly still. Imports have 
grown at around the same speed as exports, leaving the trade balance basically 
unchanged. On the export side, a number of different trends can be discerned. First and 
most important is the boom in exports of precious stones and metals starting from 1997, 
which is almost exclusively due to production of gold at the Kumtor mine. This has been 
offset to some extent, however, by a severe reduction in the value of manufactured goods 
exports, the share of which in total exports fell from 41.1 per cent to 21.7 per cent 
between 1995 and 2002. ‘Machinery, mechanical appliances and electrical equipment’ 
have been the lead industry in the decline of this sector; their export value fell by half 
between 1993 and 2002.
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Kyrgyzstan’s imports are now dominated by manufactured goods, and to a lesser 
extent fuels (UNCTAD n.d.; CIS Statistics Committee 2001). The primary growth 
categories have been machinery, mechanical appliances and electrical equipment; 
chemical products; and plastics and rubber. Imports of machinery, appliances and 
equipment peaked in 1996 and have since tapered off considerably, so it is likely that they 
were associated with the development of the Kumtor gold mine. Chemical products and 
plastics and rubber imports have grown more steadily but similarly show peaks in 1997- 
98 and also 2002. This has been offset to some extent by a decrease in the value of 
vegetable product imports from US$65 million in 1993 to US$21.7 million in 2002 
(Asian Development Bank 2003).
6.3.4 Tajikistan
Tajikistan’s total goods trade has increased markedly in the period 1993-2002. The value 
of imports climbed from US$0.25 billion to US$0.72 billion and the value of exports 
increased from US$0.19 billion to US$0.74 billion over this period. As noted above, the 
pattern of export and import destinations has been somewhat strange. In terms of exports, 
aluminium remains the single largest export commodity, accounting for over half of 
Tajikistan’s exports in 2001. Export values of Tajik aluminium increased through the 
1990s, and their destinations moved predominantly to non-CIS countries. Almost half 
(48.7 per cent) of Tajikistan’s aluminium exports in early 2003 were to Turkey and 37 per 
cent to the Netherlands.17 Exports of Tajikistan’s other major export, cotton fibre, initially 
increased but entered a serious decline after 1997.
Given the available data, it is difficult to move beyond the broad picture in terms of 
Tajikistan’s major imports. Alumina remains the single most important import, increasing 
in volume and value through the decade.18 Combined, fuels— oil and natural gas— 
represent a very large proportion of Tajikistan’s import demand, but imports of these 
products have remained fairly steady.
Electricity trade has exhibited an unusual pattern in that electricity is one of Tajikistan’s 
major exports, and also one of its major imports, reflecting the peculiarities of the Central 
Asian electricity grid, which was designed in Soviet times with little regard for republican 
boundaries. Tajikistan’s major electricity plants are located in the south and mainly export 
electricity to neighbouring regions in Uzbekistan, but these plants are not connected with 
the north of the country, which is compelled to import electricity from Uzbekistan (Petrov 
2003). In the early years of the transition period, Tajikistan was an occasional net 
electricity exporter, but this has since changed and it has become a fairly consistent net 
importer, in spite of its extensive hydro-electric resources.
This pattern of exports and imports may explain some of the curious developments in 
export/import relationships since 1992. While Tajikistan’s major exports— aluminium and 
cotton fibre—can be, and have been, directed to world markets, its CIS neighbours are 
sole or cheapest sources for its major imports, such as natural gas, oil, electricity, grain 
and flour. A considerable proportion of Tajikistan’s alumina imports are supplied by the 
Ukraine,19 gas and oil by other Central Asian republics, and most of its grain imports by 
Kazakstan and Russia.20
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6.3.5 Turkmenistan
As noted above, Turkmenistan’s merchandise imports and exports do not seem to have 
grown particularly rapidly in the transition period. If we are to take the data at face value, 
the value of imports basically followed a U-shape profile, dropping through 1996-98 and 
recovering strongly in 2000-2002. The source of imports has apparently diversified 
somewhat during this time. The value of exports followed a similar U-shape pattern. This 
is likely to be a reasonably close to the truth, reflecting Turkmenistan’s difficulties in 
exporting natural gas through the mid to late 1990s and the subsequent successes in 
negotiating deals with both Iran and with Russia’s Gazprom,21 although we may doubt 
the scale of the recovery.
Exports are dominated, as one would expect, by changes in natural gas exports. These 
fell from US$1860 million in 1993 and US$1021 million in 1996 to US$273.7 million, 
$69.5 million and $388.22 million in the years 1997-99. This was because Turkmenistan 
was unwilling to sell gas at the prices then offered by Russia and Ukraine and also to 
continue exporting to Ukraine when that country had been unable to repay the hundreds 
of millions of dollars of debt accumulated on previous natural gas imports (Lubin 1999). 
Natural gas revenues have since apparently recovered to US$1642.7 million in 2002 
(Asian Development Bank 2003). There is little reason to doubt the scale of the 
contraction indicated by these statistics. Some healthy scepticism should be applied to the 
recovery implied by the statistics for 2000-2002, but the notion of a recovery in Turkmen 
natural gas exports during this period is not as such inherently ludicrous, though we may 
doubt its scale. The available statistics suggest that, in this time, exports of petrochemicals 
and crude oil have also grown, from US$221 million in 1995 to US$746 million in 2002 
(Asian Development Bank 2003). This growth, however, has been offset by a rapid 
decline in the value of cotton fibre exports, from US$428 million in 1993 to US$48 
million in 2002. Again there is little reason to doubt these statistics—the Turkmen 
authorities have no reason to exaggerate the fall in one of their prime industries. 
Curiously, the value of manufactures exports—basic manufactures and machines and 
transport equipment— seems to have grown strongly, rising from US$63.5 to US$167.7 
between 1997 and 2002, but available statistics do not extend back beyond 1997 and 
should be interpreted with caution anyway (Asian Development Bank 2003).
On the import side, imports of foodstuffs have fallen considerably, probably reflecting 
the Turkmen authorities’ drive towards self-sufficiency. Interestingly, foodstuffs imports 
collapsed in 1998, the year after the natural gas export problems intensified. On the other 
hand, the value of manufactured imports has grown across-the-board, with the major 
growth coming in imports of machines and transport equipment, which increased from 
US$428 million to US$857.6 million between 1996 and 2002, peaking at US$1204.7 in
2001. Unlike foodstuffs and fats and oils, imports of manufactured goods were relatively 
unaffected by the events of 1997.
6.3.6 Uzbekistan
Judging by the statistics presented in Table 6.5, the value of Uzbekistan’s imports and 
exports followed an n-shape profile, rising in the mid-1990s, but falling again in 2000-
2002. During this time, Uzbekistan has diversified its export destinations and import
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sources away from traditional CIS partners. This is hardly surprising given the ease with 
which Uzbekistan’s principal exports could be redirected to raise hard currency on 
international markets.22
Little useful trade data is available, but what is available implies a steady fall in the 
value of Uzbek cotton fibre exports throughout the period, from US$ 1172 million in 1993 
and US$1508 million in 1994 to around US$669 in 2002, offset by a rise in the value of 
gold exports in 1995-97 (Asian Development Bank 2003; World Bank 2003c). Because 
of the highly aggregated nature of the rest of the data, however, it quite difficult to make 
any concrete judgments. It seems likely that the mainstays of Uzbek exports remain 
cotton, gold and to a lesser extent fuels, but this is little more than a guess made with the 
benefit of additional World Bank (2003c) statistics. On the import side, the major product 
category seems to be machinery, which accounted for 46 per cent of all imports in 2002. 
Again, however, at this level of aggregation, it is difficult to make a thorough assessment.
6.3.7 Current account
The current account performance of most Central Asian republics has not been 
particularly good. Most suffered alarming current account deficits in the early years of 
transition from the trade dislocation and terms-of-trade shock induced by the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution, but all were able to reduce the current account deficit to within five 
per cent of GDP by 2001 (Figure 6.21).
Figure 6.21 Central Asian republics: current account balance, 1993-2002
(per cent o f GDP)
10 Percent
-------Kazakstan
-------Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
-------Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003: education for global participation, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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In most cases, however, the poor current account performance has not reflected 
problems with negative net exports (see Table 6.5). Instead, it has reflected difficulties 
with net interest payments and service flows— all of the Central Asian republics appear to 
be net service importers, and most have had net negative income flows.23
Kyrgyzstan is a regional exception in that it frequently suffers a negative trade balance 
in addition to the services trade income flow deficits. Of the non-goods components of the 
current account, the services deficit is high but seems to have declined in recent years.
The net income component, on the other hand, is negative and growing, up from 
US$35.4 million in 1995 to $89.4 million in 2000 and $64.6 in 2001 (IMF 2003b). Net 
transfers are positive, totalling US$76 million in 2000 and $19.1 million in 2001.
Turkmenistan’s catastrophic current account deficit in 1997-98 was clearly related to 
its export problems (see above), and the current account’s apparent subsequent recovery 
to generally positive levels is not entirely implausible, given revival of Turkmen exports. 
Turkmenistan does not yet appear have a serious problem with interest payments, unlike 
most of the other Central Asian economies. Rather, the negative influence on the current 
account deficit appears to be driven by expenditure on construction services, which 
reportedly accounted for 39 and 58 per cent of net services imports in 1996 and 1997 
respectively, with transport another major contributor to service imports (IMF 1999b).
Kazakstan, despite its very strong net export performance, continues to experience 
occasional current account deficit problems, related to its net negative trade in services 
and interest income flows to foreign investors in Kazakstan. Net services imports in 2001 
(US$ 1518 million) completely wiped out the goods trade surplus (US$1516 million), and 
net income payments (US$ 1110 million), mostly to direct investors, contributed most of 
the rest of the current account deficit in that year (IMF 2003c).
The current account position in Tajikistan has moderated somewhat, reflecting some 
improvements in export performance. Tajikistan has also experienced a number of years 
of services trade surplus, but net income is negative and equivalent to a fairly high 
proportion of the overall current account deficit in most years, ranging from a low of 39 
per cent in 2001 to a high of 153 per cent in 1999 (IMF 2003d). It is thought, however, 
that remittances from Tajik labourers, predominantly working in Russia, represent a huge 
proportion of both GDP and income flows. For example, Tajikistan’s Minister for Labour 
and Social Security, Mamadsho Ilolov, claimed in April 2004 that the country received the 
equivalent of 20 per cent of its annual GDP as remittances from Tajik emigrant labourers 
(.ITAR-TASS, 29 April 2004).
Uzbekistan’s current account has generally been negative, but at relatively moderate 
levels. Since 1998, it has run a surplus on merchandise trade but has been a net importer 
of services, particularly transport services. In recent years, interest payments have become 
a major contributor to the negative side of the Uzbek current account balance (IMF 
2000c).
Does reform approach have any role in this? The short answer would have to be no.
Of the region’s faster reformers, Kazakstan was able to bring its current account deficit 
under some kind of control before 2001, Kyrgyzstan was not and had the worst current 
account problems of all the republics. There are two obvious reasons for this: it had a
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poor export base and it quickly ran up comparatively huge levels of foreign debt and thus 
incurred interest repayments throughout the decade. Kazakstan, on the other hand, has a 
strong trade surplus and managed to lim it the growth of its external debt before 1998.
Uzbekistan, a slower reformer, has experienced basically the same pattern as 
Kazakstan, albeit at less severe levels and for different reasons. Turkmenistan, as we 
noted before, experienced two years of stunningly bad current account deficit, but has 
(probably) since recovered, running occasional current account surpluses. Again, 
however, Turkmenistan’s problems were not created by the lack of reform, but by external 
constraints that imposed an exogenous shock to its export base. Tajikistan, a delayed 
reformer, performed poorly but marginally better than its rapid-reforming neighbour 
Kyrgyzstan, despite half a decade of civil war and repeated interruptions to its export 
routes.
6.3.8 Foreign debt and foreign aid assistance
The pattern of foreign debt accumulation in the Central A.sian republics has also differed 
considerably but, given that all the republics entered the transition period with no foreign 
debt at all, none can claim particularly impressive performance. As of 2001, external debt 
ranged between a low of about 40 per cent o f gross national income in Uzbekistan and a 
high of 120 percent in Kyrgyzstan (Figure 6.22).
Not surprisingly, the smaller, less well-endowed nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
have incurred the largest amounts of foreign debt. This concurs with Helbling et al. 
(2004), who found that those countries that have suffered the largest and most prolonged
Figure 6.22 Central Asian republics: foreign debt as a proportion of gross national 
income, 1992-2001 (percent)
Per cent 
of GNI
-------Kazakstan
------- Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
-------Uzbekistan
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003: education for global participation, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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current account deficits have also generated the highest levels of external debt. Turkmenistan 
was able initially to restrain its foreign debt levels, but seems to have lost control around 
1996-97. This was likely exacerbated by the politically-motivated urge to maintain an 
extensive network of subsidies even when the main way of financing these subsidies— 
revenues from natural gas exports—was lost. That few external data are available for 
Turkmenistan, and none after 1998, suggests that the situation has not improved greatly 
since then, but this is purely speculation. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have had the best 
performances in the region, but Uzbekistan, according to this data, performed better from 
1999 onwards. Kazakstan issued a new round of government bonds in late 1999 
(maturing in October 2004), which explains the apparent increase in Kazakstan’s debt in 
later years.24
The nature of this debt differs considerably between the republics. Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan in particular have been able to access foreign loans on extremely ‘loose’ terms, 
under which the interest rates charged are lower than market rates and/or the repayment 
term longer, deferring repayment further into the future. Table 6.8 shows ADB statistics 
for the grant element of foreign debt,25 and indicates that far higher proportions of Kyrgyz 
and Tajik debt than that of the other republics are on concessional terms.
Kyrgyzstan has been the outstanding recipient of concessional financial flows even at 
absolute levels, receiving a total of US$1992 million over the period 1992-2001. 
Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have also received considerable amounts of such 
aid since 1992, receiving between US$940 million and $1150 million each over the 
course of the decade. These figures, however, conceal the true extent of the subvention 
this represents in the individual republics. Over 1992-2001, Kyrgyzstan received on 
average US$199.2 million per year. This translates to US$40 per capita per annum, or 13 
per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s 2001 GDP. Tajikistan came second, receiving on average 
US$15.4 per capita per annum, or 8.9 per cent of its 2001 GDP. The equivalent figures 
for Kazakstan were US$7.4 per capita, or 0.5 per cent of 2001 GDP; for Turkmenistan, 
US$6.0 and 0.5 per cent; and, for Uzbekistan, US$4.4 per capita and 1.0 per cent of its 
2001 GDP (UNCTAD n.d.).
We can only speculate on why exactly international lenders have been so 
overwhelmingly interested in supporting Kyrgyzstan so much more than its neighbours, 
including poverty and war-stricken Tajikistan, but ideology probably plays a role. And we 
can only imagine what the macroeconomic effects would have been had this aid not been
Table 6.8 Central Asian republics: grant element in foreign debt, 1992-2001 
(per cent)
1 9 9 2 1993 1994 1995 1996 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1999 2 0 0 0 2001
K a za k sta n 7.3 14.1 22 .6 22 .3 15.1 2 1 .2 34 .3 7.8 13 .7 35 .6
K yrgyzstan 1 9 .7 38 .6 66 .5 5 0 .4 61 .4 4 5 .7 65 .9 58 .8 76 .4 69.1
T ajik istan 26 .4 34 .4 9.6 0 .0 8 0 .7 8 1 .5 78 .4 75 .2 78 .7 71 .0
T urkm enistan • • • 24 .3 14 .7 11.9 16 .7 13 .8 9 .7
U zb ek ista n 11.2 23 .4 10.5 23 .6 2 9 .7 16 .6 2 2 .3 25 .0 19 .2 24 .4
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003: education for global participation, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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Table 6.9 Central Asian republics: official financial flows, 1992-2001
1992 1993
Concessional finance
(Official Development Assistance)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Kazakstan 12 18 53 66 125 140 223 175 189 148 1149
Kyrgyzstan 24 112 174 285 231 240 240 283 215 188 1992
Tajikistan 12 26 67 65 103 86 161 123 142 159 944
Turkmenistan 9 31 26 28 24 12 24 24 32 72 282
Uzbekistan 62 63 28 84 88 140 158 155 186 153 1117
Non-concessional finance 
(Other Official Flows)
Kazakstan 26 42 353 371 367 265 654 213 89 124 2504
Kyrgyzstan 2 35 18 54 73 15 -2 4 -3 -27 169
Tajikistan 9 56 16 4 0 8 3 4 1 -1 100
Turkmenistan 13 108 17 5 30 37 52 161 162 58 643
Uzbekistan 3 127 -18 203 71 38 109 198 138 223 1092
Notes: Official Development Assistance from bilateral and multilateral sources consists of loans with a 
grant element of 25 per cent or more. Other Official Flows are loans targeted towards economic 
development or welfare improvement in the recipient country that have a grant element of less than 25 
per cent. It includes loans from both bilateral and multilateral sources.
Source: UNCTAD, n.d. Handbook of Statistics, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Geneva. Available online at http://www.unctad.org/ [accessed 19 June 2004].
available. Given that Tajikistan received most of its aid from 1996 onwards, however, we 
can have some idea— GDP would have collapsed further than it did, and inflation would 
probably have reached the levels seen in neighbouring countries. Thus, the foreign 
finance allowed the Kyrgyz government to avoid the upheavals generated when subsidies 
from the Soviet centre were withdrawn (Osmonaliev and Koichumanov 2004). This does 
seem to be a pay-off to the reform approach: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have not had 
good relations with the multilateral institutions, resisting the constraints these institutions 
would impose as a condition of lending. Kyrgyzstan took the opposite approach, 
assiduously assuring multilateral institutions of its willingness to implement such 
conditions, and hence got the bulk of the aid flows to the region.
In 2002, facing impending debt crisis, Kyrgyzstan convinced Paris Club creditors to 
reschedule US$99 million of debt due for repayment in 2001-04. The agreement means 
that this amount, comprising both concessional and commercial debt, will be repaid over 
20 years (Paris Club 2002). This does not solve the problems, but postpones the crisis.
6.3.9 Foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) seems to be attracted in the first order to profit 
opportunities; the economic regime in place would seem to be a second-order priority in 
the region (Campos and Kinoshita 2003; Shiells 2003).26 Kazakstan has attracted close to 
all of the FDI into Central Asia since the transition began, to levels in the order of 10 
times the rest of the region combined. The first reason is obvious: Kazakstan has 
considerable resources, but development is needed before they can be exploited. The 
second reason is probably— and this is considerably more speculative— a government that 
is relatively open and eager to deal with foreign investors. Compare this with the Turkmen
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Table 6.10 Central Asian republics: net foreign direct investment, 1992-2002 
(US$ million)
1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 19 9 9  20 0 0 2001 20 0 2
K azak h stan 100 1271 6 6 0 9 6 4 1137 1320 1143 1 5 8 4  1278 27 9 6 21 3 8
K y rg y z  R ep u b lic 0 .0 10 38 9 6 4 7 8 3 8 7 38  - 7 -1 16
T ajikistan 9 9 12 10 18 18 25 21 2 4 9 36
T u rk m en istan n .a 79 1 0 3 2 3 3 108 108 6 2 12 5  126 170 100
U z b e k is ta n 9 48 73 - 2 4 90 16 7 14 0 121 75 83 65
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2003. Key Indicators 2003: education for global participation, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003. EBRD 
Transition Report 2003, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London.
situation, where there are obviously considerable opportunities for resource exploitation, 
but foreign investors are yet to take them up. The opaque nature of the Turkmen 
government, the perceptions of corruption, and so forth may be acting to dissuade 
potential investors (Lubin 1999). Nevertheless, FDI seems to have increased in recent 
years, making Turkmenistan the second largest investment destination in the region. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan face different circumstances, conditions for profitable 
investment are quite poor given these countries’ limited resources and other risk factors.
6.4 C o n c l u s io n
6.4.1 Output contraction and reform
All the economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union experienced severe 
contractions in GDP during the transition period, but the depth and extent of the 
contraction varied from country to country. Among the Central Asian republics, the 
severity and extent depended on each republic’s economic structure at independence, its 
ability to redirect production towards world markets and minimise the dislocation of the 
Soviet collapse, and its ability to recoup payments for exports, particularly in hard 
currency. Republics that could redirect their production to world markets and derive hard 
currency from its sale were able to minimise the post-Soviet dislocation. In Tajikistan, of 
course, civil war was the major factor.
In this respect, Uzbekistan was most successful, exporting cotton and gold to world 
markets, at highly favourable prices, in return for hard currency. Turkmenistan, on the other 
hand, had a highly marketable product but suffered transport and payment difficulties, 
which prompted economic crisis in the latter half of the 1990s. Tajikistan experienced the 
dislocations of a civil war, a less opportune product mix, and transport difficulties, and 
consequently suffered one of the worst economic declines of transition economy. 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan were the republics most integrated into Soviet production 
processes. As a consequence, when the Soviet system collapsed, the manufacturing 
sectors of these economies fell apart as their links with, and subsidies from, the Soviet 
centre disappeared. It has taken time and considerable investment for alternative industries 
to develop— gold mining in Kyrgyzstan and hydrocarbons in Kazakstan— which has 
been the prime influence on their economic performance in the post-Soviet period.
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In all cases, however, the scale of the collapse and the pace of the recovery have not 
depended on reform speed or approach. Instead, as noted above, they have depended on 
factors beyond the policy sphere— initial economic structure, world markets and prices, 
and transport constraints. The problem here is that reform could play little role in 
influencing transition performance— it could not, for example, rapidly create markets for 
Kazak and Kyrgyz industrial output to replace those lost with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. It could not, moreover, have helped Turkmenistan and Tajikistan maintain 
effective transport links with the wider world, and could not have forced buyers of 
Turkmen natural gas to pay reasonable prices, or to pay at all, for that gas.
6.4.2 Inflation and economic reform
Very high levels of inflation characterised the early transition period in Central Asia, as it 
did throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This inflation was a function 
of growth in the money supply, and in most cases this was determined by fiscal deficits. 
There were exceptions, however, in that Kyrgyzstan ran very large budget deficits 
throughout the transition period, but had the best inflation performance. This is important 
because Kyrgyzstan’s good inflation performance has been erroneously attributed to its 
reform approach, where in reality it is explained by Kyrgyzstan’s ability to finance deficits 
with foreign aid and grants on extremely concessional terms. Thus, what determined 
inflation in the region was not strictly fiscal deficits, but monetisation of fiscal deficits: 
those countries that could avoid monetising deficits were able to minimise inflation (for 
example, Kyrgyzstan through foreign aid and Kazakstan through bond issues).
6.4.3 External developments and reform
External developments— in terms of foreign trade and its diversification, current account 
deficits; and foreign debt, aid and investment—have clearly been integral to the Central 
Asian republics’ transition performance. Foreign trade developments and current account 
performance were not obviously related to reform speed or approach, hence reform was 
not related to external stability more broadly. In terms of foreign aid, Kyrgyzstan was by 
far the biggest recipient in the region, followed by Tajikistan; the other republics have not 
been anywhere near as successful in attracting foreign aid, which raises questions about 
what criteria such aid is given on. In this case, reform approach seems to have determined 
the outcome: Kyrgyzstan was able to access large quantities of foreign aid, which allowed 
it to avoid restructuring and to run fiscal deficits for far longer without inflationary 
consequences. But this has merely postponed Kyrgyzstan’s adjustment— Kyrgyzstan has 
already run into difficulties repaying its debt, and the problem is not going away. 
Kazakstan was the largest recipient of foreign investment in Central Asia, followed by 
Turkmenistan, but this seems to be associated more with the opportunities there than 
reform speed or approach.
We must conclude, then, that domestic and external factors beyond the policy realm 
determined macroeconomic outcomes in the Central Asian republics. Reform, while 
extremely important, has had little influence on economic outcomes in the region so far.
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6.4.4 The impact of economics on economic and political reform
While the focus here has been on the impact of reforms on economic growth, it is 
important to consider the reverse— the impact of economic change and growth on reform. 
In terms of economic reform, renewed economic growth in the all the republics basically 
obviates the need for further reform in the short-term.27 The absence of economic crisis— 
renewed revenue flows and consequent capacity to fund infrastructure and social 
services— decreases the urgency for economic reform. This explains, to an extent the 
patterns of reform seen in Central Asia. In principle, there was no urgency for economic 
reform at independence in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, a fact that these republics’ leaders 
knew and exploited. Economic crisis in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, however, seems to 
have impelled reforms there— governments sense the need to do, or be seen to be doing, 
something to resolve the crisis. In Kyrgyzstan, this was especially important, as we have 
seen, because its economic strategy relied on infusions of funds from international donors, 
and these donors have a strong preference for liberal economies and a preference, albeit 
weaker, for democratic polities. As growth has revived in these countries, the urgency for 
reform has vanished. Renewed growth, therefore, has played a role in dampening the 
impetus for institutional, economic and political reform. Put another way: why reduce 
one’s power (say, through political reform), and potentially upset powerful interests, when 
there is nothing requiring such actions? This can go some way to explaining the political 
and institutional deterioration in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan in the second half of the 
1990s.
Second, the sources of economic growth may be influencing political and economic 
reforms. As was shown in Chapter 1 and also above, the Central Asian republics were 
heavily reliant on natural resources extraction at the beginning of the transition period, 
and they have become more so over the last decade. Now, all the republics are reliant to a 
large degree on the extraction and sale of minerals and/or hydrocarbons to generate 
revenue (or rents). The exception, of course, is Uzbekistan which is heavily reliant on the 
sale of cotton as well as the extraction and sale of gold, but the essential principle of large- 
scale rent flows still holds there. Ross (2001) argues that natural resource extraction 
which generates considerable rent flows is correlated with the presence of authoritarian 
regimes. He identifies three main strands of theory about why this might be so— the 
rentier effect, the repression effect, and the modernisation effect.28 In Central Asia, the 
problem is slightly different. Economic and political reform are a trade-off for the 
reforming politician: it will help some groups in society, but hinder others. Thus, the pay­
off to reform needs to be high enough to the politician for them to see it as worthwhile. 
Importantly, natural resource extraction firms do not need a strongly developed 
institutional basis underpinning the market economy, they simply need to be able extract 
the resources and get them out of the country relatively unencumbered. So, if such 
industries dominate economic activity, there will be little push for reform from the 
industrial sector. On the other hand, as North (1993) argues, more complex economies— 
those which involve extensive linkages across numerous firms, or involve firms 
undertaking more complex tasks than simply extracting minerals from the ground—will 
need reliable institutions to underpin their activity.29 They will require functioning and
6 MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 172
accountable regulatory institutions, coherent legislative frameworks, and effective 
impartial judiciaries. These are not things, for the reasons detailed in Chapter 5, that 
authoritarian regimes are not well equiped to provide.
Thus, the problem in Central Asia is not so much that the economic structure impedes 
democracy and economic reform, but that is does not require it. And, because there is no 
strongly-backed demand for increased political openness, there is no incentive for 
politicians to deliver it. Again, as the Kazak and Kyrgyz economies have come to be 
dominated by natural resource rents, economic reform has slowed, political reform has 
stopped, and institutional and governance reform have reversed. In short, the pay-off to 
political and economic reform is no longer great enough to make it worthwhile for the 
region’s politicians.
N otes
1 Long before the Uzbek puzzle was recognised as such, one prescient commentator wrote: ‘Uzbekistan is perhaps the 
luckiest of the new generation of landlocked Central A.sian republics; its principal exports- -gold and cctton—can 
both be airfreighted out to secure hard currency, while its increased oil production should soon secure savings of 
around $500m a year’ (East European Markets, 18 August 1995). In practice, it hasn’t quite worked this way, and 
Uzbekistan has had some difficulties getting its product to market. For example, the Uzbek government claimed in 
1997 that some consignments of cotton were being stolen en route by rail through Russia or the Ukraine, and the 
Uzbek government has struggled to prevent illegal cotton exports circumventing the low Uzbek procurement price 
(Zarudnaya 2003).
2 On the civil war’s effects on Tajik transport, see Gleason (2000).
3 See, for example, ITAR-TASS, 25 February 1993; reproduced in BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 5 March 
1993; ITAR-TASS, 15 October 1993; reproduced in BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 22 October 1993; and 
Tajik Radio First, 15 November 1996; reproduced in BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 22 November 1996.
4 The Zerafshan gold mine is a prominent example of this process. It commenced production as a joint venture 
between a Western mining concern and the Tajik government, and claims to be the largest private-sector employer in 
Tajikistan (http://avocet.co.uk/ZGCHistoryBackground.html [accessed 19 June 2004]).
5 For example, Gazprom was paying Turkmenistan $35-40/1000 cubic metres before April 2003, when the purchase 
price was revised to $44/1000 cubic meters plus goods in kind. Turkmen gas was selling for $110—120 in Central and 
Eastern Europe at the time, but it was thought that this could be reduced to $70-80 if Russia were bypassed. Either 
way, there appears to be a 100 per cent mark up at least on gas transiting Russia. Furthermore, the practice of barter 
is widespread and persistent: in July 2003, President Niyazov signed a deal to supply the Ukraine with natural gas to 
be paid partly in kind (Agence-France Presse, 12 July 2003; Interfax Central Asia News, 19 August 2003). See also, 
Ginsburg and Troschke (2003).
6 Government policy has exacerbated this. The government’s approach has been to extract the revenues from gas, oil 
and cotton exports into state coffers through a punitive non-market based exchange rate regime, then redistribute 
these profits to selected targets within the country, thereby enriching themselves and supposedly minimising the 
social stresses that otherwise have derived from the transition process. Given the extent of government intervention 
in the economy, however, this has had the effect of making the entire economy dependent on oil and gas exports.
7 This is borne out by the merchandise trade analysis in section 6.3, which finds that exports of manufactured goods 
from Kazakstan have plummeted, offset by increased exports of oil and gas; and that imports of such manufactured 
goods, as well as animal products, have increased greatly.
8 Critically, this has not happened in the way that transition theorists would expect: economic reform did not prompt 
the collapse of one sector, which then released resources for use in new sectors. Instead, geopolitical developments 
caused CIS trade and payments networks to collapse, which caused the manufacturing sector to collapse. That sector 
then released resources largely into unemployment, and the new sector, primarily oil and gas extraction, imported 
resources from outside the country to drive its own development.
9 See the trade analysis in section 6.3, which essentially finds a contraction in manufactured exports, countered by 
growth in exports of precious stones and metals.
10 The data used here are from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, but all data on 
Turkmenistan should be interpreted with caution, particularly that for later years.
11 Put more bluntly, the Turkmen data are generally considered false. As a consequence, the international financial 
agencies and other statistical agencies, such as Goskomstat Rossii, generally no longer provide data relating to most 
aspects of Turkmenistan’s economic activity. In this case, the Asian Development Bank data continue only until 
2001, presumably for the same reason.
12 Similarly, Turkmenistan’s export revenues are channelled through the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund, which is under 
the control of President Niyazov, to select industries and projects. They therefore do not appear on the budget 
(International Crisis Group 2003a; Pomfret 2001a).
13 Measurements of the black market value of the currency are understandably difficult to make. The manat seems to 
have traded at around 12,000 to the US dollar in late 1998, depreciating through 15,000 in January 2000, and 
reaching around 21,000-23,000 to the dollar in 2003-04 (Middle East Review o f Information, 1 July 1999; Interfax 
Statistical Report, 21 January 2001; EIU Viewswire, 18 February 2004).
14 For comparisons of the terms of lending to the Central Asian republics, see Table 6.8 in the next section, which deals 
with external sector developments.
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15 See section 3.2.2.
16 There is some inconclusive evidence for this in that all the Central Asian republics except Turkmenistan seem to 
have increased the CIS share in their imports from 1999 onwards. This follows the Russian financial crisis of 1998, 
which severely weakened the exchange value of the Central Asian currencies. Given that the Russian crisis occurred in 
mid-1998, however, we would have to ask why import shares showed no response in 1999. Also, official trade in 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan occurs at government-set exchange rates, which have not fluctuated much.
17 Other major destinations for Tajik aluminium are Hungary, Iran and Turkmenistan. See Platts Commodity News, 22 
May 2003; ITAR-TASS, 9 February 2003; reproduced in BBC Monitoring Service, 10 February 2003.
18 The value of electricity imports sometimes exceeds that of alumina, but most of this represents trans-shipments.
This will be discussed shortly.
19 Forty per cent of Tajikistan’s alumina is produced by one plant in the Ukraine, much of the balance is supplied by 
alumina producers in Kazakstan and Russia. More recently, Iran and Azerbaijan have begun exporting alumina to 
Tajikistan (see Interfax Mining and Metals Report, 9 August 2001; Prime TASS, 29 July 2002; IPR Strategic 
Information Database, 22 January 2003).
20 See Dow Jones Commodity Service, 19 December 2003.
21 As discussed in section 6.1.3, Turkmenistan negotiated a deal under which Gazprom will pay US$44/1000m3 for 
Turkmen natural gas, up from US$36 in 2000 and even lower earlier (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 28 November 
1994).
22 According to the Uzbek authorities, over 95 per cent of all cotton fibre exports from Uzbekistan in early 2004 were 
to non-CIS partners {Interfax Food and Agriculture Report, 13 May 2004). The equivalent figure for 2000 was 89.4 
per cent {Interfax Food and Agriculture Report, 20 April 2000).
23 See UNCTAD (n.d ). No data for Uzbekistan was available from this source at the time of writing; for that see IMF 
(2000c).
24 Bakhtior Islamov (2001) claims that the government issued these bonds specifically to raise money for repayments 
on a previous bond issue
25 The grant element is a neat measure of the different components of concessional loans—the interest rate component 
and the length of the loan. Specifically, it is the difference between the principal loan amount and the discounted 
value of the future debt-service payments (ie. repayments of both the principal and interest incurred) as a proportion 
of the principal (IMF 2003a). For a given principal, lower interest rates mean lower interest incurred and hence lower 
debt-service payments; and longer terms of repayment mean a lower discounted value of debt-service payments.
26 Lankes and Stem (1998) find that FDI is correlated with progress in transition but have to exclude Kazakstan, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan—the overwhelming recipients of FDI—to achieve this.
27 See, for example, Auty (2001) and Jones Luong (1999).
28 Briefly, as Ross (2001) argues, the rentier effect refers to situations where state revenues derived from resource 
exports allow the government to reduced taxes, to which the populace responds by demanding less government 
accountability. Higher state revenues, under this theory, also allow the government to channel money to particular 
groups who might otherwise press for greater freedom, in effect buying them off. The repression effect approach 
argues that higher revenues allow the state to bolster the repressive arms of power, thus suppressing movements in 
favour of democracy. The modernisation effect approach suggests that there are characteristics of a diversified 
market economy that lead to democracy, namely ‘occupational specialization, urbanization, and higher levels of 
education’, and that economies concentrated on natural resource industries do not generate these things widely.
29 Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2001) and Esanov et al. (2001) find a link between resource abundance and poor incentives 
to reform. Crucially, however, their arguments are based on the idea of a mendacious self-interested government.
This is entirely acceptable, but in the argument presented the government need not be mendacious, merely rational in 
making policy choices.
7 SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The political and economic upheavals of the transition period have prompted massive 
change in the socioeconomic sphere. In Central Asia in particular, the withdrawal of 
subsidies from the all-Union centre has introduced sharp problems in maintaining funding 
for social services, such as health care and education. At the same time, the economic 
upheaval—the collapse of industry, the rise of unemployment, the erosion of incomes— 
has generated severe hardships among the populace. This, however, has not been equally 
distributed; some groups have been able to benefit from this period of extraordinary 
change while others have not. As a consequence, inequalities in income have emerged 
throughout the region. This chapter considers socio-economic developments in the 
Central Asian republics in the transition period, focusing on trends in health, education, 
poverty and inequality, areas in which considerable change has occurred. Funding levels, 
it finds, have declined considerably, but this has not led to deteriorations of a similar 
extent in health and education indicators. Poverty and inequality have increased almost 
universally throughout Central Asia during the transition period, contributing to 
difficulties among some groups in accessing social services and even in the worst cases 
meeting basic nutritional requirements. Despite the claims of some of the region’s leaders, 
reform approach does not seem to have had an impact here—increases in poverty and 
inequality have been as severe, and in some cases more so, in the slower-reforming 
countries as the rapid reformers.
7.1 H ealth
On gaining their independence, the Central Asian republics shared similar health sector 
conditions, and have suffered largely the same difficulties in the post-Soviet period. 
Diminishing resources, and particularly the removal of subsidies from the Soviet centre, 
have made it difficult for the republics to sustain previous levels of service provision.
Even though health services have become more costly for individuals and governments 
have not been able to maintain Soviet levels of health spending, the effect in the transition 
period is not clear from the available data.
7.1.1 Health indicators
Life expectancies. Life expectancies in the region are generally low compared to Western 
levels, but are not unusually low compared with, for example, Russia or Turkey. Average 
life expectancy at birth in Central Asia in 2002 was around 68 years, compared to about 
76 in OECD countries in 2001 (Table 7.1; OECD 2004). Changes in life expectancies
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have shown a strange profile in Central Asia in the transition period in that they fell sharply 
in the mid 1990s, the most severe years of the transition dislocation. This is a pattern seen 
in all the Central Asian republics without exception, but Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
particular have not yet recovered their 1990 life expectancy levels (Table 7.1).
Infant mortality. Curiously, this worsening has not been accompanied by an equivalent 
deterioration in infant and under-5 mortality rates. The data suggest that infant mortality 
increased slightly in only Kazakstan during the early-mid transition period, but has since 
recovered. In all other cases, infant mortality simply declined through the 1990s. Mortality 
rates among children five years and under have been slightly different: rates deteriorated 
in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakstan initially but, according to the data, 
subsequently improved in Turkmenistan and Kazakstan.1 They did not deteriorate in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Table 7.2).
This conflicts with what we would expect in the transition. We would anticipate that 
the fiscal stresses of transition would induce a reduction in government spending on health 
services, and that private spending on health services would be relatively inflexible given 
the general impoverishment of the population. We would anticipate that these factors would 
reduce the amount and quality of services available in the republics and limit poor people’s 
use of such services, and this would impact most severely on infant health. This has not 
happened; infant mortality has not increased in the post-Soviet period in Central Asia.
A number of interpretations are possible, but two are obvious: (1) health conditions are 
generally not deteriorating in Central Asia, (2) maternal and child health conditions are 
not worsening in spite of an overall degradation in health conditions.2 The first seems 
unlikely; as we will see later, health spending has declined in all the republics, as has the 
number of health personnel. Thus, it seems likely that the burden of declining health 
sector conditions is falling disproportionately on adults.
Table 7.1 Life expectancy at birth, 1990-2002
Overall Male Female
1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002
Kazakstan 68.8 65.0 66.2 63.9 59.3 60.9 73.4 70.4 71.6
Kyrgyzstan 68.8 65.5 68.0 64.4 61.3 64.1 73.0 69.9 72.1
Tajikistan® 70.0 68.0 72.0 67.4 65.4 70.2 72.6 70.6 73.9
Turkmenistan 66.6 65.2 .. 63.1 62.1 .. 70.0 68.4 ..
Uzbekistan 69.7 67.9 70.0 66.0 65.0 67.6 72.9 70.7 72.5
Russia 69.1 65.0 65.1 63.8 58.3 58.9 74.3 71.7 72.0
Turkey 64.2 64.9 65.8 68.7 69.4 70.4
Australia 73.9 75.0 76.6 80.1 80.8 82.0
Note: a Latest data available for Tajikistan is for 2001. The latest data available for Turkmenistan are for 
1998; the relevant figures for that year are Overall: 66.1, Males: 62.5, Females: 69.8.
Source: WHO/Europe, 2003. Health For All Database, World Health Organization Regional Office for 
Europe, Copenhagen. Available online at http://www.who.dk/InformationSources/Data/20010827_T, 
TransMONEE Database; OECD, 2004. OECD Health Data 2004, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Paris. Available online at http://www.oecd.org/ [accessed 25 June 2004].
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Table 7.2 Infant and under-5 mortality, 1990-2000 (per 1000 live births)
1 9 9 0 19 9 5 2 0 0 0
Infant m orta lity
K a za k sta n 2 6 .3 2 7 19 .2
K y rg y zsta n 30 28.1 22 .6
T ajik istan 4 0 .7 3 6 .2
T u rk m en istan 4 5 .2 4 2 .2 2 5 .4 a
U z b e k is ta n 3 4 .3 2 5 .8 19.1
In d ia 8 0 63.1
C h in a .. .. 28 .9
A u stra lia 7 .7 •• 4 .9
U n d er-5  m orta lity
K a za k sta n 3 4 36 .5 25 .4
K y rg y zsta n 4 1 .3 4 1 .3 33 .2
T ajik istan 61 .5 7 1 .3 b
T u rk m en istan 64 .1 6 7 .9 4 5 .9a
U z b e k is ta n 4 7 .5 4 2 .5 3 2 .9 a
In d ia 9 3 c
C h in a 3 9 c
A u stra lia 6 C
Notes: a1999 figure, b1994 figure,c 2001 figure. 
Source: TransMONEE database.
Adult mortality. What these developments suggest is that the mid-transition deterioration 
in life expectancies is an adult phenomenon. That is, it is being driven by heightened 
mortality among adults. This appears to be the case; alarming rises in mortality among 
40-59 year olds around 1994-95 were the primary cause of deteriorations in life 
expectancies (see Appendix Table 7.1). This burgeoning mortality was worst in 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, but occurred to some extent in all the republics. Recovery has 
also occurred in all the republics, but has so far been only partial in Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.
7.1.2 Disease and other causes of mortality and morbidity
Thus the cause of elevated mortality strikes with exceptional severity among the middle- 
aged and is particularly strong in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly, these are the 
republics that have moved fastest on economic reform and also the republics with the 
highest proportion of Russians and other Slavs.3 The next sub-section considers the 
dynamics of mortality and morbidity in the Central Asian republics to see whether any 
explanations for this trend can be found.
Mortality trends. Mortality from diseases of the circulatory system initially increased in 
all the republics during the transition period, but subsequently improved slightly in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Similarly, death rates from heart disease increased in the 
mid-transition years in all the republics except Tajikistan, and seem to have stabilised in 
the second half of the 1990s in all except Kyrgyzstan. Cerebrovascular disease mortality 
increased from 1990 onwards in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, peaking around
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1994 but staying high thereafter; it has decreased considerably from 1985 levels in 
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, albeit with slight peaks around 1993-94. Rates of death 
related to malignant neoplasm (ie. cancer) have declined in the all the Central Asian 
republics since 1985. Mortality related to diseases o f the digestive system has increased in 
all republics except Tajikistan since 1985, and deaths from tuberculosis have increased 
throughout the region. Overall, however, deaths from diseases of the respiratory system 
have fallen everywhere despite slight peaks in the early 1990s (HFA Database, January 
2004).
Violence and external injury trends are slightly different. External injury and poison as 
a cause of death have declined slightly since 1985 in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and 
also in Tajikistan notwithstanding a war-related peak in 1993. They have been steady in 
Kyrgyzstan, and have increased in Kazakstan. Death rates due to homicide and
Table 7.3 Central Asian republics: mortality trends, 1985-2002
(standardised death rates, per 100,000 of the population)
1985
Diseases of the circulatory system
Kazakstan 616.7
Kyrgyzstan 576.9
Tajikistan 449.0
Turkmenistan 693.3
Uzbekistan 597.6
Ischaemic heart disease 
Kazakstan 331.0
Kyrgyzstan. 313.5
Tajikistan 238.6
Turkmenistan 393.2
Uzbekistan 390.0
Cerebrovascular disease 
Kazakstan 192.7
Kyrgyzstan 222.1
Tajikistan 132.9
Turkmenistan 237.6
Uzbekistan 169.4
Tuberculosis
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Homicide and intentional injury 
(population 0-64)
Kazakstan 9.4
Kyrgyzstan 6.7
Tajikistan 3.0
Turkmenistan 5.8
Uzbekistan 4.8
1991 1994 1998 2000 2002
619.5 787.6 801.3 787.9 822.9
532.2 688.4 631.3 658.5 716.3
475.5 654.2 588a 569.6 589.5b
814.0 1025.1 844.4 .. ##
637.8 852.6 782.5 772.3 748.8b
314.8 416.3 404.7 402.7 443.3
259.5 337.4 330.7 342.0 378.5
547.9 296.2 236.5a 251.1 260.7b
507.1 587.5 440.3 .. ..
390.0 528.1 470.6 449.3 409.5b
207.0 243.3 248.0 239.6 221.4
227.1 277.7 245.1 259.4 272.1
149.1 142.2 71.l a 69.1 80.6b
153.6 211.2 85.6 .. ..
175.2 232.2 178.2 192.1 206.2b
14.1 21.7 46.6 30.8 29.1
12.6 20.1 26.1 28.8 28.7
n.a. 12.7 13.2a 16.6 19.l b
16.8 21.2 27.8 .. „
13.3 14.6 19.5 21.3 21.2b
13.58 19.98 19.69 17.85 13.8
12.18 19.63 9.47 9.62 7.6
3.59 15.44 5.34a 4.5 3.3b
6.51 5.62 8.58 .. ..
7.87 6.26 4.52 3.77 3.9b
Notes: a1999 figure.
Source: WHO/Europe, 2003. Health For All Database, World Health Organization Regional Office for 
Europe, Copenhagen. Available online at http://www.who.dk/InformationSources/Data/20010827_l.
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intentional injury rose in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during the transition 
period, but have improved more recently in all cases; they were basically steady in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
This points to an increased prevalence of diseases of the middle-aged in Central Asia 
since 1985, with particular severity in Kazakstan, which goes some way to explaining the 
mortality profiles shown in Appendix Figure 7.1. This has been complemented in some 
cases by increased numbers of ‘unnatural’ deaths through murder and injury. Though the 
aggregate data given here do not show it, McKee and Chenet (2002) note that these 
trends seem to be more pronounced among men than women, and they attribute the 
changes and differences to aspects of lifestyle—patterns of alcohol consumption among 
some groups, smoking, diets high in fat and low in antioxidants—and to poor diagnosis 
and preventive measures for these causes of death in the region.
Morbidity. Communicable diseases are of course a problem, but no clear trends can be 
discerned. Tuberculosis is everywhere a growing problem: all the Central Asian republics 
experienced increased morbidity from tuberculosis from 1985 to 2002, but it was worst in 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Diphtheria worsened everywhere in during the transition but 
then recovered, a pattern mostly due to a transient epidemic that began around 1993.4 On 
the other hand, the incidence of viral hepatitis, as well as measles and mumps, seems to 
have declined since 1985 judging by the statistics we have available, but no obvious trend 
has emerged in the incidence of rubella (HFA database, January 2004). Malaria broke out 
seriously in Tajikistan in the second half of the 1990s, and Kyrgyzstan at the turn of the 
century, but not to any great extent in the other republics (Table 7.4).
Sexually transmitted diseases have emerged as a serious problem. The number of new 
HIV infections reported annually is increasing in all the Central Asian republics that are 
willing to publish statistics on the issue (Table 7.4). The AIDS Foundation East-West 
(2002) claims that the primary transmission mechanism for HIV/AIDS in the region is 
injection by drug users, a situation exacerbated by the wide availability of cheap heroin 
given Central Asia’s role as a transit-way for Afghan production. In this regard, poor 
public education (harm minimisation) about safe use and disposal of needles means that 
this problem will probably not long remain confined to injecting drug users. The Soviet 
tendency to rely on abortion rather than condoms as a means of birth control has 
facilitated wider transmission of sexually-transmitted diseases in most of the CIS. But, 
while this continues to exert an influence in Russia, it is less likely to be a major influence 
in Central Asia owing to the Muslim aversion to abortions and more conservative attitude 
to sexual matters overall.
This factor is partly reflected in the incidence of syphilis. Starting with roughly similar 
incidences in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, reported cases of 
syphilis have increased far more rapidly in Kazakstan than any of the other republics, 
with Kyrgyzstan showing the next quickest growth. A number of reasons could be 
adduced for this: Kazakstan had the highest proportion of Russians in the Soviet era, and 
they are still over 30 per cent of the population; both countries have opened up to the 
West far more rapidly than the others (Kazakstan for resources investment, Kyrgyzstan for 
tourism); and the traditional—that is, Muslim—culture is weakest there. On the other 
hand, increasing emphasis on the traditional culture may be decreasing the number of
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Table 7.4 Central Asian republics: selected morbidity indicators, 1985-2002 
(per 100,000 of the population)
New HIV infections reported
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Diphtheria incidence
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Malaria incidence
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Acute poliomyelitis
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Syphilis incidence
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Viral hepatitis
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
1985 1990 1994
0.024 0.0118
0.0688 0
0 0
0 0
0.1204 0.168 2.89
0.1002 0.1376 6.85
.. 0.2075 34.1
.. 0.1094 1.48
•• 0.0588 1.03
C.19 0.02 0.15
0.2 0.02 0.14
12.02 3.3 43
0.47 0.03 0.22
0.52 0.14 0.09
0.0507 0.042 0.0178
0.0251 0.0229 0
.. 0.0377 0.4637
.. 1.09 0.1483
•• 0.2057 0.5341
10.41 1.45 32.32
18.7 1.97 22.45
.. 1.62 7.97
.. 4.62 15.03
•• 1.78 11.28
376.43 479.66 234.54
590.93 638.84 466.4
.. 547.7 284.19
.. 360 234.95
.. 864.6 474.56
1998 2000 2002
1.98 2.33
0.1286 0.3274
0.0168 0.1131
0.0125 0.6247
0.4976 0.0874 0.0942
2.96 0.3069 0.0604
2.8 0.1778 0.1708
0.3823 0.6728 0.0203
0.0167 0.0162 0
0.58 0.25 0.13
0.24 0.25 55.24
325.85 308.06 95.64
2.91 0.54 0.37
0.31 0.51 0.29
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
239.13 161.38
144.18 87.53 60.64b
23.04 12.93 11.71
47.7a ,, ..
44.99 29.55 27.63b
266.91 185.63
321.79 417.84
124.63 ••
236.34 157.2a
Note: a1999 figure. Morbidity indicators for the Central Asian republics should be treated with a great 
degree of caution. As medical care becomes less affordable for the majority of the population, people 
are less likely to present with more-or-less survivable conditions and are more likely to self-medicate. 
Hence, the recorded incidence of some diseases is likely to be far less than actually exists.
Source: WHO/Europe, 2003. Health For All Database, World Health Organization Regional Office for 
Europe, Copenhagen. Available online at http://www.who.dk/InformationSources/Data/20010827_l
reported cases rather than the actual incidence. The situation appears to have improved 
slightly through the late 1990s in all republics.
Morbidity statistics are difficult to interpret because people will tend to present less for 
health care with illnesses that are not life-threatening as the costs of health care increase 
and personal incomes decrease. Given the increase in health care costs and decrease in 
personal incomes in Central Asia over the last decade, some of the ostensibly positive
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developments in morbidity shown by these statistics may actually reflect a negative 
factor—people are not seeking medical care because they cannot afford it.
7.1.3 The economics of health in Central Asia
The economic cost of poor health is hard to reckon. Clearly, the Central Asian republics 
will bear the direct costs of treating ill health, but they also bear a cost in terms of 
productive lives forgone. Together, these costs can be enormous (Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health 2001). Beyond economics, premature deaths and general ill- 
health represent an avoidable tragedy—not to mention the financial burden—for 
individuals and families.
Fiscal strain brought about during, and to an extent by, the transition has imposed 
severe financial difficulties on the health sectors in all the Central Asian republics. Some 
major consequences flow from this difficulty: degradation of health-sector infrastructure 
and capital, lack of health sector resources/supplies, and poor (often non-) payment of 
health care workers.
The Soviet Union operated an extensive system of health care provision. Almost the 
entire population could access at no or little cost a system of health care comparable to 
that available in Western Europe. The system was complicated, however, in that many 
services were delivered by enterprises to employees and their families rather than by the 
state. When the Soviet economy collapsed, these enterprises had to shed these services to 
remain competitive, leaving health care provision to the state. Unfortunately, the 
independent Central Asian republics have not been able to sustain these levels of service 
during the transition period. Expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP fell by more 
than one-half in Kazakstan and one-third in Kyrgyzstan between 1991 and 2000. 
Uzbekistan’s spending on health also halved in this period, and spending on health in 
Tajikistan fell from 3.4 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 0.6 per cent in 2000. Spending on 
health as a proportion of GDP apparently increased in Turkmenistan, although we may 
choose not to believe this data. It should be noted that GDP first declined massively in 
most of the republics and then recovered at different rates in each republic during this 
period (see Chapter 6), so the absolute level of government spending is not clear but must
Table 7.5 Central Asian republics: expenditure on health, 1991-2000
Total expenditure on health(% of GDP)
2000 Government share
1991 1994 1997
Kazakstan 4.4 2.0 1.9C
Kyrgyzstan 3.4a 3.3 3.2
Tajikistan 3.4b 2.5 0.6
Turkmenistan .. 1.6 3.7
Uzbekistan 5.9 4.6 3.0
Goskomstat of total (%)
2000 figures 1995 2000
1.9 2.1 81.8 73.2
2.1d 2.0 88.1 61.7
0.6 0.9 60.5 80.8
3.4e .. 77.1 84.9
3.0 4.1 77.3 77.5
N otes:a 1992 figure.b 1993 figure.c 1998 figure.d 1999 figure.e 1998 figures.
Source: TRANSMONEE database; World Health Organisation, 2003. World Health Report, World 
Health Organisation, Geneva; Goskomstat Rossii, 2002. Rossiya i strany mira, Goskomstat Rossii, 
Moscow
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obviously have declined considerably in all republics, except Turkmenistan where 
spending as a proportion of GDP has increased (according to these data) but GDP itself 
has decreased. Similar figures provided by Goskomstat Rossii (2002) suggest that 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP fell to 2.1 per cent in Kazakstan, 2.0 per cent in 
Kyrgyzstan and 0.9 per cent in Tajikistan in 2001. The lack of Turkmen data for 1999 
and 2000 imply that the situation there is not as satisfactory as the other data suggest.
The infrastructure for health care provision has been deteriorating since independence, 
and probably longer. Major facilities and pieces of equipment are falling apart. The 
budgetary pressures are such that repairs, and purchases of new equipment, are not 
possible, and, as a consequence, equipment that does work is largely obsolete. In the 
circumstances, it is likely that the safety and quality of medical/health services provided to 
the populations of Central Asia has deteriorated (Asankanov and Osmonov 2002). This 
trend is reflected in the statistics for hospital beds, which indicate declines throughout the 
region reaching more than 50 per cent in some republics (Table 7.6).
The payment of health workers is another issue of concern. Health workers were not 
highly paid under the Soviet system, and little has changed in the post-Soviet era. In the 
period 1993-98, for example, health-sector workers in Kyrgyzstan received about 70 per 
cent of the average wage for workers in the republic (European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems 2000; Falkingham 2002). Instances have also been reported of health 
workers being paid belatedly or not at all— as has happened with many other workers in 
post-Soviet Central Asia (Falkingham 2002,2004). The results are predictable: the 
number of health workers has fallen (Table 7.6) and unofficial payments have grown 
widespread.
The full extent of unofficial payments to health-workers and their institutions is quite 
hard to determine, but they are indisputably emerging in health care systems in the region. 
Such payments can be monetary or in-kind, and are most commonly made to individual 
health-care workers rather than to institutions (Ensor and Savelyeva 1998). It is also 
apparently common for patients to have to purchase whatever pharmaceuticals are 
required for a course of treatment provided by a medical institution (Ensor and Savelyeva 
1998). And some families in Tajikistan, according to Falkingham (2004), have even taken
Table 7.6 Central Asian republics: physicians and hospital beds 
(per 1000 population)
Physicians H ospital beds
1991 1995 2000 1980 2002
Kazakhstan 396.8 380.1 329.2 13.1 7.0
Kyrgyzstan 360 323.4 288.3 12.0 5.5
Tajikistan 256 219.4 218.3 10.6b 6.3
Turkmenistan 353.4 317 301.2a 10.5 7.1c
Uzbekistan 359.5 335.8 334a 11.3 5.5
Note: a 1999 figures.b 1985 figures.c 1997 figures.
Source: TransMONEE database, 2002. World Bank, 2004. World Development Indicators 2004, World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
7 SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS 182
to providing medical care (such as administering injections or medicine) to hospitalised 
family members to avoid having to make the payments expected if a staff member were to 
perform the activity.
While they ease the financial difficulties facing health-care workers and institutions, 
unofficial payments are problematic in that they can decrease the affordability of health 
care for a large portion of the population (see, for example, Rysakova et al. 2002; ‘Expert’ 
Center for Social Research 1999; Falkingham 2002). It seems likely that poorer groups in 
society cannot afford the payments necessary to access proper health care, but this is 
tempered by Ensor and Savelyeva’s (1998) observation that the amount of the unofficial 
payment demanded may vary according to perceptions of how poor the patient is. The 
existence of this practice is essentially confirmed in Falkingham (2004), who nevertheless 
finds evidence that a fairly high proportion of people in Tajikistan do not seek necessary 
medical care because they cannot afford it.5 World Bank (2003b) finds a similar 
development in Uzbekistan.
Health outcomes in Central Asian populations during the transition period have 
paralleled developments in the economy. That is, a similar pattern of initial deterioration 
followed by eventual slight recovery can be seen in many of the indicators for population 
health presented above. It is not clear how reliable the data are, but they imply a transient 
deterioration in the health situation in the transition, which has stabilised in most cases in 
recent years. But data for infant mortality suggest that the deterioration of health systems 
is not solely responsible for the decline in health conditions in the region. This seems to 
be borne out in the unequal distribution of mortality— the middle-aged in the advanced 
reformers, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, have been disproportionately harshly affected.
Why this has occurred is open to speculation, but a number of possible causes can be 
raised.
1. Ethnic composition. Russians and other Slavs are a far higher proportion of the 
population in Kyrgyzstan and, especially, in Kazakstan than in the other republics.
2. Dislocation. It may be that dislocation associated with transition caused ill-health 
with particular force among the middle-aged.
3. Selective use of health services. It may be that, given limited incomes, people target 
health expenditures towards children and infants, at the expense of the middle-aged. 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan are the countries where the share of private expenditure 
on health has grown most rapidly (see Table 7.5), and families faced with increasing 
costs of medical care may be more willing to pay to ensure health for children than 
for adults.
Economically, the Central Asian republics’ health sectors have been squeezed by fiscal 
deterioration in all the republics (bar, perhaps, Turkmenistan). Lower funding has meant 
that health infrastructure is degrading, health workers are underpaid or unpaid, and the costs 
of health care are increasingly being put on individuals, who are sometimes not able to 
afford it. This has occurred irrespective of the choice of reform path. The slower reformers, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have not for example been able to maintain Soviet levels 
of physicians or hospital beds, although the rate of decline thus far has been lower. In 
some respects, morbidity and mortality trends in these economies have been better than 
elsewhere in the region, but it is again not clear that this was due to reform approach.
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7.2 E d u c a t io n
7.2.1 The Soviet era and transition
Education is a critical aspect of development. As with the health sector, education is an 
area in which the Soviet Union had considerable success (Jukes 1973). In saying this, 
some caution is required. The oasis centres of Central Asia had long been repositories of 
learning and knowledge in the Arab-Persian Islamic tradition, and the region had a strong 
literary and scientific tradition that far preceded the imposition of Russian, and later 
Soviet, culture (Allworth 1994). These traditions, however, were confined to elites within 
the major oasis centres of what are now Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Among the nomadic 
groups, particularly of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, Islam was a very late adoption and had 
little influence on literacy. Overall, then, literacy in the region was low and education far 
from universal prior to Soviet rule (Soucek 2000). Using census data from 1926 and 
1959, Allworth (1994) posits an average literacy rate in 1926 of 3.6 per cent in Central 
Asia. The 1959 census found an average of 52.1 per cent.6 In 2000, this rate was 
approximately 97.8 per cent (Table 7.7). Whatever the shortcomings of the Soviet system, 
it was able to raise literacy rates in Central Asia from extremely low levels to almost 
universal.
The transition period has had a large impact on education spending, facilities and 
enrolments in the Central Asian republics. State education spending has decreased 
everywhere in the region, as a proportion of GDP and absolutely, but the number of 
educational facilities has not always followed this decline. The number of higher 
education facilities, for example, has apparently increased in all the republics through the 
transition period. Similarly, trends in enrolments are far from uniform.
7.2.2 Education funding
As a proportion of GDP, education funding has not fared well (see Table 7.8). It appears 
from the data below to have decreased in all republics, but with particular severity in 
Tajikistan, which saw funding drop from 11.2 per cent in 1991 of GDP to 1.9 per cent of 
GDP in 1997 at a time when GDP itself fell by 70 per cent. Little data is available for 
Uzbekistan, but what we have implies that education spending in that country has fallen 
more slowly than elsewhere, from 10.2 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 8.4 per cent in 1995. 
Goskomstat Rossii presents different data for Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
Table 7.7 Adult literacy rate (15 years old +), 2000 (per cent)
2000
Kazakstan 98.0
Kyrgyzstan 97.0
Tajikistan 99.2
Turkmenistan 98.0
Uzbekistan 99.2
Source: UNDP, 2002. Human Development Report 2002, United Nations Development Program, New 
York.
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Table 7.8 Education spending as proportion of GDP, 1991-99 (per cent)
1991 1994 1997 1999
Kazakhstan 7.6 3.0 4.3 ..
Kyrgyzstan 8.0a 6.1 4.9 4.1
Tajikistan l l . l b .. 1.9 2.1
Turkmenistan 9.6 2.2 4.5 5.4
Uzbekistan 10.2b •• •• ••
N ote:a 1990 figure . b 1992 figure. Goskomstat Rossii’s (2002) data differ slightly. Their figures for 
2000 are: 3.3 per cent in Kazakstan, 3.5 in Kyrgyzstan, and 2.3 per cent for Tajikistan. Their figure for 
Uzbekistan is for 1995 and is 8.4 per cent.
Source: McKee, M., Healy, J. and Falkingham, J., 2002. Health Care in Central Asia, Open University 
Press, Buckingham; TransMONEE database.
which imply slightly different levels of spending in 2000 but confirm the overall decline 
in education spending in these countries. This, moreover, does not take into account the 
fact that real GDF during this time has plummeted in almost all the republics (Klugman 
1999). Thus, absolute levels of education spending must have fallen considerably since 
the Soviet period in all the Central Asian republics.
As a consequence, funding of educational organisations and personnel has deteriorated 
considerably. While the number of educational facilities has apparently increased in the 
transition period, it is not clear what is happening to the quality of these facilities, their 
staffing, or the volume and quality of teaching materials available to them. As with health 
care, funding of education is increasingly being borne by the individual, and the sector 
has come to rely on private payments both legitimate and illegitimate. Education at higher 
levels seems increasingly to be based on some form of legitimate private funding through 
the imposition of tuition fees, but anecdote suggests that access to education and success 
in education is increasingly dependent on bribes.7
7.2.3 Factors influencing enrolments
Supply. On the supply side, the fiscal problems experienced in all the republics 
contributed to difficulties in the education sector. In most cases, the problems have 
revolved around maintaining facilities and staff.
At the pre-school level, decreased funding, alongside withdrawal of enterprises from 
provision of social services, has caused the closure of many schools (Table 7.9). All of the 
Central Asian republics have suffered falls in the number of pre-school facilities available, 
on both an absolute and per capita basis. At higher levels of education, the pattern has 
been different: the number of educational facilities has grown in all the republics 
according to CIS statistics. The number of general schools has risen, albeit slightly, in all 
republics except Kazakstan; and the number of higher education establishments has 
increased dramatically in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and less dramatically in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Despite this apparent growth in the number of educational institutions, lack of funding 
seems to have caused degradation of education infrastructure. So, where schools and 
other educational facilities exist, they may lack heating, functioning toilets and 
educational materials. Tajikistan, because of the civil war, represents the extreme example.
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Facilities there were damaged by war and natural deterioration and went unrepaired 
because of lack of funding (World Bank 2000a). School buildings, according to UNDP 
(1999), often have no heating and schools face a shortage of teachers. It must be noted 
that Tajikistan started the transition in by far the worst position of any of the Central Asian 
republics in terms of its educational facilities, and represents the most extreme 
manifestation of this problem, but similar developments are reported elsewhere. Klugman 
(1999), for example, reports a lack of teaching materials and disrepair of school facilities 
in Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. Similarly, Bauer et al. (1998) report temporary closures 
of schools in the middle years of the transition in both Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan owing 
to lack of heating. The International Crisis Group (2003b), furthermore, claims that two- 
thirds of all rural schools and half of all urban schools in Uzbekistan have no functioning 
toilets.
Table 7.9 Number of educational establishments, 1991-2000
1990 1995 1999
Preschools ('000)
Kazakstan 8.7 5.1 1.1
Kyrgyzstan 1.7 0.4 0.4
Tajikistan 1.0 0.6 0.5
Turkmenistan 1.6 1.4 l . l a
Uzbekistan 9.7 8.5 6.7
Number of children per preschoolb
Kazakstan 218 305 1082
Kyrgyzstan 371 1285 1368
Tajikistan 928 1517 1778
Turkmenistan 364 477 538
Uzbekistan 334 391 453
1991 1995 1999 2000
Number of general education establishments
Kazakstan 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.3
Kyrgyzstan 1.8 1.9 2 2
Tajikistan 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.6
Turkmenistan 1.8 1.9 .. ..
Uzbekistan 8.6 9.3 9.7 ••
Number of higher education establishments
Kazakstan 61 112 163 170
Kyrgyzstan 12 35 39 45
Tajikistan 13 24 29 30
Turkmenistan 9 15 .. ..
Uzbekistan 52 58 61 ..
Note: a 1998 data.b This figure was derived by dividing the number of preschools by the population of 
children 0 -4  in the country.
Sources: Goskomstat Rossii, 2002. Rossiya i Strany Mira, Goskomstat Rossii, Moscow. TransMONEE 
database; Statkomitet SNG, 2001. SNG v 2000 godu, Statkomitet SNG, Moscow; TransMONEE 
database.
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The other side of the supply problem is lack of skilled staff. Teachers, like many 
workers in the post-Soviet republics, have not generally been paid well. They have also 
suffered, with many others, late or non-payment of wages. Together, these factors 
combine to make teaching either unattractive or unviable as a career, leading teaching staff 
to seek other work, and have also contributed to the rise of unofficial payments for 
education. In consequence, the supply and quality of educational services in Central Asia 
is increasingly being limited by the lack of skilled staff (Vandycke 2001; Rysakova et al. 
2002).
In Turkmenistan, the supply of education has withal been explicitly curtailed by 
government policy. The government has reduced the number of years of basic education 
from eleven to nine, and the number of years of higher education from five to two years 
of study and two years of forced labour. It has also reduced the range of subjects available 
to students, refused to recognise qualifications from overseas institutions (Eurasianet.org,
5 May 2004), and has restricted the number of people who can study at higher levels 
domestically, such that only around 3000 students were enrolled in higher education in 
2001-02 according to International Crisis Group (2003a).
Demand side. Education is an investment made by the person being educated, usually 
that person’s family, and very often the state, to develop a set of skills that will over the 
longer term yield benefits both to the individual educated and to society more generally 
(see, for example, Vandycke 2001). As with any other investment, an individual will forgo 
education if the up-front costs are too high or exceed the perceived benefits. In the 
transition, this trade-off took on especial salience as many families were increasingly 
impoverished and education grew more expensive for the individual. Thus, trends in 
enrolment in the region, as elsewhere, reflect the trade-off between current costs— directly 
in such expenses as tuition fees, books, materials, and indirectly in income or subsistence 
production forgone— and future benefits, such as higher income and increased job 
prospects and mobility. We would expect, therefore, that economic strain would be 
associated with lower enrolments.
That said, education seems to have remained a very high priority for many households 
in Central Asia. The ‘Expert’ Center for Social Research (1999) reported, for example, 
that receiving a good education ranked first or second (depending on the respondent’s 
income level) among criteria of well-being in groups surveyed in Uzbekistan. World 
Bank (1999a) confirmed this, finding that Kyrgyz households in 1997 spent a very high 
proportion of their income on education, from 10.2 per cent for the extreme poor to 7.8 
per cent for the non-poor. This report also identified that, while enrolment rates are 
relatively even in the compulsory-schooling age groups, a wide differential is opening up 
in the post-compulsory levels, such that only 53.5 per cent of the extremely poor aged 
16-17 in Kyrgyzstan were enrolled in some form of education, whereas 67.9 per cent of 
the non-poor were enrolled. Similar patterns were found in Tajikistan, where secondary 
enrolments were found to be much lower, at 79.6 per cent of the relevant population, in 
the lowest quintile of the population than in the three highest quintiles, in which 86-88 
per cent of the relevant population was enrolled. Technical and higher education 
enrolments were consistent with this pattern (World Bank 2000a).
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Access to education seems to be limited first by the cost of education itself, and second 
by the costs of equipping students for school. School students, even quite young ones, in 
some cases have to work, outside school hours or during school holidays, to pay for 
education fees.8 Falkingham (2000), on other hand, reported that a high level of 
absenteeism among poor Tajik school students was because they lacked suitable clothes 
or shoes. The future pay-off to education is also becoming a factor: the future pay-off to 
education needs to be high enough to make current sacrifice worthwhile. In this regard, 
World Bank (2000a) claims that secondary education was perceived by some people in 
Tajikistan to be irrelevant given the labour market situation and outdated curricula.
7.2.4 Enrolment figures
It is not possible to make broad generalisations about enrolments in the region over 1991— 
2000. Some countries have seen transient declines in enrolment at all levels of education; 
in other countries the decline has been far more protracted at most levels of education, but 
some levels of education in particular countries have not been greatly affected. A number 
of factors, both on the supply and demand sides have contributed to the changing patterns 
of enrolment through the 1990s.
Basic education. Enrolment rates in basic education followed different paths across the 
republics. Kazakstan experienced virtually no change in enrolments during the transition 
period 1991-2000. The same is true of Uzbekistan. Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—the 
poorest of the Central Asian republics—experienced severe declines around 1992-93. 
Kyrgyzstan had recovered by 1996, whereas Tajikistan did not recover until 1998. 
Turkmenistan has shown persistent decline (Figure 7.1). It is likely, moreover, that the 
statistics for all republics overstate the true enrolment situation, as many children are 
enrolled but do not, or cannot, actually attend classes (see, for example, World Bank 
2000a, 2003b). Thus, World Bank (2000a) notes that high rates of absenteeism in 
Tajikistan are connected with, among other things, lack of clothing and bad weather 
conditions.9
It seems likely that economic hardship contributed to the enrolment declines seen in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, but some consideration should also be given to 
the role of agriculture in employment in these republics. Whereas the agricultural sector 
employs around 35 per cent of the population in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, it employs 
52.9 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, 65.6 per cent in Tajikistan, and 47.6 per cent in 
Turkmenistan (Goskomstat Rossii 2002). Agriculture represents the fall-back option for 
the population in these republics— workers fall back to traditional family employment in 
agriculture when other opportunities dry up. It may be that many children in these 
republics moved back to the agricultural sector to bolster food production within the 
family, eschewing education as not worthwhile— temporarily in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, permanently in Turkmenistan.
Secondary school enrolments. Secondary school enrolments followed a rather different 
pattern. At the outset of transition, enrolments at this level of education were far from 
universal, and only approximately 30-40 of the population aged 15-18 years old in any 
of the Central Asian republics was enrolled in general secondary education.10 Unlike 
basic-level education enrolments, enrolments in general secondary education dropped
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Figure 7.1 Basic education enrolment, gross rates, percent of relevant population, 
1991-2000 (per cent)
100 Percent
------- Kazakhstan
------- Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
— — Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan
Notes: The relevant population is 7-15 year-olds. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan enrolment 
rates for 2000 are affected by a change in the education system.
Source: TransMONEE database.
through 1991-96 in all the republics. After 1996, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan diverged 
from Uzbekistan in achieving higher levels of enrolments in general secondary education 
than prior to the transition, but as we shall see this may be related more to the continued 
value of vocational secondary education in Uzbekistan compared to the other republics. 
Turkmenistan seemed to avoid the decline seen elsewhere until 1996, and then suffered 
the same profile seen elsewhere of collapse followed by recovery (albeit at a slower 
pace). Tajikistan has experienced the most pronounced decline in Central Asia. This is 
most likely driven by a combination of civil conflict and very extensive poverty. Poverty, 
as noted above, has a two-fold impact on enrolment rates: first, families often simply 
cannot afford to pay for their children’s education and education-related expenses.
Second, the opportunity cost o f attending school can become too high— students may be 
better off, in the short term at least, engaging in productive activities, trading or other less 
wholesome enterprises (UNDP 1999).
In the majority of cases the pattern seems to be a slump in enrolments during the most 
severe years of the transition. Without conducting micro-level studies and/or extensive 
interviews, it is difficult to make confident statements about the cause of this decline, but 
the most likely explanation is the influence of economic hardship, which makes education 
either absolutely unaffordable to some families or undesirable given the trade-off between 
current sacrifice and (uncertain) future pay-off. The recovery is even less simple to 
explain. Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan are the most strongly market-oriented economies in 
the region, so it is tempting to hypothesise that the perceived returns to upper secondary
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Figure 7.2 General secondary enrolment as a proportion of population aged 15-18 
years, 1991-99 (percent)
Per cent
■ Kyrgyzstan 
Tajikistan 
■Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Source: TransMONEE database.
education under the new economic conditions in these countries may be driving the 
recovery in enrolment rates there (Klugman 1999).
Vocational/technical secondary school enrolments. Enrolment rates in vocational and 
technical secondary schools have dropped considerably in all the republics except 
Uzbekistan. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all experienced roughly similar paths 
of decline. This is somewhat puzzling because the economic structures, and the changes 
in economic structure currently being experienced, of each of these countries are quite 
different. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have reached alarming levels in this area of 
education— only 5.2 percent o f children aged 15-18 in Turkmenistan and 8.4 per cent of 
children of that age in Tajikistan are enrolled in vocational/technical secondary education. 
Enrolments in this form of education have been strongest in Uzbekistan, which begs the 
question: what is particular about the Uzbek economy that has caused vocational/ 
technical education to remain relatively attractive? The answer seems to be differences in 
the development of the industrial sector in the various Central Asian republics. As we saw 
in Chapter 6, Kazakstan’s industrial structure has changed considerably since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, reflecting the shift away from manufacturing towards hydrocarbons 
production. A similar pattern occurred in Kyrgyzstan, and the industrial sector of 
Tajikistan simply collapsed, diminishing opportunities there for those with a vocational 
secondary education. Uzbekistan, however, has managed to avoid such a precipitous shift 
in its industrial sector. As a consequence, opportunities still exist there for those with a 
vocational secondary education.11
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Figure 7.3 Vocational/technical secondary enrolments as a proportion of population 
aged 15-18, 1991-2000 (per cent)
40
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-------Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
-------Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Source: TransMONEE database.
Some o f the decline seen in vocational/technical secondary enrolments is probably due 
to economic hardship, particularly in Tajikistan where it has not been offset by a recovery 
in general secondary enrolments. But it seems likely that students in Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent Turkmenistan, are choosing a generalist/higher 
education because of the perceived returns to this investment compared to the vocational/ 
technical stream. The pattern makes sense because the transition period has been one of 
societal and economic change, particularly in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, and students 
have reacted to this by choosing more generalist streams of education, education that does 
constrain them to a particular career path and which can potentially provide a path 
towards tertiary studies.
Higher education. This trend towards higher levels o f education is present also in the 
higher education enrolments for Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan (Figure 7.4). Both countries, 
after initial declines in the early years of the transition, have had very strong recoveries in 
higher education enrolments since 1995. The levels have not changed much in Tajikistan, 
and have declined considerably in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
As Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan have undergone the most extensive economic reform, it 
is tempting to theorise that the new market-oriented conditions have caused young people 
in these countries to reassess the returns to different forms and levels of education. This is 
bolstered by Vandycke’s (2001:17) claim that university graduates’ wage premium over 
those with lower-level educational attainments was 18 percent in Kazakhstan in 1996. 
That is, the new market-oriented economic conditions were perceived to favour higher 
education graduates over lower educational levels. The decrease in Turkmenistan appears 
to be a direct product of government policy to lim it opportunities for higher education and
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Figure 7.4 Higher education enrolments as a proportion of population aged 19-24 
years, 1991-2000 (per cent)
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Source: TransMONEE database
dissuade people from seeking it. Uzbekistan’s fall is harder to explain, but probably 
reflects the continued strength of vocational/technical education, combined with less 
pronounced returns to higher-level graduates in that country.
7.2.5 Education in transition
State education funding has decreased everywhere in the region, but this has probably 
been offset to some degree by increased private funding. Enrolments have varied in each 
republic depending on the supply and demand for education in those countries. The 
supply of educational institutions, especially higher education institutions, appears to have 
increased throughout the region despite decreased funding, but quality of educational 
facilities and the education they provide is thought to have fallen in many cases, and with 
particular severity in Tajikistan. The demand for education has been fairly stable at 
compulsory levels for obvious reasons, but has grown strongly in the second half of the 
1990s in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan at post-compulsory levels, reflecting the perceived 
returns to higher levels of education in these economies. This seems to have had less of an 
impact in the slower reformers because of the slower change to economic structures, and 
hence incentives, in those countries.
Beyond this, however, the role of reform approach is not obvious. Of the slower 
reformers, Uzbekistan seems to have been able to slow the decline in education spending 
but Turkmenistan has not. The value of Uzbekistan’s ostensible success, however, is not 
clear because it has been no more successful than the more rapid reformers in preventing 
decreased enrolments in basic and general education in the transition period, and has
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performed far worse than them in higher education enrolments. Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, seem to have lifted the number of enrolments at most 
levels, except in the vocational secondary stream, despite falling funding levels and the 
increasing cost of education to the individual. Enrolments in Tajikistan suffered 
considerably during the transition, and the statistics here probably understate the problem. 
Reform approach may have been an issue, but war, impoverishment, and the loss of 
institutional capacity seem to be the direct drivers of change.
7.3 P overty
The deepening of poverty has been one of the most disturbing aspects of the economic 
transition in all post-Soviet countries. Poverty has of course always existed in Central 
Asia, and at levels higher than usual in the Soviet Union. Branko Milanovic (1998:69), 
for example, calculated income poverty headcounts for 1987-88—that is, the late Soviet 
period— and found headcounts of 5 per cent for Kazakhstan, 12 for Kyrgyzstan, 12 for 
Turkmenistan, and 24 for Uzbekistan.12 There is ample reason, however, to believe that 
the number of people living in poverty has increased in the post-Soviet period.
Income poverty is reflected in the headcount measures of poverty (Table 7.10). While 
care should be taken in making comparisons between these figures and those provided by 
Milanovic, they indicate that poverty is now quite extensive in Central Asia. The 
proportion of the population living on less than $ 1 PPP per day in Central Asia is very 
high, and this population is concentrated in the slower reformers. Less than 2 per cent of 
the population in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan are living below US$1 PPP per day, but 
around 10 per cent of Tajiks, 12 per cent of Turkmen, and 22 per cent of Uzbeks live on 
less than that level. Using the US$2 PPP per day headcount, we find that 15 per cent of 
Kazaks and 27 per cent of Kyrgyz were living below this level. In Turkmenistan, close to 
half of all people, and in Tajikistan more than half, were living under it; and in Uzbekistan 
a staggering three-quarters of the population was living on less than US$2 PPP per day.
This data is contested by other sources, which paint a still gloomier picture. 
Goskomstat Rossii data suggest that, in 2001, 18.9 per cent of all Kyrgyz and 20.9 per 
cent of Turkmen were living on less than US$1 PPP per day. Alternatively, World Bank
Table 7.10 Population living below poverty lines, 1990-2001 (per cent)
Under $ l /d a y U nder $ 2 /d a y
Under $ 4 /d a y  
(1996-99)
Kazakstan (1996) <2 15.3 62
Kyrgyzstan (2001) <2 27.2 88
Tajikistan (1998) 10.3 50.8 ..
Turkmenistan (1998) 12.1 44.0 ..
Uzbekistan (2000) 21.8 77.5 ••
Note: ** $1 a day— at 1985 international prices (equivalent to $1.08 at 1993 international prices), 
adjusted for purchasing power parity...* $2 a day— at 1985 international prices (equivalent to $2.15 at 
1993 international prices), adjusted for purchasing power parity. * $4 a day— at 1990 international 
prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity’.
Sources: UNDP, 2003. Human Development Report 2003, United Nations Development Programme, 
New York. World Bank, 2004. World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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(2000b) claims that, in 1998,49.1 per cent of all Kyrgyz were living below US$2.15 
(1993— equivalent to US$2 figure in the Table 7.10) per day, and 84.1 per cent below 
US$4.30 per day (equivalent to the US$4/day figure in Table 7.10). The relevant statistics 
were 7.0 and 34.4 per cent for Turkmenistan in 1998, 5.7 and 30.9 per cent for Kazakstan 
in 1996, and 68.3 and 95.8 per cent in Tajikistan in 1999.
The first, and most obvious source of income impoverishment is falling real wages; 
unemployment is probably the second. During the transition, high inflation (see Chapter 
6) eroded real wages, particularly in the public sectors. Real wages fell by 76 per cent in 
Kazakstan and 94 per cent in Tajikistan between 1991 and 1995. They fell by 33 per cent 
in Kyrgyzstan between 1992 and 1995, a year further into the high inflation period. No 
equivalent data are available for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but it is unlikely they 
could have avoided similar declines given the high and ongoing inflation there.
The impact of unemployment is harder to assess because the data are probably not 
accurate. Thus, in the region, Kazakstan has the highest levels of official unemployment 
at 10.4 per cent in 2001, followed by Kyrgyzstan with 7.9 per cent, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan with about 2.5-2.6 per cent, and Uzbekistan at 0.4 per cent (Asian 
Development Bank 2003). These data probably conceal considerable underemployment, 
where workers are officially employed but actually perform no work, and certainly 
conceal situations where workers are employed but never get paid. On other hand, this is 
likely to be offset by considerable unrecorded employment in all the republics.
The high levels of income poverty in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are especially 
interesting. In the first place, given the extremely low levels of unemployment cited by 
these countries, the levels of income poverty seem rather high. Furthermore, given that 
these countries have chosen slow economic strategies supposedly to limit the social and 
economic dislocation of transition, we may ask at this point whether it has been effective. 
How useful has this approach been if 40 per cent of the population in Turkmenistan and 
77 per cent in Uzbekistan now live on less than US$2 PPP? Because we have no 
comparisons over time, it is difficult to judge how much of this has developed during the 
post-Soviet period, but these countries’ policies surely must be called into question by the 
huge disparity between their performance and that of say Kyrgyzstan.
Of course, income measures of poverty can be unreliable because of the propensity of 
people to under-report;13 they also do not take into account home and subsistence 
production. I have included a measure of undernourishment (from UNDP 2003), and 
indicators of childhood wasting and stunting, to try to overcome this difficulty. In all 
cases, except for Tajikistan, this measure seems to suggest that people are either under­
reporting incomes or finding ways of accessing foodstuffs in spite of their low incomes.14 
The UNICEF indicators suggest little wasting (low weight for height) in any of the 
Central Asian republics, which indicates that outright famine is not yet a problem. The 
figures for stunting (low height for age), however, are somewhat more disturbing, with all 
countries surveyed bar Kazakstan reporting considerable levels of stunting in children 
under five, which may indicate a longer-term undernourishment among some children 
(Table 7.11).15 The figures, however, do bear out the general patterns found in the income 
measures of above: the wasting measure corresponds exactly, with Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan suffering the most severe incidence and Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan the
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least severe. The stunting measures correspond less closely but also place Uzbekistan as 
the region’s worst performer and Kazakstan its best.
Calorie intake seems to have followed different profiles in the Central Asian republics 
(Table 7.12). If we are to believe the Turkmen calorie statistics, an initial contraction in 
the early years of transition was followed by recovery to previous levels. Similarly, an 
initial fall in Kyrgyzstan was followed by a recovery to levels higher than those at the 
beginning of the transition period. Kazakstan experienced an increase, but then a decline 
to levels below the initial figure. By way of comparison, the 2001 figures put Tajikistan 
considerably below the level achieved by Bangladesh, Uzbekistan equivalent to the level 
achieved by that country, and all the others above that. Still, they remain quite low in 
comparative terms (Table 7.12).
7.3.1 Characteristics of poverty
Causes. As has been illustrated in earlier chapters, the transition period was characterised 
by a massive fall in national incomes, extremely high rates of inflation, industrial collapse 
prompted by shifts in supply and demand, removal of state supports and transfers (to 
economic sectors and to individuals), late payments for workers, and worsening social
Table 7.11 Moderate and severe wasting and stunting in children under five, 
1995-20023 (per cent)
Wasting Stunting
Kazakstan 2 10
Kyrgyzstan 3 25
Tajikistan .. .•
Turkmenistan 6 22
Uzbekistan 12 31
N otes:a Most recent year available (not specified in source). Moderate and severe wasting refers to the 
proportion of the population that is ‘below minus two standard deviations from the median weight for 
height of the reference population’. Moderate and severe stunting refers to the proportion of the 
population that is ‘below minus two standard deviations from median height for age of reference 
population’ (UNICEF 2003).
Source: UNICEF, 2003. ‘Tables’, in UNICEF, State of the World’s Children 2003, UNICEF, New York.
Table 7.12 Central Asia: daily calorific intake per capita, 1990-2001
1992 1995 1998 2001
Kazakstan 3030 3110 2545 2477
Kyrgyzstan 2506 2073 2754 2882
Tajikistan 2337 2289 1840 1662
Turkmenistan 2755 2438 2766 2738
Uzbekistan 2662 2598 2420 2197
Bangladesh 2187
Indonesia 2904
Morocco 3046
Source: FAOSTAT data, 2004
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conditions (see World Bank 2000b). The direct effects of economic collapse, the 
consequent unemployment, late payments to workers, and the removal of state supports, 
on income levels are fairly obvious— incomes, and opportunity to earn them, fell. 
Increasing inequality, as Milanovic (1998) points out, also contributes to the increase in 
poverty as it reflects a distribution of relative shares of national wealth away from the 
poor towards the wealthy.16 In this way, the rampant inflation seen in the transition 
economies worsened poverty rates by reducing the real value of incomes and savings and 
by redistributing wealth towards holders of assets and foreign currencies.
Risk groups. Some groups have experienced a higher risk of being poor than others.
This is essentially because some have been able to deal with economic deterioration and 
change more effectively than others, whereas many, for a variety of reasons, have lacked 
the means to deal with these developments. In this regard, economic change has had an 
especially hard impact on children, families with many dependents and few workers, the 
unemployed, people in rural areas, workers with skills that are no longer needed in the 
post-Soviet economy, people with lower le vels of education, and the sick (World Bank 
2000b, Milanovic 1998).
It is obvious why the unemployed are subject to poverty: they have lost their incomes. 
Children are exposed to poverty when the number of dependents in a household is large 
compared to that of income earners.17 Again, the reason is obvious—the more people 
there are dependent on a given income stream, the more widely spread that income stream 
will be. People in rural areas typically have low income levels because of the nature of 
their work. On the other hand, they have greater opportunities for subsistence production 
not captured by income measures of poverty. People with lower levels of education 
typically find it harder to adapt to changes in economic structure; their occupational 
mobility is limited by lack of skills or education. In the post-Soviet case, this may have 
been exacerbated by the strong role of vocational/technical education, a factor that has 
been especially troublesome particularly in the Central Asian republics. When the Soviet 
economies collapsed, the industrial sectors of the region mostly withered, and workers 
educated specifically for employment in those sectors were left with no industry needing 
their skills. The sick or disabled are disadvantaged for the obvious reason that illness 
tends to be costly and reduces work opportunities.
Persistence. Unfortunately, all economic shocks generate winners and losers. High levels 
of poverty, even if transient, are clearly a concern, but are not surprising given the 
economic dislocation experienced by all the Central Asian republics. More disturbing is 
the way poverty could evolve over time. Serious social and economic disturbance could 
result if those groups currently experiencing poverty find themselves unable to extract 
themselves from it. If private wealth comes excessively to determine an individual’s 
educational and health opportunities, the possibility increases of poverty replicating itself 
across generations in particular families or groups. Such cycles of poverty can be 
minimised by government, NGO and private sector action, but such action requires 
money and good governance (World Bank 2000b), neither of which are particularly 
prevalent in Central Asia at the moment.
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7.4 Inequality
Inequality was not an overt feature of the Soviet economy. Government policy was aimed 
at minimising societal inequities, especially as expressed in income differentials. As a 
result, when transition began in the Soviet Union, the income distribution was flat/ 
compressed in comparison with most market economies. Earnings inequality in Central 
Asia was, in this regard, not vastly different from inequality elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). Gini indices of earnings distribution in 1989 
for the Central Asian republics ranged between 0.255 in Turkmenistan and 0.276 in both 
Kazakstan and Tajikistan. By comparison, the same indices were around 0.400 for the 
United States and Turkey, and 0.360 for the United Kingdom in the 1990s.
Inequality can alternatively be measured by comparing the incomes of the highest 10 
per cent of earners with those of the lowest 10 per cent. Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1992) calculated this ratio for earnings in the Central Asian republics in 1989 and found 
that the richest 10 per cent of the population earned only 3-3.5 times as much as the 
poorest 10 per cent (Table 7.13). Inequality using this measure was found to be lowest in 
Uzbekistan and highest, as before, in Kazakstan.
This contrasts considerably with the post-Soviet situation. Gini indices increased in all 
the Central Asian republics, indicating that inequality has increased throughout the 
income profile. But the changes across republics are interesting because the rise in 
inequality does not seem to be related to the extent of market-oriented reform. We would 
expect that the gradual reformers would use these policies to limit social dislocation and 
upheaval, but this does not seem to have worked. Turkmenistan was, according to the 
Gini index measure, the least unequal republic in the late-Soviet period, but by the end of 
the 1990s had become the most unequal, extensive subsidies in the social sector 
notwithstanding. Uzbekistan is now the least unequal republic; the distribution of income 
there does not appear to have changed much from the Soviet period. Startling also is the 
increase in inequality in Tajikistan (Table 7.14). These findings are loosely reflected if we 
compare the incomes of the richest decile to those of the poorest. Again we find that 
inequality has exploded in Turkmenistan, with the top decile now receiving 12 times the 
incomes of the bottom decile compared to approximately three times in the late-Soviet 
period. Increases are seen all other republics, but Uzbekistan’s ratio seems higher than the
Table 7.13 Inequality indicators, earnings distribution, all workers, 1989
Richest 10% to
poorest 10% Gini index
Kazakstan 3.50 0.276
Kyrgyzstan 3.31 0.260
Tajikistan 3.44 0.276
Turkmenistan 3.29 0.255
Uzbekistan 3.18 0.257
Source: Atkinson, A.B. and Micklewright, J., 1992. Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and 
the Distribution of Income, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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Table 7.14 Inequality indicators, income distribution, 1998-2001
Richest 10% to
poorest 10% Gini index
Kazakstan (2001) 7.1 0.312
Kyrgyzstan (2001) 6.0 0.290
Tajikistan (1998) 8.0 0.347
Turkmenistan (1998) 12.3 0.408
Uzbekistan (2000) 6.1 0.268
C om parators
Turkey (2000) 7.7 0.400
United Kingdom 13.4 0.360
United States 16.6 0.408
Source: UNDP, 2003. Human Development Report 2003, United Nations Development Programme, New 
York.
Gini index would imply— it has increased from approximately 3 to 6 (Table 7.14). Again, 
however, these levels are not extraordinary by international standards in that none of the 
republics has yet approached levels of inequality seen in, for example, the United States 
or the United Kindom.
The control of inequality in the Central Asian republics reflects country-specific 
factors. Inflation has everywhere the effect of redistributing wealth away from holders of 
cash and savings towards those people who can control assets and access foreign 
currency. In the FSU, this problem was exacerbated by a tendency in many sectors to 
delay payments. Delayed payment of wages in a period of high inflation meant that the 
real value of workers’ earnings was substantially diminished by the time they received 
them. People who are unable to revise their nominal incomes to match price increases will 
be disadvantaged relative to those who can. The inflationary period thus privileged those 
who could control and dispose of Soviet-era assets (ie. high-level party functionaries, 
Soviet enterprise managers, etc.), those who could access foreign currency, those who 
could maintain their real income levels through other means (for example, through 
occupational flexibility).
The profile of inequality is still not static; much will depend on how groups that have 
been successful in the inflationary environment operate in an environment of relatively 
stable prices. But increasing barriers to education— in the form of fees, other expenses, 
and nepotistic and corrupt practices— could entrench the inequalities generated by 
inflation over the longer term.
7.5 D iscussion and conclusion
Factors such as developments in education, health, poverty and income distribution are 
important because they reflect the economy’s capacity to provide a decent minimum 
standard of living for individuals— arguably more important than the macroeconomic 
figures usually deployed— and constitute, to the extent that all these factors are related to 
the productive capacity of the people in the economy now and in the future, the basis and 
framework for economic prosperity.
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In this regard, the Central Asian economies have not performed well. In all of them, the 
transition period has seen increased levels of poverty and inequality. Spending on health 
and education as a proportion of GDP fell in all the republics, except Turkmenistan, 
where health spending apparently increased as a proportion of GDP. Given that GDP fell 
considerably during this time, the data suggest massive decreases in absolute levels of 
spending on health and education.
7.5.1 Reform and socioeconomic developments
None of the various approaches to reform adopted in Central Asia can find vindication in 
socio-economic conditions as they currently stand. The gradual approach to transition 
adopted in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, predicated on limiting the social dislocation 
arising from the transition, does not seem to have yielded much benefit in terms of 
limiting the growth of poverty, although Uzbekistan seems to have experienced a smaller 
increase in inequality than most of the other republics. At the same time, the more market- 
oriented strategies adopted in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan have not yielded many obvious 
benefits— poverty and inequality have increased in both albeit to levels lower than seen in 
the slower reformers.
Similarly, the reform approach does not seem to have had an impact other than 
apparently slowing the rate of decline in education funding in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan. Even where the rate of decline has been slowed, however, the results have 
not been particularly positive. Increased upper educational enrolments may indicate 
greater flexibility in the school age population in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, but the 
benefits of this are for obvious reasons not yet tangible. The data for Tajikistan do not 
present great grounds for optimism.
7.5.2 Socioeconomic developments and political reform
The evidence regarding socioeconomic developments and democratisation is mixed. In 
theory, it is sometimes argued that authoritarian regimes have an incentive to provide 
certain subsidies and efficient and effective social services to placate a populace that 
might otherwise demand democratic regime change. In practice, this does not seem so 
certain. In a more open polity, political opposition, lobby groups and critical media can all 
provide an effective feedback mechanism to alert governments to inadequacies or 
injustices and give expression to popular discontent. And democratic governments have 
an incentive to deal with these problems before they generate widespread political unrest. 
The problem in authoritarian regimes is that there is no such effective mechanism— 
opposition and lobby groups tend to be repressed and ignored, bureaucratic and political 
hierarchies under the sway of the ruling power, and critical media suppressed (see Sen 
1999a, 1999b; World Bank 2000b). Who in a system based on repression and fear is going 
to tell the government there are problems? On the other hand, authoritarian regimes have 
no incentive to deliver anything but the bare minimum required to forestall political unrest.
Looking at Central Asia, it is difficult to see where pressure for improved services and 
more equitable division of wealth is going to come from. Parliaments, as we saw in 
Chapter 5, do not provide an effective counter to the regimes. Instead, they are usually 
meek and subservient, bending to the will of the ruling elite. Lobby groups are typicaly
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repressed where they contradict the government line, and the critical media are harassed, 
intimidated and ultimately silenced by these regimes. Therefore, we are left to rely on 
benevolence of the politicians themselves to organise effective social services, to ensure 
that poverty is minimised, and ensure that wealth is distributed fairly. This does not look 
promising.
7.5.2 Are people better off?
The socio-economic situation in Central Asia seems to have worsened in the transition 
period. Returning to the second theme of the thesis we may ask: are the people of Central 
Asia better off after twelve years of transition? The answer appears to be no. Irrespective 
of the reform strategy adopted, spending on health and education fell, and poverty and 
inequality increased. Thus, the average person in the region has a higher likelihood of 
being poor than under the Soviet system. At the same time, that person faces health and 
educational services that are both more expensive and of worse quality than previously.
I would like to close with two observations here. First, given the slower reformers’ aim 
of limiting the economic and social damage generated by transition reforms, their 
performance has been pretty poor, especially in terms of limiting inequality and poverty.
We can justly ask whether the policies are really working; and, if they are not, why do 
they continue? Second, these indicators more generally are approximate measures of 
human capacity and well-being. Failure to provide good education and failure to 
safeguard health means, at the individual level, discomfort, harder and shorter lives, and 
unrealised potentials and ambitions. At the aggregate level, it means that productive lives 
are being wasted and cut short. Poverty, as shown above, can be crucial in determining 
whether people can access these services; and inequality, in turn, can perpetuate this 
poverty across generations. This is not merely a moral problem, but an economically 
pragmatic one: the Central Asian republics’ future depends on how well they deal with 
these difficulties.
N otes
1 We should note here that Turkmen data are probably suspect, particularly with regard to so sensitive a subject. The 
deterioration is in line with what we would expect; the subsequent recovery is less likely.
2 World Bank (2003b) argues that, in Uzbekistan at least, infant mortality is substantially higher than the statistics 
suggest because the methodology for calculating infant mortality in the former Soviet Union understates the true 
figure. While this has a bearing on our understanding of the full scale of the problem, it is less problematic here 
because we are concerned mostly with comparisons across time and the methodology has not changed over in the 
post-Soviet period.
3 Forty per cent of Kazakstan’s population was of Slavic origin in 1994, compared to 20 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, and 
less than 10 per cent in all the other republics.
4 At the time, the outbreak was blamed on a decline in inoculation and a lack of appropriate knowledge of the disease 
among health care workers. Reuters, 13 November 1995; Agence-France Presse, 22 December 1995.
s As Falkingham notes, however, given the design of the survey from which these results are drawn, it is not possible to 
see to what extent this is driven by official or unofficial charges.
6 There were substantial differences among the different cultural groups in the 1926 (for example, Karakalpak, Kazak, 
Uzbek, etc). These figures should be treated more as indicative of the likely levels rather than being considered as an 
absolute figure.
7 See, for example, ‘Turkmen president fires finance, education ministers over corruption allegations’, Associated 
Press Newswires, 23 April 2004. Reports surfaced early in 2004 that Turkmen teachers had not been paid for months 
(AKIPress, 19 April 2004). For details of teachers’ wage arrears in Uzbekistan see, for example, ‘New rights group 
seeks to protect teachers’ rights in Uzbekistan’, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 10 February 2004; ‘Teachers 
strike over wage arrears in eastern Uzbekistan’, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 9 December 2003; for 
Kyrgyzstan, see ‘Kyrgyz government to cover debt of teachers’ wage in October’, Kabar (Kyrgyzstan), 9 September 
2003; for Tajikistan, see ‘Tajikistan faces shortage of teachers due to low wages’, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 16
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August 2003; for Kazakstan, see ‘Kazakh president promises teachers’ congress more funding for education’, BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia, 5 December 1998; ‘Kazakh workers on hunger strike over unpaid wages’, Reuters News, 20 
January 1998. On corruption, see ‘Kyrgyz Ombudsman to focus on students’ rights in 2004’; Kabar, 9 January 2004; 
‘Turkmen president fires finance, education ministers over corruption allegations’, Associated Press Newswires, 23 
April 2004; Nazpary (2002); ICG (2003b).
8 For a discussion of this in Kyrgyzstan, see IRINNews (15 July 2004).
9 The problem in Tajikistan, and also to an extent Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is compounded by the mobilisation 
of many students to harvest cotton, drawing away from their studies for considerable periods of time (see, for 
example, Panfilova 2003b).
10 General Secondary Enrolment refers to ‘two- to four-year programmes o f academic study, often leading to higher 
education, with entry on a selective basis. In CIS countries, general secondary typically comprises the two or three 
upper classes of the comprehensive school' (TransMONEE database, n.d.)
11 For example, machine building and light industry—the industrial categories that use skilled labour most intensively— 
accounted for 11 and 20 per cent respectively of industrial production in Uzbekistan in 2001. The equivalent figures 
for the other republics were 1 and 10 per cent in Tajikistan (2001), 1 and 25 per cent Turkmenistan (1996), 5 and 2 
per cent for Kazakstan (1997), and 5 and 6 per cent for Kyrgyzstan (2001). See Goskomstat Rossii (2002).
12 Milanovic appears to be using US$4 PPP as the poverty line in this case. See also Marnie and Micklewright (1994), 
who analyse pre-reform poverty in Uzbekistan.
13 Note, however, that under-reporting is not a new phenomenon in the Central Asian republics. It was considerable in 
the Soviet period, particularly with regard to production on family or private farm plots, which was usually sold 
privately and hence did not appear in the Soviet statistics.
14 In the case of Tajikistan, this seems to be borne out by changes in the number and type of meals eaten by poor 
families. For example, World Bank (2000:32) reports of a survey in Tajikistan that '[o]ver half of all households had 
not eaten any meat in the 7 days prior to the survey, 61 percent had not eaten eggs...’.
15 See Micklewright and Ismail (2001) for a more specific study of wasting and stunting in Uzbekistan.
16 Inequality is briefly covered later in section 7.4.
17 For analysis of this in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively, see World Bank (1998, 1999a, 2000a).
A ppendix 7.1: mortality trends in C entral A sia
Figure A 7.1 Kazakstan: mortality by age group
(deaths per 100,000 of relevant population)
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Figure A7.2 Kyrgyzstan: mortality by age group
(deaths per 100,000 of relevant population)
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Figure A7.3 Tajikistan: mortality by age group
(deaths per 100,000 of relevant population)
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Figure A7.4 Turkmenistan: mortality by age group
(deaths per 100,000 of relevant population)
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Figure A7.5 Uzbekistan: mortality by age group
(deaths per 100,000 of relevant population)
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Source: TRANSMonee database.
8 CONCLUSION
The most important critical insight to be gained from a comparative analysis of the 
Central Asian republics’ post-Soviet economic performance is that the speed and 
approach of reform has had little role in determining results in either the 
macroeconomic or socioeconomic sectors. Reform’s most ardent advocates claimed that 
rapid reform was critical in curtailing the economic instability that beset the transition 
region in the post-Soviet period. They argued that the post-Soviet economies were 
severely distorted by Soviet economic structures and policies, that these distortions were 
generating economic instability, and as a result, the quickest way to fix the instability 
was to remove the distortions by implementing reform. Slow reform, they asserted, 
would only maintain those distortions or create new ones.
Throughout the transition period, they have sought evidence to support their 
assertions, relying on large cross-regional econometric studies to find correlations 
between rapid reform and economic stability. The question posed here is not whether 
reform is important. Clearly it is important—if these economies are to become market 
economies, and all the republics’ leaders have claimed this as a goal, then reform is 
unavoidable. Instead, the question is whether the choice of reform strategy has truly 
played a role in economic performance in the region. In Central Asia, as this thesis has 
demonstrated, it has not.
Comparing the Central Asian economies, we are forced to the conclusion that reform 
strategy has played little role in the economic results seen there. The Central Asian 
republics can be ranked according to the progress they have made towards 
implementing the ‘ideal’ reform package. Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan have been the 
leading reformers, rapidly liberalising prices, trade and exchange rates among other 
things. They have also implemented fast and far-reaching privatisation programs to 
divest the state of most economic assets. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, on the other 
hand, have been far slower to move along this path, retaining extensive controls on 
prices, restricting access to foreign exchange, and monopolising trade. They have, 
moreover, been far more cautious in privatising state enterprises. Tajikistan represents 
an intermediate case, where civil war prevented the implementation of an otherwise 
quite ambitious reform program. Institutions remain weak throughout the region, but 
again Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan represent the most advanced reformers and 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the least advanced.
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8.1 Reform and economic performance
8.1.1 Reform and macroeconomic performance
In terms of output, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan experienced the shallowest declines, 
followed by Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, and then Tajikistan, which was one of the worst 
performers in the transition region. Thus, the notion of a link between reform and robust 
GDP performance is immediately doubtful. We are compelled to look more deeply at 
what is driving the decline and recovery of GDP in the region’s economies.
Tajikistan suffered a civil war, an unfavourable initial structure, and a multitude of 
other problems associated with the withdrawal of subsidies from the Soviet Union and 
the collapse of trade routes. Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan suffered roughly 
equal output declines in the transition period, but for different reasons. In Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the Soviet industrial structure collapsed and was slowly replaced by a 
different structure. This replacement took time: until the opening of the Kumtor gold 
mine in 1997 in Kyrgyzstan, and until the development of the hydrocarbons sector in 
Kazakstan. These republics had external opportunities to replace those lost in the Soviet 
collapse, but had to overcome initial constraints through investment of time and money 
through the 1990s. Turkmenistan suffered a different problem. It had a fully developed 
industry, whose products could readily be sold on world markets, but was constrained 
by transport networks that extended through competitors’ territory and by the 
unwillingness or inability of major trading partners to pay a reasonable price or 
sometimes even to pay at all.
Uzbekistan represented a case of pure opportunity. Uzbekistan’s major export 
product in the Soviet era was cotton; and its major export in the post-Soviet period 
remained cotton. Unlike the other Central Asian republics, it could sell this cotton as 
well as gold on open markets for hard currency, avoiding the non-payments or dubious 
barter deals that characterised CIS trade during this period and avoiding the collapse in 
industrial demand that occurred throughout the former Soviet Union.
There is arguably more evidence in favour of reform progress influencing price 
stability. After all, Kyrgyzstan, a rapid reformer, was the first republic in the region to 
control hyperinflation; Turkmenistan, a slow reformer, the last. Kyrgyzstan’s fine 
performance, however, is clouded by the fact that it was achieved through an influx of 
aid loans and grants from international donors, which allowed the republic to maintain 
very high budget deficits without having to print money to finance them. It is this 
difference from the other republics, not the actual process of reform, that explains its 
reasonable inflation performance. The trade-off for price stability in Kyrgyzstan, 
however, has been the accumulation of a massive stock of external debt, which almost 
generated a fiscal and economic crisis when repayments began to fall due over 2001-04. 
Thankfully, the crisis was averted by a debt rescheduling in 2002, but the fact that there 
was a crisis underscores the problem with the Kyrgyz strategy: it has generated short­
term domestic price stability at the risk of much longer-term external instability.
In all the Central Asian republics except Kyrgyzstan, control of inflation corresponds 
closely with control of fiscal deficits, but controlling fiscal deficits is not necessarily a
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consequence of reform. The only way to control fiscal deficits is to reduce spending 
and/or increase revenues. Again, reforms of the kind advocated by economists at the 
beginning of the transition process were neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve this. 
Instead, what was needed was government commitment to reduce deficits, something 
which both reformist and non-reformist governments could achieve given sufficient 
political will and good luck.
8.1.2 Reform and socioeconomic performance
Socioeconomic developments differed in each republic, but it is clear that the choice of 
reform strategy has not played a role in containing many aspects of socioeconomic 
deterioration. The Uzbek and Turkmen governments apparently chose a slow reform 
strategy to isolate their people from the dislocation caused by rapid reform. While 
spending on, and provision of, social services in these countries seems to have remained 
stronger than in the faster reformers, this has not delivered better results in terms of 
improved indicators of mortality, morbidity, school enrolments, poverty or inequality.
This is important because the presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan explain 
their policies—minimal democratisation and extremely gradual economic reform—by 
the need to avoid social upheaval. Is this defensible given that these policies do not 
seem to succeed in this aim? If these policies do not prevent the deepening of poverty 
and inequality, do not extend healthy lives, or restrain declines in provision of social 
services such as education or health, what is their purpose?
8.2 P olitical reform
The second key insight into the Central Asian post-Soviet experience is that 
democratisation is not necessarily a component of transition. None of the Central Asian 
republics are genuinely democratising, or even becoming freer. Freedom of expression 
is everywhere repressed, and freedom to participate in political life is heavily 
circumscribed. That said, however, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan are freer than Tajikistan, 
which in turn is freer than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The overall lack of political 
reform is, however, problematic. Political reform is important because it can generate 
mechanisms for accountability, it can invoke constituencies for further reform, and it 
promotes the development of functioning institutions. At the same time, economic 
growth and its specific sources in Central Asia may be generating forces that counter 
further reform.
8.2.1 The importance of political reform in transition
Further political reform could have played an important role in two areas: generating 
better socio-economic outcomes and promoting institutional reform. Crucial here is the 
role of democracy as a mechanism for delivering information to policymakers and 
making politicians and bureaucrats more accountable. The authoritarianism currently 
seen in Central Asia, in which critical opposition and media voices are repressed and 
politicians are never genuinely held to account in elections, effectively insulates the 
regimes from dissatisfaction among the populace. Information regarding matters such as 
the poor condition of public services or public discontent with poverty or inequality
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might never be communicated to the regime head if the press and the bureaucracy are 
too servile and there is no opposition to press the issue. At the same time, if the regime 
never genuinely has to face electors’ censure over poor performance, what incentive 
does it have to improve the situation? Obviously, democratic systems are not perfect in 
this regard, and democracy is probably not the only way of generating feedback between 
policy and performance, but true freedom of expression and true political competition 
are simple ways of potentially increasing accountability and feedback. Where 
politicians’ grasp on power is dependent on building a wide constituency in their 
support, they are far more likely to be concerned about how well basic social services, 
such as schools and hospitals, are functioning, and how effective and reliable 
institutions like legal systems and regulatory institutions are.
In this regard, greater political reform might have generated better socio-economic 
outcomes in Central Asia. Of course, some deterioration was unavoidable as economic 
collapse drove reductions in spending in the social sphere. But more audible public 
demands for effective services in the social sphere might have generated better use of 
the resources that remained in the sector. This would appear particularly salient in 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which ostensibly maintained far higher spending in the 
social services than the other republics but do not seem to have achieved better results 
as a consequence.
Similarly, political and economic institutions in the region remain underdeveloped in 
the first place because the lack of accountability shields the regimes, and the institutions 
themselves, from constituencies that would demand proper institutional functioning. At 
the same time, however, institutional reform is probably incompatible with the interests 
and priorities of the current regimes. Openness and accountability contribute to reducing 
the scope for abuses of power and concentration of wealth in the hands of the political 
elite. As a consequence, judicial, bureaucratic and regulatory agencies remain poorly 
developed because it serves the regime’s needs to have them so. Particularly important 
in this regard is the disciplining mechanism of regular regime change and the ability of 
opposition groups and the media to raise issues uncomfortable to the government.
8.2.2 The impact of economic growth on reform
Renewed growth may have an impact on the progress of reform in the Central Asian 
republics. The reform programs were initiated as a response to long-term economic 
decline in the Soviet Union, and accelerated as a response to further deterioration in the 
independent republics. Even though reform has been only partial in most of the 
republics, particularly in terms of institutional reform, growth has renewed. This, as we 
saw above, occurred because reform was essentially unrelated to macroeconomic 
stability in the Central Asian republics. Now that growth has revived and price stability 
has basically been achieved in the Central Asian republics, it would not be surprising to 
find the sense of urgency for reform petering out. This is essentially what occurred in 
Kyrgyzstan, where the impulse for reform vanished at approximately the same time that 
the economic collapse bottomed out.
This is compounded, however, by the type of economic growth we are now seeing in 
Central Asia, based predominantly on the extraction and export or natural resources.
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Complex, diversified economies are more likely to require well-functioning and highly 
developed institutions than are economies based predominantly on natural resource 
industries. This is because more complex forms of economic activity require more 
extensive linkages between economic actors—firms, individuals, and so forth—as well 
as between economic actors and regulatory and bureaucratic agencies. Thus, in a more 
diverse, complex economy, there is more likely to be a powerful constituency pushing 
for reliable and effective economic and legal institutions to provide the infrastructure for 
economic interactions and enforce transactions. Because resource exploitation now 
forms the lead sector in all the Central Asian republics, there is simply no constituency 
in any of them powerful enough to make it worthwhile for politicians to initiate 
institutional reform. When economic growth is dominated by industries that are not 
bothered by flawed institutions, and the most powerful political constituencies are 
bound to these industries, what incentive is there for politicians to introduce reform? 
Again, this process seems most pronounced in Kyrgyzstan, where the notion of 
becoming the ‘Switzerland of Central Asia’ has disappeared as gold wealth has 
temporarily eased the country’s economic difficulties.
This indicates, however, that the push for ongoing regime-led economic and political 
reform is not likely to come from domestic constituencies: those in favour of further 
reform are silenced by the repressive organs of the state, and those who have the ear of 
the leaderships have no interest in further reform. As a consequence further reform will 
be initiated only insofar as it satisfies the incumbent regime and/or appeases foreign 
donors, both unilateral and multilateral. The problem here, of course, is that with no 
powerful and audible domestic constituency for reform, the reforms adopted tend to 
wither in practice, fulfilling a formal obligation but delivering limited actual benefit.
This kind of reform, as Chapter 5 noted, has characterised much of the political scene in 
Central Asia since independence, but can also reach into the economic sphere.
8.3 A re people better off?
The third key insight here relates to the human impact of the reform process and derives 
from the question: are people better off after over a decade of transition in Central Asia? 
Behind the aggregate macroeconomic statistics lies something more important: people. 
The transition period was one of hardship, stress and dislocation for ordinary people. 
Between 1992 and 1997, myriad industries collapsed, jobs and incomes were lost, and 
schools and hospitals closed. In Tajikistan, the period has seen lives interrupted and 
ended as ordinary people suffered and fled the violence. The macroeconomic statistics 
can only hint at the aspirations and talents crushed for lack of opportunity, at healthy 
lives cut short, and skills never used. The alarming increase in adult mortality in 
Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan mid-transition points to a terrible, unseen tragedy, something 
that goes beyond academic economics.
Are the people of Central Asian better off now than in the Soviet Union? The 
purpose of the transition reforms, after all, was to improve people’s lives by increasing 
overall wealth and well-being. Unfortunately, the answer in Central Asia is not entirely 
clear. Economically, the picture is mixed: most of the Central Asian economies are
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smaller than they were before 1990—only Uzbekistan has regained its 1989 GDP level. 
On the other hand, there are no widespread shortages of the kind seen at the end of the 
Soviet period. At the same time, wealth has become more concentrated, and poverty 
seems to be getting worse. Worsening statistics for calorie intake, and wasting and 
stunting in children, imply that these economies may merely have shifted from rationing 
by queuing to rationing by income. Less wealth less evenly distributed is hardly an 
improvement.
Politically, not much has changed. Central Asia’s citizens are not much better off, 
and in some cases are worse off than under the Soviet regime. In Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, opponents of the incumbent regime can expect to have a rough time, with 
punitive tax inspections, bureaucratic mendacity, official and unofficial violence, and 
imprisonment for dubious reasons the favoured government strategies. There is little 
scope for activities and voices that endanger the interests of the elite. In Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan weak totalitarianism has been replaced with a brutal form of sultanism, 
and opponents of the regime can expect to suffer violence, imprisonment, torture and 
death. There is virtually no scope for critical voices in these countries.
So, on balance, compared to a decade ago, the people of Central Asia face a situation 
in which they are politically no freer, where their economic opportunities are no greater, 
where social services are more expensive and of poorer quality, where the chances of 
living in poverty are higher, and the inequities between the rich and the poor are greater.
Other questions prompt themselves here: will the Central Asian republics perform 
better in the future? Will the republics find ways of harnessing the dreams and talents of 
its people, allowing them to develop and using them thoughtfully? Again, the answer is 
not clear. Certainly, the republics do not lack obvious sources of wealth, or the desire 
for it to happen. But so much depends on those in power—will they squander the 
region’s wealth? Will the region’s elites resist the temptation to enrich themselves at the 
majority’s expense? Will the spoils of the region’s resources be enjoyed by the majority 
or by few?
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